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Progress and Tradition
András Koltay*¤, Miklós Könczöl**¤, András Lapsánszky***¤, Ákos Tussay****¤
* University of Public Service, e-mail: koltay .andras@uni-nke .hu
** Centre for Social Sciences, e-mail: konczol .miklos@tk .hu
***  University of Győr, e-mail: lapsanszky .andras@sze .hu
**** University of Public Service, e-mail: tussay .akos@uni-nke .hu
The journal, Public Governance, Administration and Finances Law Review (PGAF LR) 
was launched in  2016 as a Central and Eastern European based law journal which was 
committed to facilitating an interdisciplinary forum of public law within the so-called 
Visegrád countries . Over the past six years, the journal’s Editorial Team was constantly 
facing with a somewhat thorny issue, namely a theoretical discussion of CEE problems 
might, in many cases, not be confined within the journal’s original and initial aims and 
scope . As a  result of this, the Editorial Team was forced to refuse otherwise relevant 
pieces of scholarship, or to accept papers that strictly-speaking did not fall within the 
journal’s scope .
In  2020, after publishing five volumes with a total number of ten issues, the Editorial 
Board decided to put an end to the above-mentioned practice and transform PGAF LR 
into a law journal with global coverage that accepts articles on all facets of public adminis-
tration, public policy and public management within the region and with other parts of 
the world as well . As part of this transformation, the Editorial Board was partly renewed 
and several new members outside of the CEE area were invited to join . This process also 
brought along some changes within the Editorial Team itself . The work, which was initi-
ated by PGAF LR’s two past editors, Gábor Hulkó and Tamás Kaiser, is now shared, under 
the watchful eye of founder Editor-in-Chief, András Lapsánszky, among three new 
editors: András Koltay, who is also the Rector of the University of Public Service, Miklós 
Könczöl, who is currently editor of two other prestigious Hungarian journals and Ákos 
Tussay, former secretary of the previous Editorial Team .
However, this transformation signals neither the end of a progress, nor a break with 
past traditions; rather, the Editorial Team wishes to uphold all the values, academic 
commitments and good practices that characterised the journal’s past six years of opera-
tion . As a  manifest sign of this expectation, the Editorial Team has decided to even 
continue with the former editors’ last initiative, namely, as a  follow up to the Pandemic 
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and Governance conference, organised in November  2020, the editors convened a second 
conference, Post-Pandemic Politics: Perspectives and Possibilities, in June  2021 . Encouraged 
by the conference’s success, the Editorial Team invited the conference’s speakers to submit 
their manuscripts to be published in the journal’s pending issue .
Thus, the first issue of our  2021 volume is partly a conference proceeding and partly 
an ordinary issue . The list of its articles is opened by the conference’s keynote speaker’s, 
Raphael Cohen-Almagor’s, paper who considers Israel’s response to the challenges raised 
by the Covid-19 pandemic with a specific focus on the invoked public policies and the 
related political, economic and legal concerns . After outlining the keys for the initial 
Israeli success, namely, the government’s swift and effective reaction to the pandemic, 
the close cooperation and coordination between the organisations that were mobilised 
to counter the pandemic, and the effective implementation of governmental policies, 
the Author indulges into a  fuller consideration of the mistakes and the moral of the 
vaccination campaign too .
The second paper is Bence Gát’s Coronavirus Test of the European Union’s Policy on 
the Rule of Law. In this article, the Author gives a  general overview of the European 
Union’s approach towards the idea of the rule of law just to set out that an extraordinary 
situation, such as the current pandemic, reveals that the EU institutions cannot provide 
sufficient guarantees for any objective examination of the issue .
Next, István Hoffman and István Balázs’s article describes the impact of 
Covid-19  on the Hungarian body of administrative law . They argue that several new 
rules have been incorporated into the Hungarian legal system and that the ‘legislative 
background’ of the pandemic offered an opportunity to the central government to pass 
significant, yet rather controversial reforms .
The fourth study is Mina Hosseini’s article which raises legal and ethical concerns 
regarding those dilemmas that hinge around the production and distribution of 
Covid-19  vaccines . As a  possible solution the Author proposes the need to emphasise 
the vital significance of public rights as opposed to focusing exclusively on individual 
rights, such as those intellectual property rights that hinder the world-wide manufac-
turing of Covid-19 vaccines .
In the fifth article, András Karácsony and Szabolcs Nagypál investigate how and by 
what constitutional mandate the Hungarian Government deviated from the normal 
constitutional situation in  2020 . Based on Carl Schmitt’s and Giorgio Agamben’s idea 
of the ‘state of exception’, they argue that the Hungarian situation in  2020 did not fall 
within this category; rather, it shall be described as an extraordinary situation .
Finally, the last article of the conference’s proceedings is a study from Oana Şerban 
in which the Author proposes that the models of good governance in the post-pandemic 
world must be shaped by leftist principles, in order to ensure not the reopening, but the 
reconstruction of public life .
Next to these six conference papers, the present issue publishes two research articles 
as well . The first article is authored by Tibor Buskó and it provides an all-encompassing 
overview of the lower-middle level of public administration in Hungary, while Csaba 
Lentner’s study endeavours to outline the development of Hungary’s monetary policy 
from the late  1980s to the present .
©  2021 Ludovika University Press, Budapest 
Public Governance, Administration and Finances Law Review Vol.  6. No.  1. (2021) • 7–17 .
Conference Proceedings
DOI: 10 .53116/pgaflr .2021 .1 .2
Israel Facing Covid-191
Raphael Cohen-Almagor* ¤
* University of Hull, Chair in Politics and Director of the Middle East Study Group (MESG), 
e-mail: R .Cohen-Almagor@hull .ac .uk
Abstract: This paper considers Israel’s response to the challenges raised by the Covid-19 pandemic 
with a specific focus on the invoked public policies and the related political, economic and legal 
concerns . I first provide some background information . Then, I outline the keys for the initial 
success in confronting the coronavirus pandemic . Three factors contributed to the initial Israeli 
success, namely: the government’s swift and effective reaction to the pandemic; the close 
cooperation and coordination between the organisations that were mobilised to counter the 
pandemic, and the effective implementation of governmental policies . However, mistakes were 
made during the second wave of the pandemic .
Keywords: Covid-19, health, Israel, pandemic, public cooperation, resourcefulness, vaccination
1. Introduction
Israel is a  country of  9 .3  million people and a  relatively small territory of 
 20,072  km2  (Israel Central Bureau of Statistics,  2021) . It is a  Western democracy; life 
expectancy is, on average,  82 years which is quite similar to those of the Western coun-
tries (Cohen,  2019) . Its demography is important to consider when we come to analyse 
the effects of Covid-19 on society .  79% of the population is Jewish . Of them,  14% are 
ultraorthodox Haredi (Israel Central Bureau of Statistics,  2018) .  21% of the population 
is Arab–Palestinian (Times of Israel,  2019) .
This paper considers Israel’s response to the challenges raised by the 
Covid-19 pandemic with a specific focus on the invoked public policies and the related 
political, economic and legal concerns . The paper outlines the keys for the initial success 
1 This paper is based on the key lecture “Israel Facing COVID-19: Challenges, Problems and Successes”, Pandemic 
and Governance: Towards an Approximation of  Covid-19’s Legal, Administrative, Fiscal and Political Dilemmas, The Eötvös 
József  Research Centre of  the University of  Public Service, Budapest (30 June  2021). It was further developed for 
the Annual Conference of  the European Consortium for Political Research (ECPR) (30 August –  3 September 
 2021). The author expresses gratitude to Gary Edles, Yuval Rotem, Yoav Tenembaum, Aharon Mor, Eugenie de 
Saint-Phalle, Avi Ohry and Ehud Toledano for their constructive comments.
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in confronting the pandemic . Three factors contributed to the initial Israeli success, 
namely: the government’s swift and effective reaction to the pandemic, the close coop-
eration and coordination between the relevant bodies and organisations that were 
mobilised to counter the pandemic, and the effective implementation of the invoked 
governmental policies, especially the rapid vaccination of the adult population . 
However, mistakes were made during the second wave of the pandemic . I explain them 
in some detail .
2. First wave: some initial success
The novel coronavirus, known as Covid-19, is part of a  family of viruses that includes 
the common cold and respiratory illnesses such as Sars . It affects the lungs and airways . 
For many people it causes mild symptoms, while for others it can be far more serious 
and can cause death . The disease is very infectious and spreads very easily . It spreads pri-
marily through droplets of saliva or discharge from the nose when an infected person 
coughs or sneezes . The average incubation period – the time between coming into con-
tact with the virus and experiencing symptoms  –  is  5  days, but it could be anything 
between  1 and  14 days (Age UK,  2021) .2
The world first learned about Covid-19 in December  2019 . A close scrutiny of the 
reports shows that between late December  2019  until June  2020, approximately 
 18,000 people were infected with the coronavirus in Israel and  295 of them died due to 
a  medical condition directly related to the infection . One may conclude that Israel’s 
handling of the pandemic at the initial stages was quite successful for the figures clearly 
indicate a tight control over the pandemic . Three factors contributed to this success:
First, the Israeli Government was quick to respond to Covid-19 .  This aptitude is 
immensely important as pandemics spread quickly by human interactions . The first case 
of Covid-19 in Israel was recorded on  21 February  2020 (Miller,  2020) . This patient was 
an Israeli citizen who came from the Diamond Princess cruise ship and by the time of 
his return to Israel, it was clear that he was carrying the infection . Israel immediately 
barred travellers from certain countries from entering Israel, and quarantined Israelis 
arriving from those countries . Thus, the following day,  22 February  2020, two hundred 
Israeli students were quarantined after being exposed to a group of South Korean tour-
ists (Miller,  2020) .
On  9 March  2020, a mandatory two-week quarantine was announced for all people 
who visit Israel from abroad because it was believed that within two weeks it is possible 
to discern if people are infected or not . On  12  March  2020, the Israeli Government 
ordered a  closure of all schools and universities (Miller,  2020) . On  16  March  2020, 
thousands of public sector employees were told to either work from home or were 
placed on paid leave in order to minimise human interactions . Then, on  19 March  2020, 
Prime Minister Netanyahu declared a national state of emergency that enabled him to 
wield special powers in dealing with the pandemic . The first Israeli fatality, the  88 years 
2 For a general overview, see Bonotti & Zech (2021).
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old Arie Even, was recorded on  23  March  2020 .  Even was a  Holocaust survivor and 
reports of his death carrying all the implications that come to the news and to the hearts 
of people in Israel when they hear the word “Holocaust” . Subsequently, on the very next 
day,  24 March  2020, Prime Minister Netanyahu announced a new way of life for Israelis, 
shutting down restaurants, malls, museums and all the places of social interaction . At 
that time, the very controversial digital tracking measure was also introduced .
The second element of success has to do with effective coordination . Since its foun-
dation in  1948, Israel had to prepare itself for the possible scenario of security crisis, or 
any other kind of disaster that may come upon the country . The wars that the country 
endured (1948,  1956,  1967,  1973,  1982–2000,  2006) pushed leaders to develop the 
necessary expertise to manage emergency situations . The establishment has also estab-
lished strong partnerships and exchanges of knowledge between the Israeli Defence 
Forces, the private sector and the public sector . In the face of the pandemic, the govern-
ment, the Israeli Defence Forces, the internal security force (SHABAC), the Mossad, 
the health sector, and the private companies were mobilised to tackle the virus . This all-
encompassing and tight cooperation, as well as the thoughtfulness of the Israeli 
population is well exemplified by the quick adjustment of the Israel Aerospace Industries . 
Normally, these industries produce private jets for the high-flying one percent of the 
world population; but early on during the pandemic, these industries started manufac-
turing ventilators, thinking that many people might be in dire need of these life-saving 
machines . This example attests not only to the coordination and the resourcefulness of 
the Israeli people but also to their ability to take people with knowledge in one sphere 
and move them to another sphere by giving them the instruction and immediately 
transform a factory to support a nation in need .
Thirdly, the implementation of the policy was thorough . The Israeli policies were 
carried out via close cooperation between the ministries, health services, the police corps 
and the Israeli Defence Forces . Soldiers were mobilised early on to support the national 
endeavour against Covid-19 .  Many people ensured that orders were obeyed . 
Furthermore, private companies were hired to do the vaccination so that nurses could 
continue doing their routine work . Efforts were made to ensure that the rapid vaccina-
tion campaign did not hinder the regular operation of the health sector .
Finally, Israel introduced a traffic light system to tag the level of infections . Cities 
and towns were characterised by colours in accordance with the number of infections in 
the vicinity . Green was the less severe; orange indicated that the number of infections 
was significant, while red indicated a high number of infections . Red towns and cities 
were closed so that no one could enter, or exit the city under quarantine . This prudent 
measure enabled the continuation of operations in the green zones and avoided a situa-
tion where the entire country would be put in a complete shutdown situation . At the 
same time, it should be noted that the system was not immune to flaws . Prime Minister 
Netanyahu acted at times in accordance with partisan political interests and not in 
accordance to what was required of him to do . This was especially noticeable regarding 
ultraorthodox cities, such as Bnei Brak, that were not always classified as red, and their 
lockdown was not maintained as it was warranted .
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3. Second wave: the mistakes
Despite the initial success, in the second phase of the pandemic, the Israeli crisis man-
agement has failed quite miserably . From  8  June until the end of October  2020  there 
were more than  300,000 infections and  2,537 people died as a result of Covid-19 (Israel 
Central Bureau of Statistics,  2020) . These figures indicated that something went wrong 
in the Israeli pandemic management . Israel became the world record holder in the num-
ber of Covid-19 carriers in relation to population size . The number of Covid-19 verified 
carriers per  1 million people was more than  245, the highest in the world . During that 
period, there was a sharp jump of  2,236% (Pilot,  2020; see also Drukman,  2020) . What 
were the reasons for such an increase?
By the end of May  2020, Israel had witnessed a strong economic pressure stemming 
especially from owners of small businesses who were struggling to provide for their 
families . As a result of increased public pressure, Israel opened up too early . The govern-
ment also allowed large gatherings and the entering of international flights into Israeli 
territory . Consequently, a  large number of tourists arrived, some of them carried the 
virus . And the large gatherings where social distancing was not kept triggered the rapid 
spread of the virus .
The decision to return to normal pre-Covid life had direct economic rationale . It 
was also influenced by narrow political considerations . The government at that time was 
comprised of several parties, including ultrareligious haredi parties . The ultraorthodox 
population takes direct orders from their rabbis . They are less amenable to listening to 
the government . Many of the leading rabbis opposed the government policies and 
ordered their followers to continue with their normal way of life . They refused to abide 
by the instructions to wear masks, keep social distancing and avoid crowded places . The 
haredi men continued to attend their places of study, and they continued to have large 
wedding celebrations and funerals (Shraki,  2020) . They ignored the traffic light system 
and travelled between cities and towns . As a result, they transmitted the coronavirus all 
around the country .3 Due to partisan political reasons, the government failed to imple-
ment its own policies .
Furthermore, the other minority group, the Israeli Palestinians, also did not abide 
by the government instructions . Just like the haredi population, the Israeli Palestinians 
also held large gatherings, weddings and funerals (Harel,  2020) . Those transgressions 
also contributed to the rapid increase in the number of infections .
4. The vaccination campaign
The vaccination campaign in Israel was very successful . By now it has become a truism 
that vaccination is the key in fighting Covid-19 .  If a country vaccinates its population 
3 In comments on a draft of  this paper, Yoav Tenembaum noted that there was a clear difference between the Ashkenazi 
(of  European origins) population, which, on the whole, tended to behave irresponsibly, and the Oriental (of  Asian–
African origins) Haredi population, which, on the whole, heeded the instructions of  the Ministry of  Health.
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than it has better chances to tackle the virus and get back to the life we knew before the 
outbreak of the global pandemic . In Israel, the vaccination campaign was launched very 
early, on  19 December  2020 . The previous month the government signed an agreement 
with Pfizer (PressNewsAgency,  2020) . Israel paid an advance sum of money and agreed 
to supply Pfizer with data regarding the effects of vaccination on the Israeli population . 
The exact details of the agreement between Pfizer and the Israeli Government were 
never disclosed . Prime Minister Netanyahu disclosed that he reached the deal with 
Pfizer’s chief executive to speed up vaccine deliveries to Israel, saying: ‘Israel will be 
a global model state… Israel will share with Pfizer and with the entire world the statisti-
cal data that will help develop strategies for defeating the coronavirus’ (Ben Zion,  2021) .
In terms of territory, Israel is a  relatively small country . Its population is less than 
 10  million people . It is world-renowned for its high-tech innovations and advanced 
information technologies that facilitate effective prioritisation, allocation and documen-
tation of vaccines for eligible individuals . Israeli health providers are efficient . Its medical 
know-how is very advanced . I mentioned the effective cooperation between govern-
ment, private and public stakeholders and its experience in carrying out rapid large-scale 
emergency responses . Israel has a  highly developed public health system and very effi-
cient health providers that have computerised records of all their members’ medical files . 
These databases also allowed for the effective monitoring of the effect of vaccines . Thus, 
it is not difficult for Israel to manage an effective vaccination campaign . These factors 
made Israel an attractive partner for Pfizer that has an obvious interest in attaining accu-
rate information on the country’s implementation of the vaccine . One may assume that 
the agreement was designed to measure and analyse the epidemiological data arising 
from the product roll-out to generate and evaluate epidemiological and populational 
level vaccine data, and to determine whether herd immunity can be achieved .
Israel has rolled out the largest per capita vaccination campaign worldwide . Within 
four months, it delivered more than  10 million doses of vaccine . By  19 April  2021,  54% 
of the entire population, and  88% of people aged  50  years or older, had received two 
doses (Leshem et al .,  2021) . By  11  August  2021,  5,827,742  people received the first 
dose, and  5,406,232 received first and second doses (Ministry of Health,  2021a) . Figure 
 1 below shows the importance of full vaccination, especially when the older population 
is concerned .
In August  2021, the Ministry of Health recorded  85 .6  severe  Covid-19  cases per 
 100,000  people among the unvaccinated over the age of  60, compared to  16 .3  per 
 100,000  people among those who are fully vaccinated . This makes the unvaccinated 
elderly more than five times as likely to experience a severe infection compared to immu-
nised people . While the risk of experiencing severe symptoms increases with age for all 
people, it rises much more dramatically among those who are unvaccinated (Sokol, 
 2021) . Earlier during the pandemic crisis, it was thought that there was no  need to 
vaccinate people under the age of  20 . That reasoning has changed . In February  2021, the 
government decided to expand vaccination to people of the age of  16 and above (Times 
of Israel,  2021) .
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On  12 August  2021, the Health Ministry (2021a) advised that  6,593 people died 
as a result of the pandemic, and there were  42,203 people who were infected with the 
virus .  748 of them were hospitalised,  87 in critical condition .
Severe cases, ages 60+
Pere 100k people






















































Figure  1 .
Severity of infection in  60+ people compared to other age groups
Source: Sokol,  2021 .
Since May  2021, the Israeli market has returned to full activity including shops, 
restaurants, theatres, sports and musical events . Because Israel relies heavily on tourism, 
in late May  2021 the government decided to open Israel to tourists, acknowledging the 
risks that are involved in taking this decision . From an epidemiological perspective, 
tourism is amongst the most difficult challenges .
5. Conclusion
With all of its flaws Israel is still a  success story . The table below (Table  1) shows the 
long list of countries that performed worse than Israel in tackling Covid-19 .  In Israel, 
one does not see millions of people infected and hundreds of thousands dead as a result 
of the pandemic . In  2021, Israel was able, largely speaking, to return to almost a normal 
way of life . There are fears of another wave of infection . Critics hold that the previous 
Netanyahu Government made a mistake in lifting all restrictions and the current Bennet 
13
Public Governance, Administration and Finances Law Review • 1. 2021
Israel Facing Covid-19
Government is mistaken for failing to institute tough restrictions right from the begin-
ning of the current wave . Further criticism is levelled against the government for 
permitting people to gather in the synagogues, especially during the High holidays of 
Rosh Hashana (New Year), Yom Kippur and Sukkot, all take place in September . A mil-
lion people have not been vaccinated at all yet (Corona virus,  2021) . According to the 
Ministry of Health,  97% of those aged  60 and over in the general society are vaccinated, 
compared with  81% in Arab society and  80% in ultraorthodox (Drukman,  2021) . On 
 13 August  2021,  5 .83 million people were vaccinated in one or two jabs, which is  79 .7% 
of the group that can be vaccinated (aged  12  and over) . In the Arab population, only 
about  884,000  people were fully or partially vaccinated and they constitute  59 .1% of 
the total group eligible for the vaccine (Globs,  2021) . There is an increased pressure on 
the unvaccinated to get the jabs as the majority tries to protect itself against the refusing 
minority . Some urge for another closure while others, especially the business sector, 
press to prevent further closure .
Still, the successful vaccination campaign provides a robust shield of defence . The 
key to the Israeli success was rapid and full vaccination of the adult population . 
Vaccination according to age appeared to be a good policy . Resourcefulness of the Israeli 
people and their cooperation and attentiveness are also crucial . Resourcefulness mani-
fested itself when nurses took the initiative and invited people from the street for 
immediate vaccination without an appointment in order to avoid destroying unused 
vaccines . This option seemed preferable to dumping the unused vaccines . Similarly, 
cooperation and attentiveness are crucial . In August  2021, Minister for Regional 
Cooperation Issawi Frej of the Meretz Party expressed sharp criticism of Israeli 
Palestinians who were traveling abroad, especially to Greece and Turkey, with fake vacci-
nation or immunity documents . Frej said: ‘Arabs are flying in huge numbers to Turkey 
and Greece and showing an utter lack of responsibility in doing so… They also present 
faked documentation in order to return to Israel’ [and dodge quarantine requirements] 
(Arutz Sheva,  2021) . Frej, who is himself an Israeli Arab, called for an in-depth study of 
those concerns .
Providing people with the third jab proved to be effective . It protects, especially the 
more elderly people, against the harms of the Delta variant of the coronavirus that was 
spreading in the country and in the world at large . With time, there is a decrease in the 
level of vaccine effectiveness among some adults . Therefore, the government decided to 
vaccinate with this booster all people aged  12 and above (Ministry of Health,  2021b; 
Cohen,  2021) . By late August  2021, almost  1 .5  million people received the third jab 
(MivzakLive,  2021) .
Resourcefulness, quick decisions and public cooperation are essential . They are 
decisive factors that distinguish between success and failure when fighting against the 
spread of the pandemic .
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Table  1 .
Cases and mortality by country
Country Confirmed Deaths Case fatality Deaths/100k pop.
Peru 2,127,034 197,102 9 .3% 606 .27
Hungary 810,046 30,037 3 .7% 307 .44
Bosnia and Herzegovina 206,476 9,694 4 .7% 293 .67
The Czech Republic 1,675,179 30,369 1 .8% 284 .63
Brazil 20,212,642 564,773 2 .8% 267 .60
San Marino 5,194 90 1 .7% 265 .80
North Macedonia 158,681 5,513 3 .5% 264 .61
Montenegro 104,264 1,637 1 .6% 263 .13
Bulgaria 429,628 18,288 4 .3% 262 .16
Colombia 4,846,955 122,768 2 .5% 243 .88
Argentina 5,041,487 108,165 2 .1% 240 .69
Moldova 261,000 6,291 2 .4% 236 .71
Slovakia 393,160 12,543 3 .2% 229 .97
Belgium 1,143,127 25,279 2 .2% 220 .12
Paraguay 455,680 15,341 3 .4% 217 .77
Italy 4,406,241 128,273 2 .9% 212 .73
Slovenia 260,372 4,433 1 .7% 212 .31
Croatia 365,335 8,275 2 .3% 203 .44
Poland 2,884,361 75,285 2 .6% 198 .27
The United Kingdom 6,146,642 130,813 2 .1% 195 .73
Mexico 2,997,885 245,476 8 .2% 192 .42
Chile 1,624,823 36,138 2 .2% 190 .68
The United States 36,055,002 618,137 1 .7% 188 .32
Ecuador 491,831 31,788 6 .5% 182 .97
Tunisia 613,628 21,089 3 .4% 180 .33
Romania 1,085,412 34,323 3 .2% 177 .32
Spain 4,643,450 82,227 1 .8% 174 .67
Uruguay 382,721 5,990 1 .6% 173 .03
Portugal 990,293 17,502 1 .8% 170 .43
France 6,407,288 112,575 1 .8% 167 .87
Andorra 14,873 129 0 .9% 167 .22
Georgia 455,846 6,182 1 .4% 166 .17
Panama 443,718 6,918 1 .6% 162 .91
Lithuania 286,943 4,433 1 .5% 159 .07
Armenia 232,610 4,658 2 .0% 157 .49
Bolivia 478,671 18,004 3 .8% 156 .38
Liechtenstein 3,107 59 1 .9% 155 .19
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Country Confirmed Deaths Case fatality Deaths/100k pop.
Sweden 1,106,821 14,658 1 .3% 142 .51
Latvia 139,587 2,561 1 .8% 133 .89
Luxembourg 74,437 825 1 .1% 133 .09
Namibia 121,507 3,204 2 .6% 128 .44
South Africa 2,546,762 75,201 3 .0% 128 .42
Switzerland 729,024 10,915 1 .5% 127 .29
Kosovo 110,756 2,273 2 .1% 126 .68
Ukraine 2,346,560 55,937 2 .4% 126 .03
Greece 521,399 13,087 2 .5% 122 .12
Austria 664,133 10,751 1 .6% 121 .11
Lebanon 573,959 7,952 1 .4% 115 .99
Suriname 26,103 669 2 .6% 115 .07
Iran 4,238,676 95,111 2 .2% 114 .71
Russia 6,404,960 163,629 2 .6% 113 .34
Germany 3,803,351 91,824 2 .4% 110 .45
The Netherlands 1,921,568 18,175 0 .9% 104 .86
Serbia 727,246 7,146 1 .0% 102 .89
Costa Rica 422,344 5,169 1 .2% 102 .41
Ireland 315,385 5,044 1 .6% 102 .08
Jordan 779,019 10,148 1 .3% 100 .46
Seychelles 18,714 98 0 .5% 100 .38
Estonia 135,512 1,277 0 .9% 96 .26
Belize 14,578 341 2 .3% 87 .36
Albania 134,201 2,460 1 .8% 86 .19
Malta 34,953 428 1 .2% 85 .15
Monaco 3,021 33 1 .1% 84 .69
Bahrain 270,290 1,384 0 .5% 84 .33
Honduras 309,029 8,202 2 .7% 84 .16
Trinidad and Tobago 40,574 1,144 2 .8% 82 .01
Botswana 130,771 1,832 1 .4% 79 .52
Oman 298,942 3,948 1 .3% 79 .36
Bahamas 15,915 308 1 .9% 79 .08
Eswatini 32,798 889 2 .7% 77 .43
West Bank and Gaza 318,181 3,615 1 .1% 77 .16
Israel 910,569 6,571 0 .7% 72 .58
Guyana 22,992 561 2 .4% 71 .67
Canada 1,451,040 26,635 1 .8% 70 .86
Guatemala 394,372 10,845 2 .7% 65 .32
Turkey 5,968,838 52,437 0 .9% 62 .85
Source: Johns Hopkins,  2021 .
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Abstract: The issue of the rule of law has been on the European Union’s (EU) agenda since the 
beginning of the  2010s . The legal history of the EU shows that the EU’s approach to the topic of 
the rule of law underwent significant changes . Initially, the Member States called for guarantees 
of fundamental rights in EU institutions . This trend began to change in the late  1990s and early 
 2000s, when the possibility of European rule of law control over Member States and the 
predecessor of the current Article  7 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) were introduced by 
the Treaty of Amsterdam . However, the idea that the EU institutions can constantly monitor the 
Member States in the name of the rule of law has only emerged and started dominating 
the  European political agenda since the early  2010s . Over the last decade, the EU institutions 
have continuously expanded their toolkit for monitoring Member States in this regard .
Following calls from some Member States and the European Parliament, in  2014  the 
Commission set up the new EU framework to strengthen the rule of law . In the same year, the 
European Council introduced an annual rule of law dialogue . In  2016, the European Parliament 
proposed the establishment of an annual rule of law report that monitors all Member States . At 
first, the European Commission was reluctant to accept this idea, but finally it introduced an 
annual rule of law report in  2020 .  However, the EU’s policy on the rule of law suffers from 
fundamental shortcomings, which were especially visible during the first wave of the coronavirus 
crisis in the spring of  2020 . In the pandemic situation, it has become even more apparent that the 
EU’s policy on the rule of law raises a  significant issue of EU institutions exceeding their 
competences and stands on a questionable legal basis .
Criticisms formulated against Hungary during the pandemic have revealed that the EU 
 institutions do not provide sufficient guarantees for an objective examination of the situation of 
the rule of law in the Member States . The situation brought about by the coronavirus has also 
raised a number of questions regarding the lawful functioning of EU institutions, which shows 
the need for a  rule of law mechanism capable of verifying that the EU institutions themselves 
also properly respect the rule of law .
Keywords: European policy on the rule of law, conferral of competences, legality of the func-
tioning of European institutions during the coronavirus pandemic
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1. Introduction
The rule of law is a constitutional concept which inherently has no fixed, universal defi-
nition . However, there is agreement that its key elements include lawfulness of political 
decisions, legal certainty, respect for fundamental rights, and the existence of checks and 
balances . In a  state based on the rule of law, the legislative power itself has also legal, 
constitutional limits (Council of Europe,  2011, p .  10) . In the last decade, a  new 
European public policy has developed around the notion of the rule of law . Public policy 
is ‘the action programme of one or more administrative or governmental authorities’ 
(Hassenteufel,  2011, p .  7) . This definition is also applicable to European policy on the 
rule of law as various EU institutions, EU politicians, non-governmental organisations 
and researchers have invested significant energy in developing newer and newer ways for 
the EU to monitor Member States in the name of the rule of law . Since  2011 numerous 
reports, resolutions, official documents and academic articles have shaped the action 
plan that the European Union continues to follow today .1 The aim of this paper is to 
provide a concise overview of European policy on the rule of law with a special emphasis 
on the impact of the coronavirus pandemic in this field .
The EU’s approach towards the notion of the rule of law went through a significant 
change during the history of European integration . Initially, the fear was that citizens’ 
fundamental rights would be threatened not by Member States, but by European insti-
tutions . It may seem odd in the context of current European politics, but originally it 
was national authorities which demanded stronger guarantees of fundamental rights for 
their citizens to defend against potential abuses by the European institutions, and not 
the reverse . Then a spectacular turnaround took place and EU institutions now take any 
opportunity to voice their concern about Member States not providing enough protec-
tion to the rule of law . The EU developed a  complex, constantly expanding set of 
instruments among which parallels and duplications may be observed which reflect 
political and institutional concurrence between different EU institutions . In the spring 
of  2020, the first phase of the coronavirus pandemic provided an opportunity to observe 
how the EU’s relatively new policy on the rule of law functions in exceptional circum-
stances . The coronavirus has created an extraordinary context, not only for the Member 
States but also for the EU’s institutional system, in which the shortcomings of European 
policy on the rule of law become more apparent .
2. The rule of law’s changing role in the European Union from 
a legal historical perspective
The European Communities, the predecessor of the EU, were primarily about economic 
rather than value-based cooperation (Téglási,  2014, p .  154) . While the protection of 
fundamental rights became the premise of Member State constitutional practices after 
the World Wars, the protection of fundamental rights and the rule of law were only 
1 For a more detailed analysis see Gát (2019).
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inserted into the treaties that shaped the predecessors of the EU after many decades of 
delay . In the first three decades of the European Communities, the founding Treaties did 
not mention fundamental rights, including only a few legal bases for the protection of 
a few special rights . Such special rights were, for example, a general prohibition of dis-
crimination on the grounds of nationality, freedom of movement for workers, freedom 
to provide services, improved working conditions and improved standards of living for 
workers and equal pay for men and women (Ferraro & Carmona,  2015, p .  3) .
Initially, fundamental rights appeared only in symbolic declarations . Following the 
 1973  Copenhagen European Summit, the nine Member States of the European 
Communities adopted the Declaration on European Identity .2 This document states 
that ‘sharing as they do the same attitudes to life, based on a  determination to build 
a  society which measures up to the needs of the individual, they are determined to 
defend the principles of representative democracy, of the rule of law, of social 
justice – which is the ultimate goal of economic progress – and of respect for human 
rights’ . In  1977, the Parliament, the Council and the Commission adopted a brief decla-
ration, comprising only two paragraphs, in which they emphasised that they ‘stress the 
prime importance they attach to the protection of fundamental rights, as derived in 
particular from the constitutions of the Member States and the European Convention 
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms’ .3
As the Community’s legal, political and economic importance has increased, it has 
become increasingly essential for the new European political entity to provide legal 
guarantees for the protection of fundamental rights against potential breaches by 
European institutions . In this regard, the so-called Solange judgment of the German 
Constitutional Court of  29  May  1974  was a  milestone . In its decision, the Karlsruhe 
Court stated that it would continue reviewing Community legislation from a  funda-
mental rights perspective for as long as the European Communities failed to ensure the 
protection of fundamental rights to the same degree as Germany . In reaction to the 
judgment of the Constitutional Court, the Court of Justice of the European Union 
(formerly the Court of Justice of the European Communities, hereinafter: the Court) 
sought to establish guarantees for the protection of fundamental rights . In the light of 
today’s debate on the rule of law in the EU, this may have been forgotten, and it should 
be emphasised that the Court, similarly to the  1977  statement by Parliament, the 
Council and the Commission, referred to the constitutional traditions of the Member 
States, and relied on them when it upheld that the protection of fundamental rights is 
part of the general principles of Community law . It later further extended the legal basis 
for the enforcement of fundamental rights and international conventions, in particular 
the European Convention on Human Rights, which became an additional source of 
inspiration .
Despite the developments in case law, the idea that there is an inherent funda-
mental rights gap of the European Communities is supported by the fact that, for a long 
2 Déclaration sur l’identité européenne (Copenhague,  14 décembre  1973).
3 Joint Declaration of  the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission on Fundamental Rights,  27 April 
 1977.
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time, the EU did not have its own instrument for the protection of fundamental rights . 
The so-called Charter of Fundamental Rights was proclaimed on  7 December  2000 in 
Nice . The proclamation of the Charter, however, was in the form of an interinstitutional 
agreement, which could not be considered equivalent to the Treaties . It would only be 
given the same legal weight as the Treaties much later, in the draft of the Treaty estab-
lishing a  Constitution for Europe (‘the Constitutional Treaty’) . Since the draft Treaty 
was rejected in referenda in two Member States, however, the Charter remained a mere 
interinstitutional agreement . The Charter of Fundamental Rights was only elevated to 
the level of the Treaties around a decade ago, when the Treaty of Lisbon entered into 
force in  2009 .
Regarding the Treaties, the first explicit reference to the rule of law only appeared 
 35 years after the establishment of the European Communities, in the  1992 Treaty of 
Maastricht . Again, it is important to note that back then, the issue of the protection of 
the rule of law had not been raised in relation to EU Member States, but basically in 
relation to third countries . At the same time, in line with the case law of the Court, 
Article F of the Maastricht Treaty stated that ‘the Union shall respect fundamental 
rights, as guaranteed by the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights 
and Fundamental Freedoms signed in Rome on  4  November  1950  and as they result 
from the constitutional traditions common to the Member States, as general principles 
of Community law’ (Maastricht Treaty, Article F) .
In comparison, the  1997 Treaty of Amsterdam brought about a significant change 
in approach . With the new Treaty, Article F (1) of the Treaty of Maastricht was amended 
as follows: ‘The Union is founded on the principles of liberty, democracy, respect for 
human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law, principles which are 
common to the Member States’ [Treaty of Amsterdam, Article  1(8)] . It can be observed 
that in this wording, the EU has progressed to referring to fundamental rights as its own 
principles, and there is no indication that these legal principles became part of the EU 
legal order thanks to the Member States’ constitutional traditions .
The Treaty of Amsterdam also introduced the predecessor to current Article  7 of 
the Treaty on European Union, well known from the political debates of the past years . 
Article F .1 of the Treaty of Amsterdam stated that ‘the Council, meeting in the compo-
sition of the Heads of State or Government and acting by unanimity on a proposal by 
one third of the Member States or by the Commission and after obtaining the assent of 
the European Parliament, may determine the existence of a serious and persistent breach 
by a  Member State of principles mentioned in Article F(1), after inviting the govern-
ment of the Member State in question to submit its observations’ . This procedure for 
sanctioning of Member States on their adherence to the rule of law has been strength-
ened and supplemented by the Treaties of Nice and Lisbon .
Based on the legal historical analysis of the Treaties, it can be established that, in 
the European Union, the protection of the rule of law is a relatively recent issue . It is also 
important to note that originally the Member States required the EU to introduce 
minimum guarantees of fundamental rights in its own legal system . Nowadays, this 
trend changed considerably and EU institutions require the Member States to provide 
more guarantees of the rule of law at national level . The idea of the EU monitoring the 
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rule of law situation in Member States appeared in the Treaty of Amsterdam . This 
control still takes the form of an exceptional procedure, subject to strict conditions in 
Article  7 of the current Treaty on European Union .
In the procedure set out under Article  7(1), a  four fifths majority of the Council 
and the consent of the European Parliament are required to determine a  clear risk of 
a serious breach by a Member State of European values . In the procedure under Article 
 7(2), determining a serious and persistent breach of values shall be subject to the unani-
mous vote of the Heads of State or Government of the Member States and the consent 
of Parliament .
The Article  7 procedure, due to its exceptional nature, would not in itself have been 
capable of making rule of law control over Member States one of the top issues of 
European politics . The rule of law control over Member States is on the EU’s political 
agenda because various European institutions and political actors translated it into 
a new European public policy . In the  2010s, one was able to observe a proliferation of 
debates, action plans, political and institutional documents examining the rule of law 
situation in certain Member States, especially the ones which joined the Union after 
 2004 . Over the last decade, the EU’s rule of law toolbox has been constantly expanding .
3. Expanding institutional toolbox of European policy 
on the rule of law
Over the last decade, various EU political actors and institutions have launched a num-
ber of initiatives with the aim of establishing a control over Member States in the name 
of the rule of law .
On  6  March  2013, the Foreign Ministers of four EU Member States, Germany, 
Finland, Denmark and the Netherlands addressed a  letter to the President of the 
European Commission requesting the establishment of an EU rule of law mechanism .4 
The letter sets out the main lines of action that EU institutions have followed to date in 
the field of policy on the rule of law, from the idea of a rule of law mechanism to the 
issue of potential financial sanctions, which were highly debated during the  2020 multi-
annual financial framework negotiations .
On  3 July  2013, the European Parliament adopted a resolution on the basis of the 
report of MEP Rui Tavares (European Parliament,  2013) . The resolution contained 
a broad list of criticism formulated by the European left wing regarding the political and 
legal developments in Hungary after  2010 .  Similarly to the above mentioned letter of 
some foreign ministers, this resolution also already advocated the adoption of a  swift 
and independent monitoring mechanism and an early-warning system coordinated at 
the highest political level to monitor EU values, without however clarifying the details 
of such a mechanism .
4 Letter from the German, Dutch, Finnish and Danish Foreign Ministers to the President of  the European 
Commission,  6 March  2013.
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On  11  March  2014, the European Commission announced in a  communication 
the establishment of ‘a new EU Framework to strengthen the Rule of Law’ (European 
Commission,  2014) (hereinafter: rule of law framework), which was the first concrete 
tool for the EU to monitor the situation of the rule of law in Member States . This docu-
ment outlined the mechanism that the Commission intended to apply in cases it would 
suspect that an EU Member State breaches the rule of law . The basis of this mechanism 
is a structured dialogue with the Member State concerned and consists of three phases . 
In the first phase, the Commission assesses whether there are any clear indications that 
the rule of law is at risk in a Member State . If, on the basis of its preliminary assessment, 
it concludes that there is a systemic threat to the rule of law, it will enter into a dialogue 
with the Member State and send the state concerned its ‘rule of law opinion’ . In the 
event that the first phase does not bring results, in the second phase the European 
Commission sends a  ‘rule of law recommendation’ to the Member State, the main 
elements of which it makes available for the public opinion . In its recommendation, the 
Commission is supposed to clearly state the reasons for its concerns and call on the 
Member State to resolve the issues outlined within a set period of time . The third phase 
is the ‘follow-up to the Commission’s recommendation’, in which the Commission 
monitors the implementation of the recommendation addressed to the Member State 
concerned . If that Member State does not follow the recommendation satisfactorily 
within the set deadline, the Commission may initiate one of the mechanisms provided 
for in Article  7 TEU .
The structure of the rule of law mechanism developed by the Commission is based 
on the analogy of the procedural structure applied in infringement procedures . The 
structured dialogue takes place in a similar way: the Member State concerned and the 
Commission communicate and negotiate with each other and further steps only take 
place if they fail to reach an agreement at any stage . However, significant differences 
may be observed between the two procedures in relation to the next steps . In the event 
of an infringement procedure, in the absence of an agreement between the Member 
State and the Commission, the Commission may refer the matter to the Court of Justice 
of the European Union . In comparison, in the rule of law framework the judicial phase 
is completely missing . For this reason, the sanctions that may be envisaged also differ 
significantly . In an infringement procedure, the Court can condemn the Member State 
and order it to change its national legislation or practice to fall in line with the 
Commission’s expectations, and can impose a fine . The rule of law framework does not 
include similar legal sanctions, failing which the Commission can only exert pressure on 
the Member State by initiating one of the procedures under Article  7 TEU .
Shortly after the announcement of the Commission’s rule of law framework, the 
Council developed its own rule of law instrument . In its press release of  16 December 
 2014, the Council announced that it would organise an annual political dialogue 
between Member States to promote and protect the rule of law . The Council empha-
sised that ‘this dialogue will be based on the principles of objectivity, non-discrimination 
and equal treatment of all Member States’ . It also stated that its mechanism ‘will be 
without prejudice to the principle of conferred competences, as well as the respect of 
national identities of Member States inherent in their fundamental political and 
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constitutional structures […], and their essential State functions’ (Council of the 
European Union,  2014a) . The Council has thus set up its own rule of law instrument in 
parallel with the Commission’s rule of law mechanism . On the one hand, this demon-
strated that it did not want to remove completely the topic of the rule of law from the 
European political agenda . On the other hand, it also indicated that by limiting the 
procedure to an intergovernmental dialogue respecting the equality and sovereignty of 
the Member States, the Council wanted to keep the EU’s rule of law control over 
Member States within strict boundaries . The reasons of this prudent approach were not 
only political, but also legal . At the next point, I will present more in detail that the 
Council’s Legal Service found the idea of EU institutions controlling the rule of law 
situation in Member States highly problematic from a legal perspective .
The Council was not the only EU institution to criticise the Commission’s rule of 
law framework . Although from a  different standpoint, the European Parliament also 
voiced its dissatisfaction . The institution started to develop a  third, alternative rule of 
law mechanism with the justification that it did not deem the Commission’s solution to 
be sufficiently comprehensive . The Parliament’s solution is set out in its resolution 
adopted on  25 October  2016, which proposed that the Commission should establish an 
EU mechanism on democracy, the rule of law and fundamental rights (European 
Parliament,  2016) .
Unlike the Commission’s rule of law framework, the rule of law mechanism 
proposed by Parliament would not only be applied to individual countries ‘if necessary’, 
on a case-by-case basis . At the contrary, all EU Member States would be regularly moni-
tored each year and EU institutions would keep all Member States under continuous 
surveillance . This resolution outlined the structure of a  mechanism in which the 
Parliament, as well as various non-governmental organisations, would have been 
assigned a much more significant role than in the Commission’s rule of law framework .
Different EU institutions have proposed different ways for the EU to monitor the 
rule of law in the Member States, and these mechanisms even compete with each other . 
For example, the Commission rejected the Parliament’s October  2016 proposal, stating 
that it had serious doubts about the need and the feasibility of an annual Report and 
a  policy cycle on democracy, the rule of law and fundamental rights prepared by 
a committee of ‘experts’ and about the need for, feasibility and added value of an inter-
institutional agreement on this matter . It explained that ‘some elements of the proposed 
approach, for instance, the central role attributed to an independent expert panel in the 
proposed pact, also raise serious questions of legality, institutional legitimacy and 
accountability’ . It considered that ‘first, the best possible use should be made of existing 
instruments, while avoiding duplication’ (European Commission,  2017) .
The Commission nevertheless changed its position after a few years . In its commu-
nication of  17 July  2019, it announced the introduction of an annual rule of law report, 
through which it assesses the rule of law situation in each Member State on a  regular 
basis (European Commission,  2019) . However, a significant difference from the mecha-
nism proposed by the European Parliament in  2016  is that, in its annual rule of law 
report, the Commission plays the central role .
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By this new rule of law instrument, the Commission sends a  strong message of 
principle: it feels entitled to bring all Member States under constant political control . 
However, from a practical point of view, doubts may be raised as to whether this regular 
review affects all Member States to the same extent . Examples from recent years have 
shown that the Union has turned a  blind eye to mass demonstrations and ongoing 
police violence against citizens in some Western European countries . At the same time, 
in case of other Member States that joined the EU more recently, the EU is willing to 
monitor closely every rule of law criticism that may appear against the government . The 
EU’s policy on the rule of law raises a number of other similar dilemmas as well, which 
became especially visible during the coronavirus crisis and are worth closer 
examination .
4. Rule of law policy during the coronavirus pandemic: 
growing concerns
In spring  2020, the first wave of the coronavirus created a  special context for the EU 
institutional system that systematically scrutinises the rule of law in Member States . 
While the predictable functioning of the state is an important element of the rule of 
law, during the pandemic, Member States took a series of emergency measures: in Italy, 
settlements and entire regions were hermetically sealed; in numerous Western European 
countries strict curfews were put in place, violations of which were punished by the 
police, and Member States closed the EU’s internal borders one after the other .
Different countries defended themselves against the virus in different ways, but 
basically every Member State focused on the fight against the coronavirus . Hungary, 
which has been in the crossfire of EU rule of law criticism for about a decade now, also 
concentrated on its defence strategy . The government introduced a  state of danger on 
the basis of Article  53(1) of the Fundamental Law, and on  30  March  2020  the 
Parliament adopted Act XII of  2020  on the containment of coronavirus . This law 
authorised the Government to introduce emergency measures to protect the country’s 
citizens against the virus and to maintain the emergency measures taken earlier for this 
purpose . This law did not set a specific end date for the authorisation of the government; 
however, it expressly provided that the National Assembly could terminate the effect of 
the legislation when the state of danger is over . Even more, the law also provided the 
National Assembly with the power to revoke the authorisation given to the government 
at any time before the end of the period of state of danger, either in general or in the case 
of specific measures . The law also amended the Criminal Code and introduced a new 
form of fearmongering during the extraordinary period . Under Section  337(2) of the 
Criminal Code, a person who, during the period of a special legal order and in front of 
a  large audience, states or disseminates any untrue fact or any misrepresented true fact 
that is capable of hindering or preventing the efficiency of the protection against the 
epidemic became punishable by imprisonment for one to five years .
The draft law was submitted to the Hungarian Parliament on  20 March  2020, and 
almost immediately became the subject of fierce international criticism . The critiques 
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were based on two allegations: one that in Hungary the Government has been given 
unlimited authorisation to rule by decree, abolishing the scrutinising role of the 
Parliament, and the other that the authorities had drastically restricted freedom of 
expression . By  23 March, a Member of the European Parliament had sent an email to 
 704  Members of the European Parliament, expressing concerns about the situation of 
democracy and the rule of law in Hungary, and collected signatures for a joint letter she 
intended to send to the European Commission the following day (Mandiner,  2020) . 
The social media was flooded with condemnatory declarations by various European 
politicians and non-governmental organisations . Representatives of international 
organisations also expressed their concerns, including the Council of Europe 
Commissioner for Human Rights, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in 
Europe Representative on Freedom of the Press, and the Secretary General of the 
Council of Europe . When the Hungarian law was adopted,  13  EU Member States5 
issued a joint statement highlighting the importance of the rule of law during the coro-
navirus crisis, including Member States in which much stricter measures were in place 
than in Hungary .6 On this occasion, the European Commission made more cautious 
statements than usual, indicating that it would carry out an examination on this issue of 
concern . During the crisis, the European Parliament switched to a  restricted mode of 
operation via teleworking arrangements, in essence limiting its work to matters related 
to the coronavirus . In this context, on  17  April  2020, it adopted a  resolution on EU 
coordinated action to combat the Covid-19  pandemic and its consequences . It used 
Paragraph  46  of this resolution to make sharp criticisms of Hungary and Poland, the 
only EU Member States singled out in this way (European Parliament,  2020) . A number 
of lessons may be learned from these reactions in relation to the EU’s policy on the rule 
of law, which has again revealed the fundamental dilemmas that characterise this 
European public policy .
4.1. The issues of legal basis and the division of competences between 
the EU and the Member States
The first and most fundamental question is on what basis the EU institutional system 
questions the protection measures of some Member State Governments in times of 
a global health crisis in the name of the rule of law . We may approach this dilemma in 
different ways .
In a moral sense, the question is how European organisations can justify criticising 
and exerting political pressure on the defence measures adopted by certain Member 
States during the most serious period of the Covid-19 emergency . When all European 
countries fight desperately for protecting human lives, such pressuring on some Member 
5 Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain 
and Sweden (Bayer,  2020).
6 For example, Pierre de Combles de Nayves drew attention in Dalloz, a major French legal journal to the severe 
sanctions for breaches of  curfew measures in France (de Combles de Nayves,  2020).
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States makes necessarily their fight even harder . This moral, ethical question is maybe 
the most easily perceivable for citizens .
From a more political approach, the problem with such pressuring is that European 
institutions exert this pressure while they bear no  political responsibility and are not 
accountable for handling the coronavirus crisis in Member States . It is obvious, that 
Member States’ governments that are directly accountable to their citizens should have 
the liberty to choose the measures they found the best for containing the pandemic .
Finally, this issue can be approached also from a legal perspective, which means an 
inquiry in the legal basis of European rule of law control over Member States . It is worth 
examining this issue more in depth, since the question of legal basis constitutes 
a dilemma from the beginning of the construction of European policy on the rule of law . 
The inherent contradiction of the EU’s policy on the rule of law policy is that EU insti-
tutions try to control Member States in the name of the rule of law, without having 
adequate legal basis to do so, in consequence by breaching themselves the very basis of 
the EU’s rule of law . Article  2 TEU sets out the values of the EU and Article  7 sets out 
the procedure that may be used in the EU in the event that a potential breach of those 
values by a Member State occurs . Other instruments developed by the EU institutions 
in addition to this lack an adequate EU legal basis . In  2014, the Council’s Legal Service 
also highlighted this problem in an expert opinion,7 which found that the Commission 
had neither the legal basis nor the competence to establish the rule of law framework 
introduced in  2014 (Council of the European Union,  2014b) .
The Council’s Legal Service pointed out that “according to Article  5  TEU, ‘the 
limits of Union competences are governed by the principle of conferral’ .” The conse-
quence of this is that ‘competences not conferred upon the Union in the Treaties remain 
within the Member States’ (Clause  15) . The opinion points out that:
Article  2 TEU does not confer any material competence upon the Union but, similarly to 
the Charter provisions, it lists certain values that ought to be respected by the institutions 
of the Union and by its Member States when they act within the limits of the powers 
conferred on the Union in the treaties, and without affecting their limits . Therefore, a viola-
tion of the values of the Union, including the rule of law, may be invoked against a Member 
State only when it acts regarding a  subject matter for which the Union has competence 
based on specific competence-setting Treaty provisions (Clause  16) . […] Respect of the rule 
of law by the Member States cannot be, under the Treaties, the subject matter of an action 
by the institutions of the Union irrespective of the existence of a specific material compe-
tence to frame this action, with the sole exception of the procedure described at Article 
 7 TEU (Clause  17) .
7 This body, part of  the General Secretariat of  the Council, gives opinions to the Council in order to ensure that its 
acts are lawful and well-drafted both in form and content. The Legal Service also represents the Council in judicial 
proceedings before the European Court of  Justice, the General Court and the Civil Service Tribunal.
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The Legal Service also stated that ‘the non-binding nature of a  recommendation does 
not allow the institutions to act by issuing such type of acts in matters or subjects on 
which the Treaties have not vested powers on them’ . It added that ‘to build a permanent 
mechanism for a rule of law study and proposal facility operated by the Commission on 
the combined bases of Article  7  TEU and Article  241  TFEU would undermine the 
specific character of the procedure of Article  7(1) – particularly concerning the way it 
can be initiated’ (Clause  21) . The Legal Service clearly concluded that:
There is no legal basis in the Treaties empowering the institutions to create a new supervi-
sion mechanism of the respect of the rule of law by the Member States, additional to what is 
laid down in Article  7 TEU, neither to amend, modify or supplement the procedure laid 
down in this Article . Were the Council to act along such lines, it would run the risk of 
being found to have abased its powers by deciding without a legal basis (Clause  24) .
In recent years, the EU’s policy on the rule of law has been able to evolve without major 
obstacles, despite the fundamental legal concerns expressed by the Council’s Legal 
Service in  2014 .  The political narrative that has been repeatedly voiced in European 
political forums and the international media  –  that the rule of law is so seriously 
threatened in some EU Member States that the EU, as an organisation that places 
human rights and universal values above all, must respond  –  was able to override the 
legal problem that the EU has no  competence to examine Member States’ domestic 
policy in issues not affecting EU law . Despite this very basic legal dilemma, more and 
more statements and resolutions were issued to condemn the measures of the 
governments of certain Central and Eastern European Member States . However, several 
constitutional law practitioners and authors of political science drew attention to the 
importance of the division of competences within the European Union . French 
constitutional law professor Bertrand Mathieu, for example, deduced that democracy 
developed in nation states, so democracy is directly threatened if the right to adopt 
crucial political decisions is taken away from national governments and illegally 
transferred to supranational, international entities, in violation of Member State 
sovereignty . At the end of the day, this would necessarily lead to citizens lose their 
control on political decisions (Mathieu,  2017) .
4.2. The issue of objectivity
During the coronavirus pandemic, while all the EU Member States introduced emer-
gency measures, Hungary and Poland found themselves again in the main focus of 
investigations and criticisms . In its resolution of  17 April  2020, mentioned above, the 
European Parliament voiced its concerns about the rule of law in Hungary and Poland . 
Hungary was also the subject of a  debate in the plenary session of the European 
Parliament on  14 May  2020, entitled ‘Emergency governance in Hungary and its impact 
on the rule of law and fundamental rights’ . This uneven emphasis has once again drawn 
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attention to the question if EU rule of law instruments are capable to ensure an objec-
tive rule of law control over Member States .
Objectivity is an essential element of any set of instruments, which in principle, is 
designed to protect the rule of law against political arbitrariness . However, the EU’s 
policy on the rule of law is characterised by a lack of objectivity . This structural problem 
stems from the fact that although EU institutions conduct rule of law investigations in 
the name of legal principles, the procedures themselves are political in nature . On the 
one hand, the reason for this is to be found in the subject of the investigations, which is 
political in each and every case: EU institutions examine governmental policy measures 
and parliamentary decisions of Member States . On the other hand, it may also be 
observed that the debate on a measure can always be traced back to a division related to 
some deeper differences in political worldviews and visions of the European Union . 
Most of the debates on the rule of law can be traced back to broader debates on consti-
tutional and political theory, surrounding the relationship between democracy and 
liberalism, or to the competition between federalist and nation state concepts of the 
European Union (Gát,  2019, p .  200–234) . Third, the main actors in the rule of law 
policy are political institutions rather than neutral judicial forums, and consequently 
political considerations rather than objectivity play a key role in their decisions . With 
regard to the European Commission, former Commission President Jean-Claude 
Juncker said in a speech that the Commission is a political body and he wanted to make 
it highly political ( Juncker,  2014) . The European Parliament consists of elected repre-
sentatives who take their decisions on a party-political basis . The Council consisting of 
the Ministers of the Member States is not a  neutral institution either, but one of the 
main stages of European policy and diplomacy .
Against this background, the question of whether the EU’s policy on the rule of 
law can itself become a  tool of political arbitrariness is a  logical one . In his book, 
professor of constitutional law, András Zs . Varga analysed the theoretical dangers of the 
totalitarian use of the rule of law concept in detail (Varga,  2019) . He pointed out that 
there was a danger that the idea of the rule of law, originally intended to limit political 
arbitrariness, would become a means of achieving arbitrariness .
4.3. The need for guarantees that EU institutions respect the rule of law
In order for the EU’s policy on the rule of law not to become an instrument of political 
arbitrariness, in addition to the settling of the above mentioned structural problems of 
legal basis and objectivity it is also extremely important to ensure that EU institutions 
themselves respect the rule of law, i .e . the lawfulness of individual policy measures, in 
their daily operation . With regard to the EU institutional system, dysfunctions were 
seen in this area even before the coronavirus crisis . In the European Parliament, for 
example, the debate on the Sargentini report that initiated the rule of law procedure 
against Hungary under Article  7 raised the question of how the extraordinary majority 
required to initiate the procedure is to be calculated . Hungary disputed the Parliament’s 
procedure for not taking into account abstention votes cast when determining the 
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voting results . In another case in  2019, during the appointment procedure of the mem-
bers of the Von der Leyen Commission, in case of the Hungarian commissioner-designate, 
political and legal procedures were confusingly merged . In the autumn of  2019, the 
commissioner-designates from each country were heard in public by the relevant the-
matic committees of the European Parliament . The public hearing of the Hungarian 
Commissioner-designate was scheduled to take place in the Foreign Affairs Committee . 
However, referring to a  potential conflict of interest, the MEPs of the European 
Parliament’s Committee on Legal Affairs voted against the candidate in advance in 
a closed session, thus making it impossible for a public hearing to take place before the 
relevant parliamentary committee .
When the coronavirus epidemic broke out in the spring of  2020, several rule of law 
dilemmas arose over the functioning of the European Parliament . The Parliament’s 
Rules of Procedure were not prepared for such an emergency and the EP switched to 
a virtually ad hoc mode of operation, without developing the appropriate legal environ-
ment . A  Hungarian Member of the European Parliament exposed these anomalies in 
a scientific legal analysis (Szájer,  2020) . He noted that ‘there is no particular legal basis, 
which would exempt the institutions from the obligation to comply with the EU norms 
and standards in force . . […] In the case of the European Parliament [sic] physical pres-
ence is an immanent, essential condition, core concept of the entire functioning, since 
all the provisions of the Rules of Procedure are based on the condition of Members’ 
physical presence . Presence is a legal fact and it has numerous legal effects in the Rules of 
Procedure, in many cases related to the validity of acts’ . The study details the legal uncer-
tainties that have arisen in connection with the issues of quorum, parliamentary 
thresholds, the exercise of the right to speak and voting procedures .
Another characteristic contradiction in the functioning of the European Parliament 
during the coronavirus epidemic was manifested in the already mentioned debate in the 
European Parliament on  14 May  2020 entitled ‘Emergency governance in Hungary and 
its impact on the rule of law and fundamental rights’ (European Parliament,  2020a) . 
The plenary debate was the result of the process described above, in which Hungary was 
accused of, among other things, restricting the freedom of expression . Paradoxically, 
however, the President of the European Parliament has repeatedly rejected the 
Hungarian Government’s request for its Minister of Justice to speak on behalf of the 
Hungarian Government in the debate on Hungary (Magyar Nemzet,  2020) .
5. Conclusion
The development of the legal history of the EU shows that initially Member States 
called for guarantees of the rule of law in EU institutions . This trend began to shift in 
the late  1990s and early  2000s, when a provision allowing for a European supervision of 
fundamental rights in the Member States in certain cases was inserted into the Treaty of 
Amsterdam . In practice, however, it was not until the beginning of the  2010s that the 
European political agenda became increasingly dominated by the discourse that the EU 
institutions were responsible for monitoring the rule of law situation in Member States . 
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Over the last decade, the EU institutions have continuously extended their set of tools 
for monitoring Member States in the name of the rule of law . However, the EU’s rule of 
law policy, as thus established, suffers from fundamental shortcomings, which were 
clearly revealed during the first wave of the coronavirus pandemic in the spring of 
 2019 . The European policy on the rule of law is built on a questionable legal basis and 
lacks guarantees of objectivity . The EU rule of law monitoring is always directed at 
Member States; it does not hold the EU institutions to account, even though numerous 
recent dilemmas have arisen about their lawful functioning .
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Abstract: The Hungarian administrative law has been significantly impacted by the 
Covid-19 pandemic . Several rules – which were introduced during the state of danger based on 
the epidemic situation  –  have been incorporated into the Hungarian legal system . The 
administrative procedural law has been influenced by the epidemic transformation . However, the 
rules on e-administration have not been reformed significantly (due to the digitalisation reforms 
of the last years), but the rules on administrative licenses and permissions have been amended . 
The priority of the general code on administrative procedure has been weakened: new, simplified 
procedure and regime have been introduced . The local self-governance has been impacted by the 
reforms . The transformation has had two, opposite trends . On the one hand, the Hungarian 
administrative system became more centralised during the last year: municipal revenues and task 
performance have been partly centralised . The Hungarian municipal system has been 
concentrated, as well . The role of the second-tier government, the counties (megye), has been 
strengthened by the establishment of the special economic (investment) zones . On the other 
hand, the municipalities could be interpreted as a  ‘trash can’ of the Hungarian public 
administration: they received new, mainly unpopular competences on the restrictions related to 
the pandemic . Although these changes have been related to the current epidemic situation, it 
seems, that the ‘legislative background’ of the pandemic offered an opportunity to the central 
government to pass significant reforms . From  2021  a new phenomenon can be observed: the 
state of danger has remained, but the majority of the restrictions have been terminated by the 
Government of Hungary . Therefore, the justification of the state of danger during the summer of 
 2021 became controversial in Hungarian public discourse .
Keywords: Hungarian administrative law, administrative procedure, self-governance, 
 administrative licenses and permission, Covid-19 pandemic, epidemic, state of danger
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1. Introduction
The first state of danger – which has been declared in Hungary during the first wave of 
the Covid-19 – ended on  18 June  2020, but it has been expected to leave lasting traces 
in the Hungarian legal system . The administrative procedural law has been partly trans-
formed by the regulations on the verified notifications: the primacy of Act CL of 
 2016 on the Code of General Administrative Procedure (hereinafter: CGAP) has been 
weakened by these special statutory rules, which appear as a specific underlying rule for 
(administrative) permitting and licensing procedures (Fazekas,  2020, p .  194) . The inter-
pretation of local self-governance has also changed . The financial autonomy of the 
municipalities has been restricted, first of all, by the centralisation of several local or 
shared taxes and the amendment of their rates and, secondly, by the establishment of the 
special economic zones . It could be emphasised, the provisions that remain permanently 
in Hungarian administrative law are those which were only indirectly related to epide-
miological measures . The ‘legislative background noise’ related to the current epidemic 
situation seems to have served as a kind of backdrop for certain amendments and trans-
formations that would otherwise receive more attention . In addition, a  new, specific, 
quasi-emergency situation used to deal with the second wave of the epidemic, as well as 
the legislation issued in this regard, raises several dogmatic issues that tension the cur-
rent system of administrative law .
In our study, the emergency operations of the public administration is analysed 
from a  legal point of view, comparing the dogmatic foundations and empirical experi-
ence of these actions . The starting point of our research is that the framework of these 
actions is provided by the conditions and demands based on the rule of law administra-
tion . In our paper, the integration of the measures and practices introduced during the 
emergency is analysed as well as the new, quasi-emergency, epidemiological emergency 
into the ‘normal’ operation of the legal system .
For reasons of length, this paper should not be intended to provide a comprehen-
sive answer to all the emerging dogmatic problems of administrative law in emergency 
administrative legislation but is limited to an overview of the most controversial, impor-
tant administrative law issues . We try to outline a kind of problem map that can serve as 
a basis for further research in legal dogmatics and empirical methodology .
2. The epidemic and the special legal order (emergency): 
An overview of the legal regulation in Hungary
The primary research field of the epidemiological situation can be the issues related to 
the introduction and regulation of the special legal order in Hungary . However, these 
mainly concern the field of constitutional law, this paper only deals shortly with these 
questions . If we look at the Hungarian constitutional regulation, it should be empha-
sised that the Fundamental Law of Hungary (25 April  2011) (hereinafter: Fundamental 
Law) has closed taxation on the reasons which justify the state of danger . Para .  1 Article 
 53  of the Fundamental Law states, that the state of danger (veszélyhelyzet) can be 
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declared ‘in the event of a  natural disaster or industrial accident endangering life and 
property’ . Thus, the epidemic situation has not been among a  justifiable reason of the 
declaration of special legal order . The detailed regulation on the establishment and 
introduction of the state of danger as a special legal order (emergency) is regulated by 
Act CXXVIII of  2011 on Disaster Management (hereinafter: DMA) . The rules of the 
Fundamental Law are interpreted broadly by point c) Article  44 of the DMA . The regu-
lation states, ‘human epidemic disease causing mass illness and animal epidemic’ is 
a  justifiable reason of the declaration of the state of danger .2 In case of a  special legal 
order (emergency), in accordance with the Fundamental Law, most of the measures 
defined by Chapters  21–24  of the DMA could be introduced by the Government, 
which may issue decrees with a content contrary to the acts of Parliament for a transi-
tional period of  15 days . In addition to the emergency government decree regulations, 
a limited number of ministers, such as the minister responsible for education and voca-
tional training or the minister responsible for national property, may also take decisions 
that constitute individual acts .
It is shown by the above regulation that the Hungarian public administration – like 
other European administrations – was unexpectedly affected by the Covid-19 pandemic 
at the level of constitutional regulation . At the beginning of the pandemic  –  when 
Hungary has not been affected by it – the institution of ‘health crisis’ (defined by Act 
CLIV of  1997  on Health Care) was used (by which the provision of the health care 
services can be transformed) (Asbóth et al .,  2020, p .  39) . The Hungarian system – which 
has been typically modelled for the treatment of industrial and elemental disasters3 – did 
not contain detailed provisions for an emergency situation related to the management 
of a pandemic .
Within the above-mentioned framework, the state of danger  –  due to the 
Covid-19  human epidemic  –  was declared by Government Decree no .  40/2020 
(11  March  2020) . Based on the constitutional regulation and the provisions of the 
DMA, the Government had the opportunity to suspend the application of acts of 
Parliament in its (emergency) decrees, to deviate from certain statutory provisions, and 
to take other (otherwise statutory, parliamentary) extraordinary measures . Based on 
para .  3  Article  53  of the Fundamental Law, these decrees shall remain in force for 
 15 days as a general rule, unless the scope of these (emergency) decrees is extended by 
the Parliament . Because the epidemic risk and its management could take more than 
 15  days, the Parliament  –  passing a  bill submitted by the Government  –  decided to 
extend the scope of the emergency decrees by a  general authorisation, which was Act 
XII of  2020 . However, the law did not enter into force within  15 days of the adoption 
2 According to other views, this regulation of  the DMA ‘goes beyond the provisions of  the Fundamental Law, i.e. it 
is contrary to the text of  the Fundamental Law. The provisions of  the Fundamental Law could not be overwritten 
by an Act of  Parliament’. According to this view, it is not an expanding interpretation, but a covert, statutory 
amendment to the constitution that can be considered unconstitutional (Szente,  2020; Vörös,  2020, pp.  24–27).
3 In Hungary, after the Democratic Transition, state of  danger has been declared several times, although typically 
not the whole territory of  the country was covered by this emergency. Thus, for example, the government declared 
a state of  emergency during the flood on the Danube in  2002 (Government Decree no. 176/2002,  15 August  2002) 
and after the red mud (industrial) disaster in Devecser (Government Decree no. 245/2010,  6 October  2010).
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of the first emergency government decrees, to maintain the measures, the national chief 
medical officer resorted to a  special solution . These restrictions and rules were main-
tained as a general decision of the national chief medical officer based on the epidemic 
emergency . The above-mentioned solution was born of coercion, and the challenges of 
casuistic regulation on emergency can be observed by it . This decision of the national 
chief medical officer is difficult to interpret in the current Hungarian legal system . The 
decision – as it is highlighted by the government information page on the coronavirus, 
but not by the actual text of the decision4 – is a normative one . On the one hand, the 
chief national medical officer is not authorised by para .  1 Article  23 of Act CXXX of 
 2010 on Legislation to pass such a normative decision . On the other hand, the decision 
does not comply with rules of Act CLIV of  1997 on Health Care (hereinafter: HCA); 
however, there were indications that this decision may be interpreted in this context . 
The national chief medical officer, as a national epidemiological authority, is entitled to 
make individual decisions and not general rules the scope of which covers the whole 
country (Dósa et al .,  2016, pp .  197–198) .
The shortcomings of the regulation of the constitutional regulation were also 
recognised by the legislation . The legal basis for imposing specific restrictions was 
created by Act LVIII of  2020  on transitional rules related to the termination of the 
emergency and on epidemiological emergency (hereinafter: Transitional Act), by which 
a new institution, the epidemiological emergency was introduced by the amendment of 
the HCA . The regulation on health crisis has been reshaped significantly by that Act . 
Different restrictions – based on the epidemiological emergency, which is defined by the 
Act as a  special type of health crisis  –  can be introduced by the government . These 
restrictive measures can be the special rules on the operation and opening hours of 
shops, travel, transport and freight restrictions, restriction on sale and consumption, 
special regulation on the public education (public education, vocational training and 
higher education, e .g . the introduction of digital learning) . During the epidemiological 
emergency, the Hungarian Armed Forces can be involved in the management of health 
care institutions and the provision of health care services can be transformed during that 
special situation . However, the Fundamental Law does not contain regulation on this 
epidemiological emergency, it is regulated only by the HCA, but it can be interpreted as 
a new type emergency . This solution fits into the trend in the Hungarian legislation, that 
several quasi-emergencies have been institutionalised by Acts of Parliament, because 
a similar, quasi-emergency situation is regulated by the DMA during natural and indus-
trial disasters, which are not as serious that the declaration of the state of danger could 
be justified .
The first state of danger – which was declared on  11 March  2020 – was terminated 
by Government Decree no .  282/2000  (17  June  2020) . Act XII of  2020  – which 
extended the scope of the emergency government decrees – was repealed by Act LVII of 
 2020 on the termination of the state of danger .
The application of the special rules created for the period of the emergency was 
extended by the Transitional Act, typically until  31  August  2020 .  Based on the new 
4 See Nemzeti Népegészségügyi Központ,  2020.
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provisions on epidemiological emergency, this state was declared by Government Decree 
no . 283/2020 (17 June  2020) for half a year . Several restrictive regulations were based 
on that special situation, e .g . rules on obligatory wearing face masks and some restric-
tions on foreign travelling (especially travel bans outside the EU) . These rules were the 
basis for even stricter restrictions . At the end of summer, extremely strict travel restric-
tions and mandatory quarantine were introduced by Government Decree 
no . 408/2020 (30 August  2020) . However, several legal concerns have been raised about 
the Decree and other related regulations . Several exceptions were provided, which were 
difficult to justify . One of the controversial exceptions was the special regulation on the 
travelling of the citizens of the V4 countries (the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Poland) . 
The citizens of these countries could enter into Hungary without mandatory lockdown . 
These exceptions were permitted by separate government decrees . The travel ban (and 
even the exceptions) was extended by other decrees . It should be emphasised that 
infringement proceedings were envisaged by two commissioners of the European 
Commission due to the selective (discriminative) nature of the travel ban . Therefore, the 
regulation has been amended, and other exceptions – especially the exception to manda-
tory lockdown in case of business travel – have been institutionalised .
The regulation on epidemiological emergency was a  transitional regime between 
the first and second waves of Covid-19 in Hungary . During late autumn a second, and 
a  serious wave of infections and illnesses evolved in Hungary . Because of the serious 
epidemiological situation, the state of danger was declared on  3  November  2020  (the 
state of danger entered into force on  4  November) . The new Act CIX of  2020  was 
passed . The scope of the emergency government decrees were extended by this Act . But 
opposite to the regime of Act XII of  2020, the extension was not indefinite . The Act 
declared a  90 days deadline for the authorisation (and for the scope of itself ) . Thus, the 
major criticism (Drinóczi & Bień-Kacala,  2020, p .  184; Gárdos-Orosz,  2020, pp . 
 159–161) on the former regulation was corrected by the Parliament . The Government 
of Hungary has not received indefinite authorisation for passing emergency decrees . 
Even the constitutional regulations were amended at the end of the year  2020 .  The 
Fundamental Law was amended by the  9th Amendment by which the legal regulation 
on the state of emergencies were transformed . Similarly, the regulation on state of emer-
gencies in acts passed by qualified majorities was amended during  2021 . However, the 
new rules will enter into force in  2023, the detailed constitutional regulation which has 
been based on the closed taxation of the justifiable reasons and the extraordinary 
government measures remained, but the expiry of the extraordinary measures became 
more flexible . The expiry of the extraordinary measures is not defined by the constitu-
tional rules but by the Act of Parliament which can be passed by a qualified (two-third) 
majority (Hoffman & Kádár,  2021, pp .  26–28) .
It should be noted that the travel restrictions have remained, and they have been 
enforced by the new Act CIV of  2020 .  New sanctions have been introduced by this 
regulation, which have not been clear enough . It was not specified by the Act whether 
these sanctions are objective (Nagy,  2010, pp .  39–74) ones or they are based on the 
imputability of the citizens, and therefore, the nature of these sanctions is partly obvious .
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3. Administrative procedural law and the Covid-19 pandemic
One of the major features of the special legal order (state of emergency, etc .) is that cer-
tain fundamental rights can be restricted more widely (Barnett,  2002, pp .  821–822) . 
Related to that constitutional principle, fundamental (administrative) procedural rights 
can be restricted during the state of danger in Hungary .5 These procedural constraints 
may be particularly acute in an epidemiological situation, because procedural regulation 
should be impacted by the reduction of human contacts . This necessarily entails the 
requirement to amend the rules of administrative procedures . Challenges of modern 
epidemics include their economic effects . In a globalised world, travel and trade restric-
tions can necessarily be linked to a  decline in economic production, which should 
be – at least, partly – treated or compensated by administrative measures .
If we look at the impact of epidemiological measures on the Hungarian administra-
tive procedures, it can be emphasised that the issues related to the reduction of the 
number of contacts have appeared in procedural law and the changes related to 
economic administration have had a more significant role .
Administrative proceedings are typically file-based proceedings in which the pres-
ence of clients is not as important as in court proceedings (litigation) based on the 
constitutional principle of public hearing . Therefore, in the administrative proce-
dures – in contrast with court procedures – it has not been issued a general and uniform 
special regulation for the state of danger, an ‘emergency administrative procedural code’ 
has not been published . The administrative procedures have been based on the regula-
tion of the CGAP, just several additional sectoral regulations have been published by 
emergency government decrees . The peculiarity of the Hungarian solution was 
that  –  unlike other European and American countries (like the United States of 
America, Canada, Germany and Spain where sectoral  –  special provisions have been 
introduced by the countries or by their member states) (Huang et el .  2020, p . 8 .) – special 
rules have been used relatively narrowly by the procedural regulation related to employ-
ment policy and social benefits, i .e . these procedures have been regulated primarily by 
the general (non-pandemic, non-emergency) rules . It has been an ‘unorthodox’ regula-
tion, because the number of registered jobseekers (unemployed people) has been 
significantly increased by the economic crisis related to the restrictions imposed by the 
coronavirus epidemic (see Figure  1) .
5 Article  54 para.  1 of  the Fundamental Law: ‘Under a special legal order, the exercise of  fundamental rights – with 
the exception of  the fundamental rights provided for in Articles II and III, and Article XXVIII (2) to (6) – may 
be suspended or may be restricted beyond the extent specified in Article I (3).’ A similar regulation has been 
institutionalised by the  9th Amendment of  the Fundamental Law (amended para.  2 Article  52 of  the Fundamental 
Law).
41
Public Governance, Administration and Finances Law Review • 1. 2021
















Figure  1 .
Number of registered jobseekers (unemployed people) (2019–2020) and its linear trend line
Source: Hungarian Central Statistical Office,  2020 .
Therefore, the number of employment policy cases increased significantly (by  17 .01%) 
in the first half of  2020 (compared to the number of cases in the first half of  2019) (see 
Figure  2) . Because the general rules should be applied by the employment authorities, 
the average administration time in employment cases increased similarly, by  71 .42% 














Figure  2 .
Number of employment decisions (in  2019H1 and  2020H1)
Source: Országos Statisztikai Adatgyűjtési Program (OSAP)  2019 and  2020 .
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Figure  3 .
Average administration time of employment cases (in  2019H1 and  2020H1)
Source: Országos Statisztikai Adatgyűjtési Program (OSAP)  2019 and  2020 .
However, the regulation on social and employment procedure has not been amended, 
a new legal institution has been established during the first wave of the pandemic . It is 
the so-called ‘controlled notification’ . This reform was justified by the reduction of 
bureaucracy, the simplification of the procedures, thus reducing obstacles to economic 
activities . The traditional administrative permissions have been widely erased because 
the majority of the administrative licensing cases are now under the scope of the new 
rules . A  new, separate regulatory regime has been established . The CAGP is just 
a  subsidiary regulation in the ‘controlled notification’ cases, thus the primacy of the 
CAGP has been weakened by these new rules (Potěšil et al .,  2021, p .  15) . Not only 
the bureaucracy is increased by the institutionalisation of administrative permission 
means, but the protection of the rights of opposing clients are provided by these 
procedures, as well . However, the legal protection of these clients is provided only 
moderately by the newly institutionalised controlled notification . It is stated by 
the  Transitional Act  –  which contains the permanent rules on controlled 
notification – that the protection of public interest is primarily in this procedure . The 
rights and interests of other persons or clients adversely affected can be protected by 
the authority, if apparently only to the extent that, in the course of the proceedings, 
the authority may prohibit the activity of the applicant client if ‘the notification 
constitutes an abusive exercise of a right’ . Thus, the rights of the opposing clients can 
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hardly be enforced by the administrative procedure, they are encouraged to submit 
much more expensive and cumbersome civil lawsuits (mainly property and tort 
lawsuits) . It is highlighted by the  literature, that in addition to the limited 
enforceability of opposing client rights and the difficulty of protecting the legal 
interests of opposing clients, there are stronger corruption risks in this type of cases 
because, in case of a silence, the infringements of the authorities (based on corruption) 
are less conspicuous than in a formal decision of a permission (licensing) case (Alaimo 
et al .,  2009, pp .  141–142) .
The reduction of the number of the administrative cases can be observed by the 
analysis of the administrative statistics . The number of the cases of the major 
Hungarian first instance administrative bodies, the district offices in the second half 
of  2020 was  81 .85% of the number of the cases of the first half of  2020 . However, the 
number of the administrative cases is always lower in the second half year – because 
there are cases which should be decided once in a  year, mainly in the first half year 
(i .e . yearly benefits, taxes etc .) – but the drop of the cases is significant in  2020 . In the 
second half of  2019, the number of the administrative cases in the district offices was 
 97 .80% of the number of the cases in the first half of  2019 . Thus, the drop of the cases 
are mainly around  2–3% and not nearly  20%, like in  2020  (see Figure  4  and  5) 












Figure  4 .
Number of administrative cases of the district offices in  2019 (with linear trend line)
Source: Országos Statisztikai Adatgyűjtési Program (OSAP)  2019 .
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Figure  5 .
Number of administrative cases of the district offices in  2020 (with linear trend line)
Source: Országos Statisztikai Adatgyűjtési Program (OSAP)  2020 .
It should be emphasised, that special procedural rules have been established for admin-
istrative court procedures  –  which is part of the broad administrative procedural 
law – in contrast to the administrative procedures of the authorities . The main aim of 
the pandemic emergency regulation of the administrative court procedure has been the 
reduction of personal contacts .
4. Local self-governance in the time of corona(virus)
The issue of self-government is important in administrative legal research related to the 
coronavirus epidemic . The epidemiological situation and the socio-economic crisis, 
which has been partly caused by the epidemic restrictions, are a situation that is clearly 
pointing in the direction of strengthening centralisation trends . In crisis situations, cen-
tralisation steps and these administrative reforms have traditionally taken precedence 
over decentralisation (Kostrubiec,  2021, pp .  112–113) . The Hungarian municipal sys-
tem and regulation have been significantly influenced by the Covid-19  pandemic . 
Therefore, the municipal administration and organisation issues have been transformed 
based on the emergency (state of danger) situation . Secondly, the municipal tasks have 
been changed during the time of the pandemic . Thirdly, alternative, local solutions of 
the communities have evolved during the time of the pandemic . We would like to 
 analyse these amendments and transformations .
A special regime of the municipal decision-making has been introduced by the 
emergency regulations in the Hungarian public law . Because of the extraordinary 
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situation which requires quick answers and decisions, the council-based municipal deci-
sion-making is suspended by the DMA . It is stated by para .  4 Article  46 of the DMA, 
that the competences of the representative body (képviselő-testület) of the municipality 
is performed by the mayor when the state of danger is declared by the Government of 
Hungary . There are several exceptions, thus the decisions of the major on the local 
public service structure cannot be amended and restructured by the mayors . Therefore, 
the mayors have the local law-making competences, as well . The mayors can pass local 
decrees, which remain in force after the end of the state of danger . The mayor can pass 
and amend the local budget and they can partly transform the organisation of the 
municipal administration, as well . The mayors can decide the individual cases . The scope 
of the competences (of the mayors)  –  set out in the previous sentences  –  is not fully 
clear but based on the legal interpretation of the supervising authorities (the county 
government offices and the Prime Minister’s Office), the competences of the commit-
tees of the representative bodies shall be performed by the mayors, as well . The position 
of the mayor is similar to the ‘dictators’ of the Roman Republic: because of the extraor-
dinary situation, the rapid decision-making is supported by personal leadership . The 
role of the mayor was strengthened in early  2021 . The DMA declared that the compe-
tences of the representative body (actually the municipal council) should be performed 
by the mayor . There were no direct rules on the competences of another municipal body, 
even collegial bodies, like the committees of the representative body . Therefore, it was 
questionable, because these bodies are collegial, and it could be justified that the compe-
tences of these bodies should be performed by the mayors . During the first wave of the 
pandemic, a  joint communication of two state secretaries “recommended” for the 
mayors to fulfil the competences of the committees . But this communication is not 
a real legal norm, and therefore, this solution was controversial, because it hardly fitted 
in the concept of the rule of law . During the second wave of the pandemic, it was offi-
cially declared by Government Decree no . 15/2021 (22 January) that the competences 
of the committees should be performed by the mayors .
This regulation resulted from different solutions in the Hungarian large municipali-
ties . It shall be emphasised that the mayor has a  greater power, but his or her 
responsibilities are increased by this regulation . For example, in the largest Hungarian 
municipality, in the Capital Municipality of Budapest, a special decision-making regula-
tion has been introduced during the period of the state of danger . The decisions of the 
Capital Municipality are made by the Mayor of Budapest, but there is a  normative 
instruction issued by the Mayor (no .  6/2020  [13  March] Instruction of the Mayor of 
Budapest), that before the decision-making the Mayor shall consult the leaders of the 
political groups (fractions) of the Capital Assembly . After the  1st state of danger, the 
decrees issued by the Mayor were confirmed by a  normative decision of the Capital 
Assembly (no .  740/2020 [24 June] Assembly Decision) . However, this decision can be 
interpreted as a political declaration, but it shows that the Mayor of Budapest tried to 
share his power and even his responsibility . There are different patterns among the 
Hungarian large municipalities, as well . For example, in the County Town Győr several 
unpopular decisions and land planning regulation were passed by the mayor, who fully 
exercised his emergency power .
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However, the state of emergency remained, the competences of the representative 
bodies and committees have been restored by Government Decree no .  307/2021 
(5 June), by which the regulations of the DMA and Government Decree no . 15/2021 
(22 January) was actually rewritten .
As a second issue, the centralisation of the municipal tasks and revenues should be 
analysed . As we have mentioned earlier, centralisation is encouraged by crises, especially 
the centralisation of the economic (budget) resources . These tendencies can be observed 
in Hungary, especially in the field of local taxation . (Emergency) Government Decree 
no . 140/2020 (published on  21 April) stated that tourism taxation has been suspended 
for the year  2020 .  (Emergency) Government Decree no .  92/2020  (published on 
 6 April) centralised the revenues of the municipalities from the shared vehicle tax, and 
later the vehicle tax became a  national tax (before the Covid-19, the revenues from 
vehicle tax were shared between the municipalities and the central government, but the 
taxation was the responsibility of the municipal offices) . The most significant centralisa-
tion of the taxation was (Emergency) Government Decree no . 639/2020 (published on 
 22 December) by which the local business tax rate was maximised at  1% (instead of the 
former  2%) for the small and medium enterprises which have less than yearly 
HUF4  billion (approximately EUR10 .8  million) balance sheet total . It has been 
a significant intervention into the local autonomy, and especially into the autonomy of 
the larger municipalities, because the local business tax is one of their most important 
revenues (see Table  1) .6
Table  1 .
Business tax revenues in Hungary
Year 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019
All revenues at regional and local 
level (in million HUF) 2,745,138 2,240,787 2,437,439 2,508,116 2,774,200
All tax revenues at regional and 
local level (in million HUF) 770,375 805,446 845,975 923,664 1,006,066
Business tax revenue (in billion 
HUF) 523,125 584,380 638,731 711,276 788,308
Business tax revenue as % of all 
local revenues 19 .05 26 .08 26 .20 28 .36 28 .42
Business tax revenue as % of tax 
revenues at local level 67 .90 72 .55 72 .50 77 .01 78 .36
Source: Hungarian Central Statistical Office,  2020 .
6 This tax reduction, as a state aid for small and medium enterprises has been approved by the European Commission 
based on the Temporary Framework for the coronavirus-related state aids. See EU Commission Press,  2021.
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Similarly, the government declared that the municipalities could not charge parking 
fees, by which decision the urban municipalities have been impacted, because parking is 
a typical urban issue, and these municipalities introduced differentiated parking charge 
regulations .
As a  part of the concentration, a  new regulation evolved . A  new institution, the 
special investment area was introduced – originally by (emergency) Government Decree 
no . 135/2020 (published on  17 April), later, as a permanent regulation by Act LIX of 
 2020 .  It is stated by Act LIX of  2020  that the Government of Hungary can establish 
a  special investment area for those job-creating investments whose value is more than 
HUF5 billion (approximately EUR13 .5 million) . If a special investment area has been 
established, the municipal property of the area and the right to local taxation are trans-
ferred to the county government from the  1st tier municipality . The justification of the 
regulation was to ensure a more balanced revenue system for the environment of these 
investments, by which the benefits of the investments can be shared with other munici-
palities . Prima facie, it seems a  justifiable transformation, but there are different open 
questions . First of all, the county government did not get service provision competences, 
therefore, the local public services shall be performed by the  1st tier municipalities . The 
county governments cannot aid the performance of these services, they can only give 
them development aids . Secondly, this model is not widespread . Till early  2021  only 
one special investment area has been established, in the town of Göd based on the 
Samsung investment . Therefore, this seemingly fair concentration of the municipal tasks 
seems to be an individual measure, driven by extrajudicial considerations .
However, the centralisation trend has been dominant during the legislation of the 
last year, different tendencies can be observed, as well (Fazekas,  2014, p .  292) . As we 
have mentioned, the municipalities can be the ‘trash cans’ of public administration . This 
‘trash can’ role can be observed in Hungary, as well . During the first wave of the 
pandemic, the municipalities were empowered to pass decrees on the opening hours and 
shopping time for elderly people for the local markets, and they were empowered to pass 
strict regulations on local curfew . These measures were restrictive; therefore, they can be 
interpreted as unpopular decisions . Similarly, after the second wave of the pandemic, it 
was declared that face masks were mandatory on the streets and other public spaces if 
the municipality had more than  10,000  inhabitants . The detailed regulation on these 
measures was passed by the municipality . Therefore, the unpopular measures on public 
space mask wearing became municipal tasks, as well .
Last, but not least, the municipalities as grassroot administrative bodies can solve 
several problems locally, therefore, alternative policies and solutions are evolved by their 
activities, especially in the time of crises .
Especially, the large municipalities – which have significant revenues – have enough 
economic power to provide additional services for their citizens . Those large municipali-
ties, which are led by opposition leaders, can use this opportunity to offer and to show 
alternative solutions for the national policies, therefore the (national) opposition-led 
municipalities are traditionally active in the field of facultative tasks (Hoffman & Papp, 
 2019, pp .  47–48) . If we look at the decision-making of the large Hungarian municipali-
ties, it can be highlighted that not only the opposition-led municipalities, but even the 
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government-led local governments tried to introduce several voluntary services and 
benefits related to the health and socio-economic crises caused by the Covid-19 .  The 
major fields of these municipal non-mandatory (voluntary) tasks have been the institu-
tionalisation of new social benefits, by which the moderate central benefits could be 
supplemented (in Hungary, the increase of the social benefits related to the 
Covid-19 crisis has been very limited, e .g . the sum and the period of the unemployment 
benefit has not been amended) . Similarly, several municipalities established special aid 
for the local small enterprises . Different public services  –  especially social care and 
health care services – have been performed (e .g . mass testing of SARS-CoV-2, aid for flu 
vaccination and provision of free face masks for the local citizens) . The fate of this 
municipal activity is ambiguous this year because the coverage of these measures has 
been the local tax revenues . As we have mentioned, the major tax revenue of the munici-
palities is the local business tax, the rate of which has been radically reduced by the latest 
legislation .
5. State of emergency with limited (reduced) restrictions (?)
The approach of the Hungarian administrative law has been significantly transformed 
during the summer of  2021 . The majority of the restrictions were recalled, even those 
restrictions which were linked to the so-called ‘immunity card’ which proved and 
declared that the given person was infected and recovered of Covid-19  or was vacci-
nated against the disease . For example, the obligatory wear of face masks was terminated 
and even sport events, cultural events etc . were opened (with limited restrictions) . 
Similarly, the major transformations in the field of administrative law – as we have men-
tioned earlier, for example, the amended competence performance in the 
municipalities – were terminated or suspended . Therefore, the justification of the state 
of emergency became a topic of public discourse . The justification became controversial 
during the debates, because the major elements of that kind of state of emergency were 
linked to the extraordinary and mainly personal leadership and the simplified adminis-
trative procedures . During the summer, the majority of these elements were reduced or 
dissolved . It is now a question, whether this ‘reduced’ state of danger should be main-
tained or not .
6. Conclusions
It is clear now, that the Covid-19 pandemic leaves lasting traces on the Hungarian legal 
(and administrative) system . Several important regulations will remain after the Covid-
19  pandemic, such as the health emergency (which was institutionalised by a  sectoral 
act of Parliament and not by the constitutional rules or bay an act which should be 
passed by a qualified majority of two-third of the Parliament), the special statutory rules 
weakening the primacy of the CAGP (especially the controlled notification), and the 
provisions for special economic zones . Precisely those regulations were only indirectly 
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linked to the epidemiological measures . Thus, the ‘legislative background noise’ due to 
the threat of an epidemic seems to have served as a kind of backdrop for certain changes 
and transformations that would otherwise receive more (public and political) attention . 
However, this may mean the Hungarian legal system resilience, as well, which would 
also be justified by further research .
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Abstract: The Covid-19 pandemic has impacted multiple facets of our lives and created a number 
of legal and ethical dilemmas . One of the greatest challenges at present is the production and 
distribution of the Covid-19  vaccine . Refusing to supply Covid vaccines widely could 
affect  millions worldwide, and the pandemic may last for a  long time . The competition 
authorities’ monitoring of the health sector in many countries has been subject to changes in the 
current crisis . The question is whether we can force the Covid-19 vaccine manufacturers, legally 
and ethically, to sell their products and share their information  with their competitors . 
Furthermore, what are the post-pandemic consequences of policies adopted during the 
pandemic? This paper employs a  descriptive-analytical method to examine the importance of 
competition and intellectual property policies as they relate to Covid-19 .  It concludes that 
instead of focusing on individual rights in a crisis, public rights need to be emphasised . However, 
we should not underestimate the post-pandemic consequences of policies adopted during the 
Covid-19 pandemic .
Keywords: Covid-19, competition law, vaccine policy, ethics, intellectual property
1. Introduction
The pharmaceutical industry is of vital importance due to its direct relationship with 
individuals and public health . Competition rules, intellectual property rights, price 
mechanisms, consumer protection and patient’s health, are all factors which intersect in 
the pharmaceutical market . Some practices in the healthcare industry, such as anti-com-
petitive agreements and firms’ abuse of their dominant position, can increase prices, lead 
to a shortage of drugs, infringe consumer rights, endanger the health of consumers and 
put public health at risk (Cseres,  2005, pp .  207–210) . In the pharmaceutical market, 
implementing competition rules aims to increase access to affordable drugs while also 
encouraging innovation . Regulating the pharmaceutical sector heavily depends on intel-
lectual property rights and innovations originating from research and development . 
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As such, controlling the market and interfering with policies must be conducted with 
great caution .
The vaccine market has proven to be one of the most profitable markets in the 
pharmaceutical industry, with an upward trend (Pitruzzella & Arnaudo,  2017, p .  350) . 
After the start of the Covid-19  pandemic, research and development budgets have 
significantly expanded globally to tackle the virus and prevent it by using vaccines . 
Global vaccine market revenue in  2020  was  59 .2  billion US dollars (Statista,  2021a), 
and the forecast for  2021  is much higher .  The vaccine industry before Covid-19  was 
a stable oligopoly globally, with the top four players – GlaxoSmithKline, Merck & Co ., 
Sanofi Pasteur and Pfizer – controlling  80 per cent of the total market share (Pitruzzella 
& Arnaudo,  2017, p .  352) . According to recent statistics, up to this point (August 
 2021), ‘32 .4% of the world population has received at least one dose of 
a  COVID-19  vaccine, and  24 .4% is fully vaccinated .  4 .93  billion doses have been 
administered globally, and  34 .25 million are now administered each day . Only  1 .4% of 
people in low-income countries have received at least one dose’ (Mathieu et al .,  2021) .
There are serious concerns regarding the distribution and allocation of the 
Covid-19 vaccine, and this is not a new problem; in another global pandemic (Influenza 
A) that broke out in  2009, several wealthy and developed countries bought all the stocks 
of vaccines, and the shortage of vaccines for developing countries became a severe issue 
(Bollyky et al .,  2020, pp .  2462–2463) . During the Covid-19 pandemic, the competition 
authorities’ monitoring of the health sector in many countries underwent significant 
changes . Along with other active undertakings in the health sector, vaccine manufac-
turers were encouraged to collaborate because of the necessity of these efforts for 
citizens’ welfare .
The problem of the vaccine manufacturer’s intellectual property rights is a critical 
issue . Due to the principle of freedom of contract, the supplier’s choice of whether to 
deal with specific individuals should not be prohibited or limited by the legislator . Still, 
in exceptional circumstances, such as when one firm is dominant, the refusal to supply 
can jeopardise the market competition . In a pandemic situation, pharmaceutical compa-
nies’ exclusive intellectual property rights and the right to health may come into conflict . 
There has been a  great deal of ethical debate regarding waiving intellectual property 
rights, compulsory licensing and the conflict between public and private rights .
This paper is divided into two parts . The first part deals with the competition 
authorities’ reactions to the Covid-19 pandemic in the pharmaceutical sector (especially 
their vaccine policies), and the second part is dedicated to Covid-related intellectual 
property policies and discusses the challenges facing policy-makers from a  legal and 
ethical point of view .
2. Covid-19, competition law and vaccines policies
Since the beginning of the Covid-19 crisis in the pharmaceutical sector, the competition 
authorities have had to make various decisions . Many competition authorities around 
the globe changed their competition policies to combat this unexpected outbreak . Some 
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countries designed a  specific framework for emergency competition law; for example, 
the European Commission released a  ‘Temporary Framework Communication’ 
(European Commission,  2020a) on  8 April  2020 to regulate companies’ collaboration 
regarding the Covid-19 outbreak . This communication was primarily aimed at facilitat-
ing cooperation to address shortages of essential hospital medicine supplies . According 
to the European Union (EU) Covid-19 policy, suppliers of critical and scarce goods are 
permitted to cooperate in production and distribution . Even some behaviours which are 
usually in direct violation of EU competition law regulations can be regarded as appro-
priate and even beneficial in the Covid era . Outside the scope of this declaration and the 
essential circumstances of the pandemic, such arrangements are not approved by the EU 
competition authorities (Costa-Cabral et al .,  2021, p .  21) . The publication of comfort 
letters was also of importance in this regard . The European Commission provided 
a  comfort letter to Medicines for Europe (European Commission DGC,  2020), that 
suggests voluntary cooperation in the pharmaceutical sector to decrease the risk of the 
shortage of medicines to treat Covid-19 patients .
A popular competition policy involved granting licenses to economic enterprises in 
the pharmaceutical sector to exchange information and enter into agreements with 
competitors; European competition authorities encouraged cooperation between 
competitors in vaccines production as part of its Covid competition policies . In March 
 2020, the UK Competition and Markets Authority (CMA) published an ‘Open letter 
to the pharmaceutical and food and drink industries’ . In this, CMA responded to some 
behaviours (including charging unjustifiably high prices for essential goods or making 
misleading claims about efficacy [Competition and Markets Authority,  2020]) . On 
 25  March  2020, the  CMA indicated in a  guidance note entitled ‘CMA approach to 
business cooperation in response to Covid-19’ that it facilitates collaboration between 
competitors, but only when that cooperation is to discuss problems resulting from the 
Covid-19  crisis . It would not go further or last longer than is essential (Competition 
and Markets Authority,  2021) .
Another competition policy in the pandemic situation involved collaboration 
between competition authorities and section regulators to control and monitor some 
agreements between competitors . For example, in Iceland, sector regulators have played 
an essential role in designing emergency competition policies . These regulators in 
particular sectors (such as the Icelandic Directorate of Health and the Icelandic 
Medicines Agency in the pharma sector) have access to the cooperation between under-
takings during the Covid-19  period . The Icelandic competition authority handles the 
requests for exemption on time-sensitive problems related to Covid-19 within  48 hours 
after their receipt . Some examples of these exemptions are given on the Authority’s 
website . For instance, cooperation between pharmaceutical importers and distributors 
ensures access to critical pharmaceuticals (Decision No . 11/2020; Icelandic Competition 
Authority,  2020) .
Prompt and decisive confrontation with some anti-competitive practices that were 
to the detriment of consumers (such as excessive pricing in the pharmaceutical sector 
and collusion between competitors to divide the market or raise prices) has also proved 
to be an effective policy . For example, the Spanish competition watchdog (CNMC) 
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declared that it had launched inquiries into various sectors after several anti-competitive 
behaviours were discovered in the health sector . CNMC emphasised that the authority 
is actively tracking pricing and supply shortages in the health products industry (in 
connection with products such as sanitising gels and the raw materials used in their 
production) to detect anti-competitive activities leading to possible price changes 
(Rakić,  2020, p .  31) .
In the same vein, the Greek competition regulator started to monitor prices of 
goods on the health  market during the crisis .  It sent information requests to 
numerous companies engaged in the production, distribution, and marketing chains of 
health-related goods (Costa-Cabral et al .,  2021, pp .  16–17) . The requested information 
was mainly connected with reports of and complaints about price rises and output limits 
(Hellenic Competition Commission,  2020) . A team of economists reviewed the results . 
The Greek competition authority also conducted inquiries into businesses that did not 
respond to its request . Vaccine policies were among the competition policies of compe-
tition authorities . The World Health Organisation (WHO) reports that several different 
vaccines (from different producers) such as the AstraZeneca, Janssen, Pfizer-BioNTech, 
Moderna and Sputnik V vaccines have been provided up to this time (World Health 
Organization,  2021a) .
According to EU officials, the EU vaccines strategy is based on meeting objectives 
such as: ‘Ensuring the  quality, safety and efficacy  of vaccines, securing  swift access  to 
vaccines for the member states and their populations while leading the global solidarity 
effort and ensuring  equitable access  to an affordable vaccine as early as possible’ 
(European Commission,  2021b) . The European competition authorities have also been 
encouraging cooperation between competitors in vaccines production . The 
Matchmaking Experience was an online event hosted on b2match, a third-party website 
run by Sociedade Portuguesa de Inovaçao, on  29 and  31 March  2021 . Several meetings 
between potential alliances and participating companies were scheduled to exchange 
information and Covid-19  vaccine-related data . The European Commission issued 
a comfort letter on  21 March  2021 (European Commission,  2021a), stating that in the 
light of competition law considerations, the collaboration between participating compa-
nies in the Matchmaking Event, particularly the sharing of related commercial details, 
does not pose questions under Article  101  of the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union, as long as the competition law principles are followed . In parallel to 
the EU, each Member State has taken measures to promote competition in the 
Covid-19 vaccine market .
The European Union’s policies during the Covid-19  crisis encouraged state aid, 
especially in connection with health-related products . European Commission guidance 
(on  8  April  2020) and the EU Communication from the Commission on an 
Amendment to the Temporary Framework for State aid measures to support the 
economy in the current Covid-19  outbreak, of  3  April  2020, states that the manufac-
turing of essential drugs, in particular, should be improved where possible or kept at 
current levels . Member states were advised to encourage companies  to expand their 
manufacturing capability, primarily through tax incentives and state aid .
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State aid policies have been subject to change in the Covid period . Within the EU 
Commission’s Temporary Framework, there are several instances of state aid . Germany, 
for example, created an umbrella scheme to fund some aspects of Covid-19-related 
research and development, as well as investments in testing and upscaling the infrastruc-
tures that contribute to the development of Covid-19-relevant pharmaceuticals and 
facilities (European Commission,  2020b) . The Italian state aid vaccine development 
project by ReiThera, an Italian  40 million euro measure that aims to support the devel-
opment of a new coronavirus vaccine,1 is another example of Covid-19 state aid cases . 
The European Commission Directorate General for Competition has also established 
a dedicated mailbox and phone number to assist the Member States with any questions 
or requests to discuss the Temporary Framework . The Directorate General for 
Competition has released a  number of templates to assist Member States in creating 
their national strategies under the Recovery and Resilience Facility (European 
Commission,  2021c) .2
One of the successful competition cases regarding this issue was the investigation 
into Roche Diagnostics . The competition authority of the Netherlands announced on 
 3 April  2020 that it would take no further steps in the inquiry into Roche Diagnostics . 
The problem had been the refusal of this firm to comply with the expansion of capability 
for Covid-19  testing . Roche and the competition authority came to an agreement 
whereby Roche committed to sharing technology with its competitors to scale up 
production (Authority for Consumers and Markets,  2021) . The necessity of these 
actions and the supremacy of public health over individual benefit is apparent in this 
case and can be used as an example of sharing vaccine information and data to overcome 
the crisis . Overall, the most effective way to enforce competition law rules in the 
pandemic era is by combining the above solutions .
3. Intellectual property Covid policies:  
A legal and ethical challenge
As mentioned in the UN Sustainable Development Goal (The United Nations,  2015): 
Up to  2030, ‘to achieve universal health coverage, including financial risk protection, 
access to quality essential healthcare services and access to safe, effective, quality and 
affordable essential medicines and vaccines for all’ is an important goal for the UN . As 
the WHO Director-General stated in January  2021, ‘the world is on the brink of a cata-
strophic moral failure – and the price of this failure will be paid with lives and livelihoods 
in the world’s poorest countries’ (World Health Organization,  2021b) . The right to 
receive therapeutic and life-saving interventions is one of every patient’s most basic 
rights in pandemic situations . The right to health as one of the fundamental human 
rights is declared in numerous international human rights documents (Tobin,  2012), 
1 SA.61774 COVID-19, State Aid SA.61774 (2021/N) – Italy COVID-19: Vaccine development project by ReiThera 
S.r.l., Brussels,  26.2.2021 C (2021)  1458 final.
2 See also Regulation (EU)  2021/241 of  the European Parliament and of  the Council of   12 February  2021 establishing 
the Recovery and Resilience Facility.
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such as Article  55(a) of the UN Charter, the Constitution of the World Health 
Organization, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 
the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (1965) and 
the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women 
(1979) . According to Article  12 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights, governments must provide adequate and prompt treatment to protect 
citizens’ right to health (Ssenyonjo,  2011, pp .  969–971) .
There has been much debate regarding waiving intellectual property rights, 
compulsory licensing, and the conflict between public and private rights . Intellectual 
property waivers request that countries be excluded from the requirements of the 
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (Love,  2021) . In 
compulsory licensing, the government allows a third party to use the patented vaccine . 
The question concerns the possibility of violating the rights of a  particular group of 
people under the pretext of protecting society . This challenge is severe in a pandemic . 
Article  31 of TRIPS requires governments, in certain circumstances, to allow domestic 
producers to produce a patented product without the patent holder’s consent . In addi-
tion, Article  31  will enable countries to impose compulsory licenses in a  ‘social 
emergency or other extraordinary situations’ or in the case of ‘public non-commercial 
use’ (World Health Organization,  2002) .
In  October  2020, India and South Africa requested World Trade Organization 
(WTO) representatives to waive patent, copyright, industrial design and undisclosed 
information (trade secrets) in the context of the ‘prevention, containment, or care of 
COVID-19’ . Furthermore, they asked for this waiver to continue until universal vacci-
nation is in effect worldwide and the majority of the world’s population has achieved 
immunity (Council for Trade‐Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights,  2020) . 
This issue had a mixed reception among scholars and governments, with many arguing 
both in support of and against such special dispensation .
3.1. Opponents’ arguments
The United States (at first), the EU, Switzerland, Germany, the United Kingdom and 
Japan were all against the TRIPS waiver . However, on  5 May  2021, the U .S . Government 
announced that it ‘supports the waiver of those protections for COVID-19  vaccines’ 
(Office of the United States Trade Representative,  2021), although this support 
only covers vaccines, leaving other products like diagnostics, treatments, ventilators, res-
pirators, syringes and refrigerators that keep doses cold during preparation and transport 
unprotected (Bonadio & Fontanelli,  2021) . Some of the essential arguments of oppo-
nents of waiving intellectual property and compulsory licensing are as follows: The right 
to own private property, freedom of contract and the protection of the inventor’s intel-
lectual rights are legally protected rights . Moreover, intellectual property waiving and 
compulsory licensing are morally wrong because they are considered a  kind of theft . 
Furthermore, waiver and compulsory licenses destroy the pharmaceutical companies’ 
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ability to innovate and incentives to produce and distribute new drugs and vaccines 
(Bagley,  2017, pp .  2468–2470; Sangameshwaran,  2021) .
Some scholars argue that intellectual property waiving of Covid-19  vaccines is 
futile and symbolic . They believe that even if the developing countries can remove intel-
lectual property barriers and obtain permits to manufacture vaccines, they lack the 
know-how expertise, infrastructure and qualified staff to produce these pharmaceutical 
products . Furthermore, current TRIPS flexibilities have done little to help (Huizen, 
 2021) . In its opposition to TRIPS waiver, the U .K . Government, in a statement on July 
 2021 in WTO, asserted that ‘[i]t was the intellectual property regime that has enabled 
the extraordinary scientific advances of the last year, including the development of safe 
and effective vaccine’ .
Germany, as one of the most vigorous opponents of TRIPS waiver, argues that ‘the 
protection of the intellectual property is a source of innovation and must remain so in 
the future’ (DW,  2021) . Germany was the WHO’s most significant donor during 
Covid-19, contributing  881 .6 million dollars . It is also a substantial contributor to the 
COVAX, having donated over  2 .58 billion dollars to date (Sangameshwaran,  2021) .
The statement of International Federation of Pharmaceutical Manufacturers and 
Associations on ‘WTO TRIPS intellectual property waiver’ published on  5  May 
 2021  called the U .S . Government solution ‘the wrong answer to what is a  complex 
problem’ . The Federation emphasises that ‘waiving patents of COVID-19 vaccines will 
not increase production nor provide practical solutions needed to battle this global 
health crisis’ (International Federation of Pharmaceutical Manufacturers & Associations, 
 2021) . Albert Bourla, Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of Pfizer, at an open day 
on  10  May  2021, emphasised that ‘equity does not mean we give everyone the 
same .  Equity means we give more to those that need more’ and in opposition to the 
TRIPS wavier he argued that ‘entities with little or no  experience in manufacturing 
vaccines are likely to chase the very raw materials we require to scale our production, 
putting the safety and security of all at risk’ (Bourla,  2021) .
3.2. Proponents’ arguments
A popular opinion also argues that global public health depends on the free availability 
of these products (Bagley,  2017, pp .  2492–2493) . According to the freedom of contract 
principle, the supplier’s will to enter into a contract with certain individuals, and refuse 
to supply others is not illegal, nor can be prohibited by the legislator (Williston,  1920; 
Cserne,  2012) . Nevertheless, when a  firm is in a  dominant position, such a  refusal to 
supply can put the market competition in danger, and must be managed by competition 
law rules . Refusal to supply by non-dominant firms is not prohibited in EU competition 
law, although it may harm some markets . In Case T-41/96  Bayer v Commission of the 
European Communities such an issue was addressed by the European Court of Justice .
Some believe that the arrangements for technology transfer and production sharing 
have already been established (such as those between BioNTech and Pfizer, Oxfarm/
AstraZeneca and Novavax with the Serum Institute) . The existence of these 
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arrangements proves that the claims that technology transfer is too complicated or takes 
too long are exaggerated (Love,  2021) . Furthermore, as there may be only one solution, 
if developing countries seek to acquire the scientific and technical knowledge necessary 
for vaccine production without using the existing expertise of vaccine intellectual prop-
erty holders and scientists, the results might be a  great disappointment . This may 
prolong the pandemic indefinitely and lead to an irrational waste of resources .
The violation of individual rights to social protection is similar to violating person-
ality rights in order to protect community rights . As every person has the right to 
physical integrity, any physical assault on a  person is prohibited and entails the assail-
ant’s criminal and civil liability . However, there are exceptions to such protection, and 
waiving the intellectual property rights is one of them . During the Covid-19 pandemic, 
the breach of individual rights can be sanctioned to protect the right to public health 
(McMahon,  2021, pp .  142–148) . Although some frameworks, including COVAX, are 
designed to distribute vaccines in low-income and middle-income nations in the current 
pandemic, it seems that these arrangements are insufficient, and more solutions are 
required to end this health crisis (Roope et al .,  2020, pp .  558–560; Vercler,  2020, pp . 
 1–3; Catania,  2021, pp .  455–459) .
It appears that ensuring collective benefits, even if it harms certain individuals, is 
morally justifiable . Even in non-pandemic contexts, the theory of essential facilities3 and 
compulsory pharmaceutical licensing has justified the coercion of producers for the 
benefit of society (Son,  2019; Lo Bianco,  2020, pp .  2–4) .
In an open letter published in July  2021, more than  120  academic lawyers and 
intellectual property experts from around the globe called on governments to support 
a TRIPS waiver to battle the Covid-19 pandemic . They claimed that ‘[t]he intellectual 
property system has failed in the past to create market incentives for vaccine develop-
ment’ and ‘in the case of COVID-19 vaccines, such a market failure has been mitigated 
with unprecedented public funding and de-risking of research and development costs 
through advance market commitments by governments’ (Kang et al .,  2021, p .  2) . Jecker 
and Atuire (2021) also supported the anti-waiver analyses from a utilitarian and deon-
tological ethics point of view . The utilitarian analysis examines the idea that intellectual 
property protection is essential to keep motivation and innovation alive . The authors 
then asked how much money is enough to ensure the survival of this motivation and 
innovation, as well as could pharmaceutical companies and vaccine producers ‘earn less 
and the incentive to innovate remain intact?’ From the deontological point of view, ‘no 
one can rightfully take what is theirs’ . They argued that producing Covid-19  vaccines 
would be impossible without a massive amount of public investment ( Jecker & Atuire, 
 2021, p .  596) .
A recent development in this regard occurred in Brazil . On  29  April  2021, the 
Brazilian Senate approved a bill facilitating the compulsory licensing of Covid-19 vaccine 
3 In response to a written question in  2020, the European Commission stated that: ‘In our competition 
enforcement, the “essential facility doctrine” may require a dominant firm to share its assets with others, if  an 
asset is “essential” (indispensable) for others to compete effectively in the market and if  refusing access would 
eliminate effective competition on that market and thus cause consumer harm.’ www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/
document/E-9-2020-000595_EN.html
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patents . The Senate passed the bill on  12  August  2021 .  The bill will now go to the 
Brazilian President for his signature . It modifies some aspects of Brazilian patent law 
addressing compulsory licensing and allows for the waiver of patent rights in times of 
international or national crisis and emergency (Eakin,  2021) .
4. Post-pandemic effects of Covid-19 policies
An important question associated with the competition and IP policies relating to the 
Covid pandemic relates to the post-Covid situation . It is essential to consider this 
because there are so many concerns regarding the post-pandemic effects of pandemic 
policies . It remains unclear the degree to which the post-pandemic period will be differ-
ent from the pre-pandemic era . At this stage of understanding, it seems that competition 
law enforcement during a crisis is vital, and cooperation among rivals can benefit con-
sumers . However, we should not underestimate the post-crisis repercussions of 
competition crisis policies . Data sharing, competitor collaboration, vaccine intellectual 
property challenges, and anti-competitive behaviour by pharmaceutical companies are 
all critical concerns in the post-pandemic times .
Given the dominant position of vaccine producers, widespread horizontal coopera-
tion, price gouging (Williams,  2020, pp .  183–184), interrupted supply chains (Yu et al ., 
 2021) and excessive protectionism during the crisis ( Jenny,  2020), it appears that post-
crisis competition law and policy will differ from the pre-crisis era . Some pharmaceutical 
companies will regard themselves as ‘pandemic champions’, and post-crisis competition 
law enforcement may be difficult . One of the concerns regarding the TRIPS waivers in 
the long term centres on incentives for innovation and investment . Some believe that it 
would simply slow vaccine research and development and make it more challenging to 
prevent and combat subsequent pandemics . Opponents of a TRIPS waiver ask who has 
the motive to create next-generation vaccines if intellectual property rights are required 
to be waived?
On  9  November  2020, BioNTech, a  German biotech firm, and Pfizer, a  U .S . 
pharma ceutical company, were the first to declare that a  validated Covid-19  vaccine 
would be available for mass manufacturing . For the last  10  to  20  years, several small 
creative start-ups such as BioNTech and Moderna have pioneered mRNA technology 
for cancer therapy, often without generating a  profit . BioNTech reported an annual 
operational loss of about  82 .4 million euros in  2020 compared to a  181 .5 million euro 
loss in  2019 . At the same time, BioNTech’s annual operational losses were in the thou-
sands of euros range from  2017 to  2020 (Statista,  2021b) . These businesses will spend 
more extensively on innovative cancer treatments and infectious disease vaccinations, 
thanks to the profits gained from the Covid-19 vaccines . Corporations will think care-
fully before risking their investment in the event of a  future health crisis because  they 
know it may harm the firm in the long term . These concerns are well-founded, but it is 
important to remember that decreasing post-pandemic incentives cannot be more 
important than human lives . In low- and middle-income countries, the number of 
people dying because of Covid is much higher than in developed countries . In one 
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world, many people are fully vaccinated and waiting for a  booster dose . At the same 
time, many people, including influential scientists, physicians, health providers, artists 
and scholars, are dying without vaccines in another world .
In the pandemic and post-pandemic era, the pharmaceutical industry will continue 
to have a monopoly on vaccine expertise and technological platforms . Every company is 
indeed more concerned with profitable operations than with global health . Still, compe-
tition policy and intellectual property policies must monitor and manage the vaccine 
markets even in the post-pandemic times . The pharmaceutical companies gained a great 
deal during the pandemic, and the dominant positions of vaccine producers have led to 
price increases of the vaccines . In August  2021, the price of the Pfizer vaccine was raised 
by more than a quarter, and Moderna by more than a tenth in their latest contract with 
the EU (Financial Times,  2021) . The dominant position of these companies can 
generate some concerns about competition and lead to anti-competitive practices .
Harm to consumers is another possible effect of competition and intellectual prop-
erty policies . Data sharing, cooperation, collaboration and information exchange among 
competitors can lead to collusion, price increases and the endangering of consumer’s 
health . Sharing information without technological platforms, technology transfer and 
training can also lead to low-quality products that harm consumers .
5. Conclusion
Competition authorities must formulate appropriate rules to manage the crisis effec-
tively . These regulations should be regularly updated as the dimensions of the situation 
become apparent, and some efforts should be allocated to the post-crisis phase . 
Immediate investigation and prosecution of anti-competitive practices, while permitting 
some agreements and exchange of information, especially regarding medicines and vac-
cines during the health crisis, is necessary . Some anti-competitive practices, such as 
excessive pricing, collusion between pharmaceutical companies and refusal to deal have 
increased in the Covid-19 era . Some of the presently permitted data-sharing and collab-
orations between competitors may harm consumers in the post-Covid period, and the 
consequences are not yet clear .
Vaccines are an essential part of pandemic-related products, and some competition 
authorities up to this point have not had clear policies regarding vaccines . Where the 
lives of millions of people worldwide are in danger, these authorities must use various 
methods to encourage or even compel vaccine producers to collaborate with rivals and 
exchange the necessary data .
Creating a  balance between the intellectual property rights of Covid-19  vaccine 
producers, the public right to health and the competition rules is thus the key to an 
effective competition policy to help overcome this global crisis .
In a  situation where the lives of  millions of people worldwide are in danger, the 
competition authorities, using various mechanisms, must force the companies that 
possess the vaccine technology to cooperate with competitors and share the data, tech-
nologies and information as required . Because the right to health and receiving 
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appropriate treatment are among the fundamental human rights, the issues regarding 
waiving intellectual property rights and compulsory licensing of Covid-19 vaccines are 
legally and ethically justifiable .
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Abstract: The various legal theorists dealing with the operation and effect of law have mostly 
examined situations that can be described as occurring in the usual, regular, normal state of social 
life . Over the last half century, and particularly since the formation and later enlargement of the 
European Union, the requirement of the rule of law has emerged as a key topic . The test of the 
rule of law is as follows: it is necessary to examine in an abnormal situation or, as it were, in an 
extraordinary situation exactly how it is possible to take political decisions that are of fundamental 
importance to society while also guaranteeing that these decisions remain within the rule of law 
at all times .
The aim of this study is to investigate how and by what constitutional mandate the  Hungarian 
Government deviated from the normal constitutional situation in  2020 . The “state of exception” 
theorised by Carl Schmitt and Giorgio Agamben means the suspension of the law . It is important 
to understand their views in order to see that the Hungarian situation in  2020 is utterly dissimilar 
to such a  state of exception . In short, we need to distinguish a  state of exception from an 
extraordinary situation, because the latter does not imply the suspension of law in general or, 
more specifically, the suspension of the rule of law, but that parliamentary and government 
decisions remain within it . The special legal order applied in an extraordinary situation is not in 
fact a suspension of democracy, still less of the rule of law. On the contrary, it actually falls within 
both: in a  state of national crisis, this situation is democracy itself and the rule of law itself, 
and – accordingly – strict laws (both democratic and imposed within the rule of law), or rather 
laws of cardinal importance, make its conditions and its functioning possible and regulate it .
Keywords: rule of law, extraordinary situation, state of exception, Carl Schmitt, Giorgio Agam-
ben, pandemia
1. Introduction
The various legal theorists dealing with the operation and effect of law have mostly 
examined situations that can be described as occurring within the usual, regular, normal 
state of social life . In such circumstances, society is not in the throes of revolution, civil 
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war, or other horrors and disasters . In short, life proceeds in the normal and usual way . 
Over the past century and a half, legal and political thinkers have not only analysed the 
state of law but have also formulated various requirements for the way that law operates . 
In this regard, the requirement to establish and maintain the legal state (Rechtsstaat) 
and the rule of law has been set up quite specifically .1 The legal state, as the phrase 
implies, is not only about the law, but also about the state .
Over the last half century, and particularly since the formation and later enlarge-
ment of the European Union, the requirement of the rule of law has emerged as a key 
condition . The test of the rule of law is as follows: it is necessary to examine in an 
abnormal situation or, as it were, in an extraordinary situation exactly how it is possible 
to take political decisions that are of fundamental importance to society while also 
guaranteeing that these decisions remain within the rule of law at all times . The shocking 
experience of the past few months, dominated by the epidemic threat, shows that various 
misunderstandings and unfounded assumptions of one kind or another are held by the 
general public . The objective of this paper, which focuses primarily on the Hungarian 
situation, is to show, that even this extraordinary situation can be managed and 
controlled within the normal framework of the rule of law .
2. The state of national crisis is not a state of exception
The epidemic has shown how well governments in European countries were able to 
respond quickly and effectively to the ever-changing problems they have faced . The 
general expectation, of course, was that government policy in this particular, special situ-
ation should be consistent with what is permitted within the framework of the rule of 
law . However, criticisms have been levelled at Hungary (such as Donald Tusk’s comment 
in Der Spiegel about the Hungarian Prime Minister [Müller & Puhl,  2020] that the 
German legal and political thinker Schmitt, who is known to have been unafraid of the 
state of exception and to have been a fervent supporter of Adolf Hitler in the early years 
of the National Socialist regime, would have been proud of Viktor Orbán) which 
demon strate either a  complete lack of knowledge of the actual circumstances or an 
expression of mere political antipathy .
The aim of the study is to shed light on how and by what constitutional mandate 
the Hungarian Government deviated from the normal constitutional situation in 
 2020 . It is worth clarifying a few concepts at the beginning of this inquiry . In doing so, 
we shall draw on various works by Schmitt and related studies by Agamben . Both 
thinkers have analysed historical and political situations in which the normal, ordinary 
world of law does not prevail; more specifically, they have discussed extraordinary or 
exceptional situations . Schmitt wrote a hundred years ago, whereas Agamben continues 
to work today . Because of the long-lasting influence they have had, they are both classics 
in this field .
1 The relationship between the concepts of  the legal state and the rule of  law (differences and similarities) will not be 
discussed in this paper.
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In the normal state (when the normal course of life is not disrupted by natural 
disasters or political and military crises affecting countries), the normal functioning of 
the legal system provides security through predictability . However, there are situa-
tions – outside the normal situation – where the traditional formal legal requirements 
are not sufficient to ensure the safe protection of life, but where the emergency itself 
must be addressed first and foremost . The security of a  society can be threatened not 
only by armed conflict, but also by a natural disaster or, as the case may be, an epidemic . 
A health problem on a massive scale can be as serious as a multitude of violent actions 
on the streets . In anticipation of such a situation, the constitutional order of states which 
function under the rule of law provides for the legal possibility of deviating from the 
normal situation . It should be emphasised that it is only possible to deviate from the 
normal legal situation in a  legally regulated manner . As such, the confrontation with 
extraordinary situations, while modifying the normal order of law-making, is still part 
of the overall functioning of the rule of law .
Schmitt examined how the state of law deviates from the normal state in relation to 
the question of sovereignty . Two of his books address this in detail: one, Dictatorship 
(Die Diktatur,  1921), which examined the history of ideas on the question of sover-
eignty; the other, Political Theology (Politische Theologie,  1922) . In his  1921  work, he 
described two types of dictatorship, one based on pouvoir constitué (constitutional 
power) and the other on pouvoir constituant (constituent power): the commissar (i .e . the 
dictator entrusted with a  specific task) and the sovereign dictator. The distinction is 
based on the following question: what can guarantee the enforcement of the given 
norms and how can a new norm be created?
The commissarial dictator always starts from the existing constitutional order and 
seeks to implement such constitutional order in a  situation where the application of 
constitutional procedures does not ensure the existence of a constitutional order accepted 
by the political community . In this state of exception, his task is to restore the normal 
legal (i .e . constitutional) situation . This kind of dictatorship is limited by time . Schmitt 
gave the example of the Roman Republic, when it was the task of the dictator, elected 
for one year, to bridge the gap or conflict between the norms of law and the norm of law 
enforcement (the implementation of law) in the face of a  serious external threat, by 
making political decisions to resolve the emergency . In short, the commissar-like dictator 
suspends the constitution in order to defend that same constitution . Schmitt compared 
this situation to a state of siege .
In contrast, the sovereign dictator does not simply suspend an existing, specific 
constitution based on the law, but seeks, by its suspension, to create a situation in which 
a new constitutional order becomes possible . His activity is characterised by the pouvoir 
constituant, or constituent power . The pouvoir constituant knows only rights, but 
not obligations; a pouvoir constitué, on the other hand, knows only obligations and not 
rights . The relationship between pouvoir constituant and pouvoir constitué is captured by 
Schmitt in a  parallel analogy with nature, as the difference between natura naturans 
(nature that creates) and natura naturata (nature that is created) . What the two types of 
dictatorship analysed by Schmitt have in common, however, is that the possibility 
of  each occurring is legally regulated, and both aim to create a  constitutional state of 
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normality . The first does this by reinforcing the old status quo, the second by creating 
a new one .
Less than a year later, Schmitt’s book on political theology appeared, in which there 
was no mention of the commissar at all, only of the sovereign . One might suppose that 
the author had radicalised his position on both the sovereign and, in line with this, the 
state of exception . The very first sentence of the work – ‘Sovereign is he who decides on 
the state of exception’  –  has since been quoted countless times (Schmitt,  2005, p .  5) . 
Schmitt here focused on the final decision, i .e . the decision that cannot be deduced from 
the legal norm (this alone shows his departure from the rule of law principle) . 
Underlying all this was his conviction that the state (politics) takes precedence over the 
law . The end of the legal order does not mean the end of all orders, as there is the order 
of the state (politics) .
Incidentally, we wish to note that it is here that Schmitt’s dispute with Hans Kelsen 
lies, as Kelsen interpreted the state order only in the context of legal regulation, and 
analysed only the normal situation of life . For Schmitt, the sovereign’s power originates 
in itself; it is not derived from something else, nor is it a  power deduced from some 
norm . However, this sovereign is no  longer the same as the sovereign dictator formu-
lated a year earlier, because that type of dictator was tied to the constitutional situation, 
whereas this sovereign is no longer tied . The sovereign therefore stands alone, with only 
the power behind it by which it can act as sovereign, and the suspension of the existing 
legal order is the end point of its potential for power . In essence, in the state of exception 
there is no legal order; there is only the order established by political will .
What did Agamben (2004) add to Schmitt’s thoughts on sovereignty? He made it 
clear that the state of exception is a situation where, on the one hand, there are effective 
laws that are not applied and, on the other hand, there are actions that have no  place 
under the laws . They have power, but not the force of law . The state of exception, simply 
put, is a no-man’s land . The no man’s land lying between public law and political facts, 
between the legal order and life . It is therefore a  borderline situation, not just for the 
individual, but also for the community .
It is not only totalitarian regimes which are characterised by the introduction of 
a state of exception . In the same way, according to Agamben, the Patriot Act passed on 
 26 October  2001 and the other related provisions have created a  state of exception in 
the United States of America, which, among other things, has made it possible to detain 
people considered suspicious for many years without judicial review . This is of course 
a  rather paradoxical situation, since the law itself regulates the suspension of funda-
mental rights . The state of exception is therefore a phenomenon where life and law are 
in conflict, i .e . where the decision-making domains of law and politics diverge .
3. Constitutional principles of the special legal order in Europe 
and in Hungary
What does all this have to do with the state of national crisis introduced in Hungary as 
a  response to the epidemiological emergency? In short: nothing . In Schmitt’s view, 
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a state of exception is always a state of lawlessness, where only political power is mani-
fested, whereas the Hungarian state of national crisis was introduced on the basis of the 
constitutional order.2 However, it was precisely to make this difference clear that it was 
necessary to recall the interpretation of the Schmittian state of exception, to show how 
wrong it is to equate the decisions taken in this epidemic situation with the state of 
exception .
Having examined the different theoretical approaches to law (the ideas of Schmitt 
and Agamben) that have paid particular attention to the operation of law in a  non-
normal situation, it is now worth briefly examining the constitutional framework of the 
Hungarian legal response to the threat of epidemic . This will clearly show that the 
handling of the situation has not reached even close to a  level which could be called 
a state of exception; in other words, the country has remained fully within the rule of 
law . It is important to note that the core of the criticisms and doubts concern the rela-
tionship and correlations between the special legal order and human rights. Perhaps one 
of the decisive theoretical foundations to be taken into consideration is that the special 
legal order itself is not in fact a kind of suspension of (liberal) democracy (the people’s 
rule), still less of the legal state and the rule of law but, on the contrary, it is part of both . 
In a  state of national crisis, this new situation is democracy itself and the rule of law 
itself, and – accordingly – strict laws (both democratic and imposed within the rule of 
law), or rather laws of cardinal importance, make its conditions and its functioning 
possible and regulate it .
In international (public) law, two main groups of human rights can be distin-
guished .3 On the one hand, there are human rights that cannot be restricted in any 
respect, even in a special legal order, and which can therefore be considered absolute and 
retain the highest priority, as a  minimum requirement of constitutionality .4 The 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted by the United Nations 
(UN) in  1966, highlights seven such human rights . These are included in the group of 
rights that cannot be subject to restrictions pursuant to Article  4(2) .
Two of the four  1949  conventions that are part of the so-called Geneva 
Conventions and which predate the international law developed by the UN, namely the 
third convention on prisoners of war and the fourth on the status and protection of 
civilians (both dated  12 August  1949), contain similar provisions . Furthermore, both of 
the  1977 Additional Protocols (both dated  8 June  1977) give priority to certain human 
rights: the first Additional Protocol provides for the protection of victims of interna-
tional armed conflicts; the second Additional Protocol contains various legal provisions 
on the protection of certain victims of non-international armed conflicts, i .e . civil wars .
The currently effective Hungarian Fundamental Law (the country’s constitution) 
defines the following rights as inalienable rights: the right to life and human dignity; 
the  prohibition of torture, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment; 
2 A sophisticated contemporary press analysis comes to the same conclusion (Techet,  2020).
3 For example, András Jakab’s study provides an overview of  the German constitutional law, which is a model for 
Europe (Jakab,  2007).
4 Doctoral dissertations are also being written on the theoretical systematisation of  regulations made under special 
legal order see, for example, Mészáros,  2017.
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the prohibition of slavery and trafficking in human beings; the prohibition of medical 
or scientific experimentation without voluntary consent; the prohibition of human 
selective breeding or the use of the human body or parts of the human body for profit 
and furthermore the prohibition of human cloning; the presumption of innocence 
(præsumptio innocentiæ); the right of defence; the principle of “no crime without law” 
(nullum crimen sine lege); and the prohibition of multiple convictions .5
On the other hand – and the vast majority of human rights fall precisely into this 
category – there are also human rights that cannot be regarded as unrestrictable by defi-
nition . For instance, in case of a  conflict (i .e . collision) between human rights, the 
necessity and proportionality (fundamental rights) tests guide the (possibly reciprocal) 
restriction .6 The exercise and enjoyment of these human rights and their enforcement 
may therefore be suspended in a special legal order, even beyond the limits allowed by the 
necessity and proportionality tests .7 The key feature of this is the temporary nature, 
however .8
Constitutional law must always strike a balance (although of course it will never be, 
nor can it be, a  perfect one) between, on the one hand, ensuring that the protection 
against a given threat is secure and implemented by swift and effective measures,9 and on 
the other hand, protecting fundamental rights in a  constitutional democracy and the 
rule of law . The proportionality requirement ensures that the resulting concentration of 
power is limited to what is strictly necessary .
The extraordinary legal order was introduced into the Hungarian constitutional 
order in  1989, and its effects are still felt today . Compared to the two previous authori-
tarian regimes, it is therefore a  legal achievement of the democratic transition and the 
establishment of the rule of law .10 In the new Fundamental Law of  2012, a  separate 
chapter is devoted to the special legal order  –  now bearing a  slightly changed 
name – which refers to the current Defence and Disaster Management Act (2011. évi 
CXXVIII.  törvény a katasztrófavédelemről és a hozzá kapcsolódó egyes törvények módosí-
tásáról) in terms of detailed rules . In the Hungarian Fundamental Law, the qualified 
periods were supplemented in  2016 with rules on the protection of internal security, i .e . 
rules to be followed in the event of a  terrorist emergency, in response to the growing 
international threat of terrorist acts .
The regulation of the special legal order can be regarded as very sophisticated in the 
Hungarian system, if compared to other regulatory practices, for example in Europe . In 
many countries, no distinction is made at constitutional level between different types of 
emergency . Currently there are six types of emergencies in Hungary: state of national 
crisis, state of emergency, state of preventive defence, state of terrorist threat, unexpected 
5 On the question of  fundamental rights and their limitations in English see Kiss,  2013.
6 The necessity and proportionality test, for example, provides a constitutional safeguard in times of  the special legal 
order (Mógor & Horváth,  2009).
7 The restrictions on fundamental rights were already essentially the same in principle in the previous constitution see 
Kiss,  2008.
8 All measures must be of  a temporary nature see Kádár,  2014.
9 This fundamental contradiction (dilemma) of  special legal orders is well summarised in the study by Barnabás Kiss 
(Kiss,  2018). 
10  For an analysis of  the development of  Hungarian constitutional law see Szabó & Horváth,  2012. 
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attack and state of extreme danger .11 The type of emergency just introduced in relation 
to the epidemic is the mildest of these .12 The promulgator is the Parliament in the first 
four cases and the Government in the last one, whereas there is no promulgation in case 
of an unexpected attack . In the last four cases, extraordinary measures may be taken by 
the Government, in the first case by the Defence Council, and in case of a state of emer-
gency by the President of the Republic .
It can be seen that, in terms of the structure of the state, the principle of separation of 
powers will temporarily change, and a temporary concentration of power may occur for 
practical reasons . Once the emergency is over, this must be restored to its original state, 
and in the meantime strong checks and balances must be built in (primarily by the 
National Assembly and the Constitutional Court) .13
In the first six months of  2020, the Covid-19  epidemic fundamentally tested the 
European states and showed in practice the level of response and ability to react to 
various crisis situations in each country, including the legislative framework, the institu-
tional system and infrastructure, and also the coordinating political leadership which 
brings nations together (Sándor,  2020a) . Obviously, the extent of the threat to basic 
needs was such that state intervention was urgently needed, beyond the means normally 
available under the legal system . The fact that there is no uniform name for the different 
modes and types of special legal order in the European Union has made comparison 
between the various approaches applied in different European states considerably more 
difficult (Sándor,  2020b) . In addition to legal incompetence and journalistic sloppiness, 
translation difficulties have often contributed to misunderstandings (Kelemen,  2019) .
A fundamental characteristic of crisis situations is the need to step outside the 
normal legal framework and systems of everyday life and to provide quick and decisive 
responses and reactions, which is what the institution called the state of national crisis 
provides .14 In such cases, a natural tension is created between security and freedom: one 
could label this as a paradox of the rule of law, when the legal mandate or authority must 
be both sufficiently detailed and at the same time provide sufficient freedom to act 
(Csink,  2017) . As is evident from this review, the state of national crisis introduced in 
Hungary because of the epidemic has nothing to do with the state of exception coined 
by Schmitt . The latter means the suspension of the law, whereas the solutions applied 
now were based on the constitutional order, the legal order . This means, simply put, that 
the critical references to Schmitt, to dictatorship and to the dissolution of Parliament 
simply have nothing to do with reality .
To summarise, the extraordinary legal order in Hungary is ‘a constitutional state, 
not a state of unconstitutionality’ (Koja,  2003) . To put it another way, it is not the end 
of the legal state (or the rule of law), but  –  despite the extreme challenges facing the 
country and the state – precisely the celebration of it .
11  A typological analysis of  the six periods can be found in Jakab & Till,  2016.
12 A short summary analysis of  the measures introduced is also available in English in Szilvay,  2020.
13  For a review of  the safeguards and guarantees see Till,  2019.
14 Of  course, the reasons behind the restrictions of  the extraordinary legal order always reveal some political 
philosophy see Fődi,  2020.
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Abstract: As the  21st century became shaped by the matters of public health, the 
Covid-19  pandemic revealed that it is a  trap to believe that we have to choose between the 
medicalisation of politics and the politicisation of medicine . My thesis is that models of good 
governance in the post-pandemic world must be shaped by leftist principles, values and practices, 
in order to ensure not the reopening, but the reconstruction of public life, which needs more 
than ever overcoming social inequalities and political polarisations, whereas liberal principles 
should be implemented in order to fix standards of economic performance and efficiency after 
applying mechanism of recovery . Governments as well as electoral spheres are reticent to 
biopolitical incursions, historically associated with panoptic systems . I claim that it is time to 
plead for positivising biopolitics as political humanism . My research will expose twelve themes 
for disseminating biopolitics as political humanism, focused on sensitive key-domains such as 
labour, social cohesion, security, infodemia, domestic life and good governance .
Keywords: biopolitics, biosecurity, biohumanism, good governance, panoptic systems
1. Immunising communities:  
A biopolitical framework inspired by Robert Esposito
The pandemic raised by the spread of Covid-19 has rapidly developed what politically is 
known as a state of exception: human rights have been narrowed or even suspended for 
a determined period of time and the management of the sanitary crises has been  doubled 
by the management of population . Such coordinates depict what Foucault, Agamben 
and Esposito claim as a biopolitical scenario: governments face the exclusive responsibi-
lity of securing biological life (zoe), revealing the non-biological life (bios), reduced to 
economy, politics, culture, as a  secondary priority . It is well known that biopolitics is 
one of the worst nightmares of political philosophy: it activates only in cases of natural 
emergencies, such as pandemics, or contractual break-ups that lead to political general 
conflicts or wars . At a  first glimpse, the biopolitical power draws on the rationality 
invested by governments in shaping and controlling populations by procedures of con-
straint and coercion that tend progressively to barrow, counterweights of civil freedom . 
Traditionally, biopolitics becomes the ‘politics of life’ (Siisiäinen,  2018, p .  18), that 
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tracks a particular raison d’État that quantifies freedoms and liberties as variables influ-
enced by states of exception (Agamben,  2005) that ‘do not foreclose all possibilities of 
historical specificity’ (Walsh,  2014, p .  9) . Nevertheless, biopolitics is an equation of 
power that frames sovereignty and biopolitics as two mutually productive forces: the 
more a situation is exceptional, the more the administration of life by disciplinary prac-
tices is needed . At the threshold of modernity, biopolitics has been grasped as a form of 
governance that articulates sovereignty by maximising mechanisms of control and sur-
veillance; thus ‘the production of a biopolitical body is the original activity of a sovereign 
power’ (Agamben,  1998, p .  6) . According to Agamben, albeit such states of exception 
reflect a  suspension of normality and consequently impose certain power practices, 
societies rather assume that as long as a  juridical content is rational, they can abandon 
themselves to it . Therefore, in a  biopolitical frame, individuals do not expect to be 
banned by the law; they are abandoned to the law (Agamben,  1998, p .  31) . This phe-
nomenon happens because of two major causes: on the one hand, each legal content is 
determined by the jus divinum and therefore, we tend to respect the law because we 
acknowledge our respect towards a messianic form of rationality, that is subsequent to 
any juridical imperative; on the other hand, because we abandon ourselves to the law by 
the law, or, to be more specific, ‘abandonment respects the law, it cannot do otherwise’ 
(Nancy,  1983,  149) . But how far can we address nowadays such abandonment? In the 
traditional paradigm of biopolitics, it was conceived as a proof of trust and obedience in 
front of a  superior ontological authority that inspires power; nonetheless, today, in 
a secular world, such aspects are hardly conceived as parts of a reliable, valid argument . 
After the  21st century, political philosophy turned biopolitics towards a  form of bio-
power that has nothing to do with a divine rationality of state . The dark decades of this 
historical time have been shaped by a radical biopolitics that advanced not the politicis-
ing of life, but the politicising of death . Political bodies have been nationalised, and 
historical subjects have been regarded as exceptions, meaning as conditio inhumana, 
lacking the dignity and the right to live as long as they were declared undesirable sub-
jects within a state border . We do not know if God lived at Auschwitz (see Agamben, 
 2002), but it is clear that biopolitics feed the mentalities behind panoptic systems that 
renounced to subtlety and shift to dominant, dictatorial control mechanisms, specific to 
death camps . Therefore, biopolitics operates in a double sense: from the oppressor to the 
oppressed and vice versa, meaning that it measures the biopower that annihilates life 
and the resistance of the victims against invalidating their bios and retracting their zoe. 
The dominant exegetic part of biopolitics is mainly concentrated on the negative project 
of biopower: authors such Foucault and Agamben insist on the destruction phenome-
non behind the architectonic of disciplinary and punitive societies . Nevertheless, 
authors such as Esposito bring to the spotlight a more balanced, equilibrated perspec-
tive, according to which disadvantaged communities have strengthened their capacity to 
survive and overcome obstacles dictated by a discretionary biopower and that a biopo-
litical project is equally represented by the attempt to face, resist and recover from such 
dictatorial regimes . This latter acceptance of biopolitics should rather be reinforced 
nowadays when the Covid-19  pandemic activated a  biopolitical undertaking of good 
governance and resilience . The main aim of the current analysis is to prescribe 
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a  biopolitical positive project that could depict solutions for raising durable resilient 
societies governed in the name of life without sacrificing bios, namely culture, religion, 
society or economics . Such endeavour reflects a great opportunity to address biopolitics 
as a  new humanism, that we have expected after Camus’s and Heidegger’s claims 
(inspired by different reasons1) that humanism is no longer possible in our contempo-
rary history . This would be biopolitical humanism that targets resilience as a product of 
cultural mentalities invested in immunising civilisations against the abnormal life caused 
by pandemics . First, we should briefly overview the advantages of a biopolitical critique 
of this pandemic .
A biopolitical governance will help individuals to secure life and maximise its 
quality . This biopolitical background reshapes, of course, the major priority of govern-
ance models . We are used to governing by administering regenerable resources – forms 
of capital, highly criticised by leftist approaches and rather preferred by liberal convic-
tions . Nonetheless, we have never been challenged by now to govern life as an 
unregenerable resource, for which a biopower is needed to conserve the life and safety of 
populations and to aim at developing nations in due course .
The correct question is not ‘how compromised is the sanitary and economic 
normality of the state?’, but ‘how far are we from understanding that any crisis is an 
opportunity?’ Krisis is not possible without krinein: the crisis imposes a  judgment, 
a choice, thus, an opportunity . We have the possibility to choose biopolitics as a  solu-
tion to the project of good governance to combat the effects of the health crisis on the 
well-being of society and to increase resilience, orienting it towards progress . A biopo-
litical judgment frames the management of the Covid-19 pandemic out of the classical, 
divisionary perspective that aims to separate the right and the left; it rather pleads to 
bring them together, jointly, around a core objective that inspires securing life and devel-
oping culture by advancing first, leftist measures to combat inequalities and disparities 
raised by the pandemic and only afterwards right-wing practices to stimulate recovery 
and growth .
At the Western level, the spirit of the European pan-community has rather been 
considered a matter of axiological consensus . States have arbitrated differently, through 
a  rational calculation, the gradual closure of borders and the maximisation of social 
isolation protocols to total quarantine (“lockdown”) . Citizens looked at maximising 
surveillance and control of the population under the sign of a  test of autonomy and 
freedom, which reactivated the biopolitical appetite for interrogating what should and 
could, in these conditions, reflect good governance?
Gradually, the political and civil spheres were crossed by common moral dilemmas 
that suggest that the only way to reconcile them is a biopolitical platform . Is it normal to 
1 According to Heidegger, the age of  technical rationality lead to violence and oppression, therefore, our human 
reason that trusted wholeheartedly technique has failed and humanism has more than ever disappointed us. Thus, 
philosophy will move frontwards but only following the anti-humanist path, whereas Camus considers humanism 
still possible as long as the metaphysics of  sufferance framed by the  21st century can be integrated into a political 
project that will defy and defeat colonialism, war and oppression. In the end, we must imagine Sisif  being happy, 
and this is exactly the task that this new humanism should fulfil by all its means (see Heidegger,  2013 and Camus, 
 1942,  1951).
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give political priority to securing public health at the expense of privacy? How far can 
we sacrifice individual freedoms in the name of the principle of prudence? Why does 
the state of emergency become the source of normative contents that perpetuate the 
militarisation of society in order to protect the population? Is civil cooperation possible 
to develop biosecurity through collective health discipline, as long as the authorities are 
considered with scepticism and even distrust by citizens?
To do politics starting from life means to put humanism at the heart of political 
action . Not just any humanism, but a biopolitical humanism . This is not an ideological 
fad, despite the fact that today we live in an age crossed by the continuous dynamics of 
ideologies . Some ideologies updated, such as nationalism, others performed as ‘autoim-
mune’, such as liberalism, which is becoming more and more pronounced illiberalism . 
The principle of this humanism is that political power must be biopolitical . But it must 
be put at the service of the community, not at the basis of constructing a certain immu-
nity in the face of social solidarity . These two words that are quite abused along public 
speeches framing the management of the pandemic, community and immunity, are 
bridged by a common radical, the Latin munus. For this argument, I engage the biopo-
litical theory of Robert Esposito .2 Translated both as ‘obligations’ and as habits naturally 
developed by a  community, munus is suppressed, in times of Covid-19, by social 
distancing . In the attempt to raise immunisation in the face of disease, communities 
distance their members more and more, alienating them from traditional obligations 
and habits, from their natural quality of being social beings . What makes us authentic, 
sociability, makes us sick (Harari,  2020) . But let us keep in mind for now that munus is 
shared by community and immunity, in order to track the multiple implications of such 
consubstantiality in biopolitical terms .
How can we ensure that ‘immunity’ does not destroy our ‘community’? This is 
a  biopolitical issue . ‘Munus’ must be rewritten today so that we can preserve all our 
obligations to the community and our habits together, becoming immune to the disease . 
But can current politics make this image a reality? Can politics choose first and foremost 
life and only after power? In times of pandemics, power must come to us from life . The 
fact that everyone’s life depends on power is the greatest disease we suffer from . 
Therefore, biopolitics, which none of us knows how to do yet, must be the new obliga-
tion and habit of the political class . Politicians must simultaneously operate the priorities 
of biological life (zoe) and the superstructures of non-organic life (bios). Thus, the 
biopolitical challenge for a post-pandemic world is to draw principles of good govern-
ance that pursue equally and responsibly the guarantee, by the state, of all the necessary 
2 Esposito embraces the traditional position of  biopolitics defined as ‘a science by the conduct of  states and human 
collectivities, determined by laws, the natural environment, and ontological givens that support life and determine 
man’s activities’, a statement that lacks, however, ‘a categorical generalness’ (Esposito,  2008, p.  21). In his perspective, 
physics and power conceive sovereignty in different regimes that turn us back to the Kantian question surrounding 
the rationality of  governance, that progressively goes, along the  19th century, towards the Foucauldian challenge of  
understanding the power’s hold over life (Esposito,  2008,  32). Esposito rather prefers the Foucauldian acceptance 
that life is no longer ‘a scientific concept’, but ‘an epistemological indicator’ (Esposito,  2008,  40) of  classifying and 
discerning scientific discourses that do not exclude those oriented towards the analysis of  power. Thus, modernity 
grasps the age of  bio-history that transforms human life throughout bio-power. In these terms, preserving life 
becomes a priority, coined as conservation vitae.
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resources for the preservation of organic life, integrity and body health . Only in this 
manner will be possible the biopolitical tone of development of all non-organic fields 
such as politics, society, economy and culture, starting from their potential to preserve 
and improve the quality of life .
2. Who is afraid of biopolitics?
In its own way, biopolitics is a  civilisational barometer . It shows us how life has been 
valued and protected in various historical contexts noted as states of emergency, such as 
pandemics, wars, civil conflicts, in the context in which the security of life is both a legal 
and disciplinary issue . The pandemic forces us to rethink the social contract, a process in 
which the main challenge is that of population management. In this regard, a clarifica-
tion is needed: in the career of the term, the positive meanings of biopolitics, as 
a government strategy for managing the population in order to preserve safety and the 
phenomenon of life, corresponded to negative meanings, such as biopower or bioterror. 
It usually depicted political situations in which a category of individuals was considered 
undesirable to a  totalitarian society and this led to their exclusion, marginalisation or 
closure in devices of supervision, control and discipline .3 In migration issues, such as the 
management of refugee groups, biopolitics has often indicated abusive, repressive gov-
erning bodies . But these negative meanings are not the subject of this discussion . 
Through its scale, the pandemic has activated biopolitical discourse . We may have preju-
dices against this term, but they come only from ignorance or from an impermissible 
error of extending the concept to a project of power with an iron fist . It is not necessary 
to do so .
We live, as I have said on other occasions, in an age in which citizens feel governed 
by fear. It is the fear of disease, which sometimes arouses distrust in the authorities 
responsible for managing the epidemiological risk, to the point that the idea of a sani-
tary dictatorship dangerously seduces not corona-sceptics, but bona fide citizens, who 
respect all prudential rules . But who no longer resist the anxieties caused by the unpre-
dictable extension of restrictions . Fighting the government by fear is a  biopolitical 
project . Authors such as Lorenzini argue that biopolitics is back since the pandemic 
activated new ‘genres of quarantine’ (Lorenzini,  2020), leading to control, discipline 
and even surveillance, all conceived as Covid-19 responses . If Foucault used to address 
the nationalisation of the biological, nowadays, in times of pandemics, we face its inter-
nationalisation . Lorenzini closely observes that each biopolitical regime advances ‘a 
blackmail’: usually, individuals must be for or against a  regime of governance, but 
biopolitics forces us to conceive each political measure as the best option – in a utilita-
rianist perspective – within a crisis, thus reflecting a reasonable compromise . Therefore, 
3 In my opinion, one of  the greatest authors on biopolitics is Hannah Arendt with her Origins of  Totalitarianism (1973), 
yet, unrecognised as such by exegetes. It is not the place nor the strike of  this article to follow such endeavour here; 
however, we must say that Arendt’s opinion that Jewish communities had to immunise themselves in front of  two 
circulating, well-spread prejudgments, the myth of  eternal anti-Semitism and the myth of  the scapegoat, reflect 
a biopolitical undertaking of  the genealogy of  totalitarianism.
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biopolitics expects from us not acceptance or refusal, nor conformity or anarchism, but 
a  justificatory thought . Traditionally, the Foucauldian argument on biopolitics states 
that biopower is not exclusively explicit: it can act implicitly, in subtle manners, multi-
plying its effects and diversifying in order to perform global obedience from populations 
reflected as masses at risk . Therefore, if we look to the ‘dark’ side of biopolitics, resist-
ance is not the key for a proper and ingenious philosophical analysis of such phenomena, 
but the power of biopolitics to mirror our resilience, conformity and reasonability, thus 
becoming an expression of what Foucault would call ‘the critical ontology of ourselves’ 
(Foucault,  1984,  47) . Lorenzini defines biopolitics as ‘a politics of differential vulnera-
bility’: social inequalities occasioned by this pandemic should be solutioned by an 
efficient governance method . Therefore, biopolitics is the correct political framework 
not only in times of pandemic but especially in depicting a post-pandemic world .
At the same time, resilience is a biopolitical expression, before being a psycholog-
ical, affective, social one . The global response to the coronary crisis is to secure humanity 
both biologically and morally . Authors such as Giorgio Agamben, Michel Foucault, 
Robert Esposito, Yuval Harari point out that the policy of a pandemic tends to develop 
authoritarian implications on the part of democracies . On the other hand, the state of 
emergency in which the golden principle is ‘follow the rules to recover’, challenges us to 
understand how citizens follow the rules imposed in a state of emergency and why devi-
ating from them means not recognising the rationality of these rules . Who pays for 
disobedience, for making others sick, for freedom? This remains an open question that 
highlights the fact that each of us is responsible for the other’s biological life, not only 
for his/her own and that convinces us, once more, that biopolitical discourses are 
adequate for depicting a post-pandemic world .
Last but not least, the medical drama, as we have all seen in Italian hospitals, reen-
gaged the biopolitical protocol . At a first glimpse, this is a bioethical problem: doctors 
forced to choose, in conditions of insufficient material resources in the fight against the 
pandemic, the life of which patient will rather be saved: that of a young man who, math-
ematically, has more chances of cure, or that belonging to an old man who has 
comorbidities and thus, less chances of going through the disease? Such a choice leads to 
medical bioethics under the sign of biopolitics .
To put all in a  nutshell, we see how all these problems indicate a  very simple 
phenomenon: either we will seek to understand bio-politically this pandemic, looking 
for solutions to combat it, or we will turn a  global disease into a  pretext for internal 
power games, with incredible and unfortunate costs for everyone’s life . Running away 
from the term  –  biopolitics  –  just because it reminds us of the most difficult political 
regimes from our humanity, is not a solution . The return of biopolitics to our situation, 
in order to understand how humanity has reacted, over the years, to similar pandemic 
contexts, what mistakes have cost lives and what misunderstandings have affected rights 
and freedoms, is a gesture of responsibility these days .
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3. Biopolitical governance is not a simple exercise of population 
management: De-politicising biopolitics
A biopolitical platform for governance is not a left or right project . This is an absolutely 
necessary construction of a political humanism starting from the revision of the follow-
ing  12  principles and measures, puzzling Leftist and Neoliberal Insights . My research 
will expose twelve themes for disseminating biopolitics as political humanism, as it 
follows:
3.1. The new model of social cohesion is based on the principle of solidarity 
in solitude.
Social distancing and (self ) isolation test our civility and social responsibility . The 
boundaries of empathy, trust and mutual cooperation in the absence of direct interac-
tion are equally reshaped . Living exclusively at home involves a certain routine, in the 
ergonomics of which work, loneliness or cohabitation find, as the case may be, new 
forms of manifestation . Solidarity in solitude is a challenge both at the level of individual 
life and at the level of states, which, although they react as ‘closed societies’, seek to 
maintain a  sense of the European pan-community through an open morality . 
Compassion without cooperation cannot be a  space for the administration of life 
through solidarity . According to de Mata (2020), in the attempt to align health and 
other perspectives, such as relaunching the economy and reopening public sectors of 
cultural, social and educational activity, the principle of solidarity in solitude must pre-
cede the priority of tracking recovery and resilience . The biggest threat for any 
community becomes, from a certain point, ‘the isolation fatigue’ (de Mata,  2020, p .  20), 
that lead not only to a vulnerable sense of mutual commitment and unity, but also to 
the fragmentation of unitarian projects, such as the European Union . Nevertheless, it is 
not like solidarity has never been a core value for our communities by now – it reflects 
the central belief at the heart of the European union; what has radically changed in 
understanding its social role in increasing bonding and cooperation is represented by 
the effects of this pandemic that ‘brought solidarity and appreciation to the front lines 
that, although have always been there working for the population, were previously 
‘invisible’ to the public eye’ (Cuschieri,  2020, p .  6) . This pandemic has the power to 
develop a more emphatic sense of solidarity, by engaging compassion: ‘once we under-
stand ourselves as interconnected, we can collectively construct a disaster imaginary of 
solidarity . In this way, pandemics can be ethically innovative disasters’ (Pascoe & 
Stripling,  2020, p .  443) . Therefore, whoever expects resilient society to overlap to soli-
dary communities has fallen into a  trap: solidarity should be the primary value 
determining not a pandemic world, but a post-pandemic one .
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3.2. Social inequality is a topic for public debates devoted to the improvement 
of life standards and quality in remote work paradigms for protecting citizens 
and increasing safety.
The home quarantine protocol takes up the main concerns of the leftist political agenda 
on social inequalities and class privileges, on the basis of which comfort, security and 
quality of life are assessed . Carrying out professional activities at home is far from the 
romantic rhetoric of quarantine . The distinction between working time and free time is 
doubled by that between living space and space for professional activity . The (non) 
material costs involved in these new contexts make their mark on the quality and pri-
vacy, in most cases exceeding the financial strength of individuals . In different occasions, 
the physical distancing protocol must be maintained between family members belong-
ing to different risk groups and cohabiting in a space where it is impossible to minimise 
the interaction . In addition, in the name of securing the lives of citizens through isola-
tion at home, the state has often failed to ensure their physical and moral integrity . 
Statistics show that crime in the public space is declining, but cases of domestic violence 
and abuse are dramatically increasing . There is also a cynicism of the isolation protocol: 
there are many individuals who do not have a home . For these vulnerable categories of 
citizens, protecting life means taking life from the beginning, with the support of the 
state . This is why leftist measures are prior to right-wing practices in governing this pan-
demic and constructing a  post-Covid world . The public spheres has been crossed by 
different and intriguing opinions, such as Jane Fonda’s statement, that the coronavirus 
has been ‘God’s gift to the Left’: elections from this pandemic revealed that the political 
spectre has been radically inclined in favour of left-wing parties that chose to solve social 
disparities before accelerating economic growth in terms of a post-pandemic world sce-
nario . Therefore, ideologically, left-wing politics is more equipped to face the social 
challenges occurred by this pandemic, whereas in what concerns the fate of liberalism, 
many authors insist that ‘the spread of the virus complicates the implementation of poli-
cies consistent with liberal international order, potentially destroying the order in which 
liberal democracies participate’ (Norrlöf,  2020, p .  799) . Consequently, I defend the idea 
that biopolitics ensures a cyclical, natural and progressivist alternance of left-wing and 
right-wing principles, such ideological nuances regaining their doctrinaire nuances only 
in a  post-pandemic world: to reboot this pandemic society, we need to depoliticise 
biopolitics, thus, to govern not for the sake of the left or the right, but for the good of 
a society that has no need of political competition, but of political cooperation .
3.3. The compatibility of public health measures to protect the lives of 
citizens with human rights should be coherent and attainable, so that the 
temporary suspension of universal rights will not lead to censorship, 
discrimination, xenophobia.
Governance must provide conditions for biopolitics, not thanatopolitics (Foucault, 
 2003) . It is not the arbitration of death, but the protection and disposition of life in the 
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social space that is the main concern of political action . The public sphere pointed out 
some of the important themes of this direction . For example, limiting access to medical 
services regardless of the severity of the medical case, invoking caution in social distanc-
ing and avoiding overloading the health system; access to key medicines in a treatment 
regimen as a form of respecting the right to health;4 non-compliance with the principles 
of the right to privacy by limiting travel in order to reconcile professional and family life 
or forms of civil partnership; limiting religious freedom by imposing robust and essen-
tial restrictions in combating the spread of coronavirus on public cult activity, etc . It is 
not the effects of the medical crisis that will be ungovernable at the end of this pan-
demic, but the social reactions to the medical crisis .
3.4. Democratisation of biopolitical security. We need the transparency of 
any form of protecting the life and health of citizens in public spaces through 
biometric surveillance.
There are gaps in communication between the state and citizens in the administration of 
protocols to prevent the spread of coronavirus . The progressive increase of state inter-
vention in the administration of civil life has generated panic among the population . 
People thus knew the invisible and subtle force of the ‘invisible hand’ . The fact that there 
is a virtual biometric surveillance only ensures the effectiveness of this protocol and the 
production of disciplinary effects on subjects or patients . This does not mean that the 
measure cannot be felt as invasive . We live within digital societies, whose advantages can 
be valued not only along the informational or cognitive sphere, but also within medical 
or social environments . However, the transparency of biocommunicability is a  crucial 
measure to make known to citizens that the surveillance of the disease does not coincide 
with the surveillance of individuals; governing the Covid-19  crisis overlaps with the 
limits of prudence and biosecurity . Authors such as Albert et al . argue that  ‘COVID-19 is 
a threat to global security by the ontological crisis posed to individuals through human 
security theory and through high politics, as evidenced by biosecurity’ (Albert et al ., 
 2020, p .  1) . Although such arguments are quite plausible and embraced by experts in 
the fields of biopolitics, a problem still remains: biosecurity will be reshaped from now 
on, as the biggest danger is not the virus itself, as Harari would put it, but the behav-
ioural effects, in terms of control and surveillance, of this pandemic . According to 
Harari, Covid-19  taught us that contemporary history struggles between ‘the choice 
between totalitarian surveillance and citizen empowerment’ . It is not surveillance for the 
4 In this pandemic, the access to Euthyrox has been restricted for many weeks to patients suffering from thyroid 
disorder. The crisis of  Euthyrox began in Romania in April  2020, at first being speculated that its missing from the 
market was the effect of  infodemia: people thought that its administration could prevent the spread of  Covid-19. In 
fact, the distribution of  medicines in time of  Covid has been one of  the greatest challenges of  this pandemic. The 
same happened with Siofor, a drug applied in the medical scheme of  treating T2D, or with Vitamin D. Therefore, the 
Romanian Government considered the possibility to produce part of  this medicines internally, so that importations 
would not affect the right of  patients to medical services. One of  the greatest outcomes of  this crisis was to raise the 
awareness on the fact that we begin to import more and to produce less; hence, in a post-pandemic world, different 
countries should focus on increasing the capacity of  self-production in vulnerable industries.
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sake of combating the virus the worst danger threatening our democracies, but surveil-
lance for other reasons than sanitary ones . It is one thing to have your phone ringing 
after passing by a Covid-19 infected person – as tracking applications monitor the circu-
lation of non/diagnosed patients, and it is another thing to use this pandemic as 
a precedent for perfecting systems inside- or over-the-skin-surveillance that could easily 
emerge in dystopian, newer totalitarian regimes (Harari,  2021) .
3.5. Controlling the effects of automatising labour in different economic sec-
tors in order to reconsider and preserve the value of manual labour, individual 
effort, working time, within both essential and non-essential industries.
As Covid-19 induced automation and labour disparities, leftist agendas began to seduce 
public spheres as they have been focused on reducing job losses and increasing the role 
of the human intelligence and force work within different industries . Recent ‘findings 
suggest that COVID-19-induced automation may exacerbate labour market disparities, 
as females with mid to low levels of wages and education appear to be at the highest risk 
of being negatively affected’ (Chernoff & Warman,  2021) . In fact, this pandemic 
reduced physical interaction as much and, as incidences of Covid-19 became lower, the 
economic scenario that this crisis added a  ‘shadow cost’ (Korinek & Stiglitz,  2021) on 
labour has increased . For example, the costs of adapting a business to Covid-19 condi-
tions have accelerated the appetite for remote or automatic work, by case . However, by 
the time we will see if this pandemic caused a  new Industrial Revolution, we must 
understand that in different non-essential domains, many jobs have been conceived as 
redundant and, consequently, attracted a modest financial support from the state . On 
the one hand, many non-essential domains should be redefined as essential domains: for 
example culture, in order to save the production of culture and arts and the employees 
of creative cultural sectors from collapse . On the other hand, labour markets still have to 
implement technology in order to ensure a so-called material progress of automatising 
labour . The greatest impact of this pandemic will be, in terms of revaluing human work 
and effort, a new wealth distribution supported by the degree of automatising labour in 
each society .
3.6. Increasing human empathy by assuming solidarity with all life forms. 
From this point of view, species life is a political strategy.
Preserving and improving life does not reflect a simple task of the biopolitical agenda, 
but also an ecological turn of state policies . However, this is not a matter of reflection 
on natural policy . The climate crisis caused by technological exuberance and its improve-
ment with the social isolation of individuals forces us to reconsider the relationship 
between nature and individuals through the prism of nonhuman species . This pandemic 
was an opportunity to restart ecosystems: nature took back Venice, as cruise ships dis-
appeared and its biosphere began to manifest freely, from ducks to dolphins . However, 
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the moral is that lockdowns have been a benefit for certain species but ‘nature will not 
heal’ (Owens,  2021) in two months of emergency-state that supressed any human public 
activity .
3.7. Combating forms of national isolation in the name of state biosecurity.
The delayed reaction of solidarity promoted by the European Union towards certain 
countries radically affected by the pandemic – such as Italy – may set a risky precedent 
for increased hostility, not transnational hospitality .5 An external biopolitical platform 
is one of the few projects that can optimise common biosecurity standards for the future 
of the European Union . Governing the coronavirus crisis means, in a biopolitical frame-
work, governing the mobility of the population in all its aspects: professional migration, 
economic cooperation, free or cultural tourism, as correlated phenomena in terms of 
inclusion and social emergency . Fragility must not become a  lesson in humiliation 
between states, but a  morality of common sense . As we see, the pandemic occasioned 
a  particular context in which racist discourses began to flourish: we have seen the 
European waves of Asianophobia, after the Wuhan case, and the riposte of Asian French 
citizens who rise the campaign #JeNeSuisPasUnVirus, and nowadays we see that this 
trend begins to reactivate older forms of racism, such as antisemitism . Moreover, during 
this pandemic, resilience became the core value of our contemporary societies . The need 
for social distance called, in turn, for the principle of solidarity in solitude . Isolation 
forms raised beyond anxiety, hate, racism and lack of empathy . A  study recently pub-
lished by INSHR-EW (The “Elie Wiesel” National Institute for Studying the Holocaust 
in Romania) revealed that the pandemic reactivated anti-Semitic attitudes that began to 
manifest progressively in online spheres . Therefore, costs of isolation can be, at least 
from a  political standpoint, devastating for cultivating civilised and emphatic public 
spheres .
3.8. Legislative innovations in the field of increasing security and protecting 
the lives of citizens should not take advantage of the anomy or vulnerabilities 
of democratic models.
This is possible in the direction of maximising state intervention at the level of individual 
life . History has shown us that politics tends to turn any crisis into a field of totalitarian 
experiences . Therefore, to any biopolitical action of the state, the citizens react, naturally, 
by suspicion . Individuals question whether prevention measures are far too restrictive . 
Citizens wonder if the measures imposed for population surveillance and control do not 
develop, symptomatically, disciplinary effects that can turn into authoritarian reflexes . 
People need to understand organically that the state of emergency is not a pretext for 
5 See the Kantian distinction between hospitality and hostility from Perpetual Peace, later on retaken critically by 
Derrida.
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turning these interim measures into long-term surveillance protocols, which increase 
state intrusion into civilian, community and individual life . But in order to assume that 
the state of emergency does not develop rules that will last even after dropping such cri-
sis, nor does it offer a way to compensate the vulnerabilities of democracy only for a class 
of privileged subjects, citizens must confirm their trust in the state, as a  long-lasting 
process grounded on culture, which nowadays is mostly considered a  non-essential 
domain .
3.9. No pandemic should be doubled by infodemia. Fake news feeds civil 
 disobedience, anxiety and panic of the population.
Regaining the pragmatism of public communication in terms of biocommunication 
could bring an advantage to the media . Providing accurate information on public safety 
would reduce the state’s information monopoly in strategic communication to combat 
the pandemic . At the same time, the immediate effect would be to democratise access to 
culture and truth . Otherwise, the state will remain, in its biopolitical vocation, a pure 
agent of information management on disease dynamics .
3.10. Consolidation of public space as an extension of domestic space.
Cohabitation between individuals is possible through social distancing without affect-
ing cultural values, free time, social liberties, social segregation and respect between 
individuals . By maintaining protocols of social isolation, people oppose, in a  sense, to 
their own nature: to socialise, to be together . No power is credible if it reduces its gov-
ernable to an amorphic biomass . It should be a  democratic, reflective power, the one 
that governs critical masses . Biopolitics involves thematising the cultural values associ-
ated with life through which we understand the predispositions of a people or a society 
to empathy, tolerance, cooperation, sacrifice . The model of open or closed societies aris-
ing from the management of the pandemic is nothing but the effect of cultures that 
adopt different mentalities and beliefs in the management of life . Returning to normal 
means returning to the community . But only culture has the capacity to gradually 
increase the participation of citizens in the dynamics of society and the state in which 
they live .
3.11. Reconsidering the relations between the Church and the state in the 
management of life could lead to more emphatic and efficient social spheres.
It is not just about recognising the church’s ability to expand the cultural, symbolic and 
material capital of a form of spirituality in adapting people to the experience of a sani-
tary crisis . The Church has developed an eschatology of pandemics (Cunningham, 
 2008, p .  29) as narratives of the dynamics of this world and solidarity between 
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individuals . But its role remains to complete the social agenda of a state through a space 
of intervention in which philanthropy, missionary work and spirituality maintain the 
ideals of solidarity and community cohesion . The state must not miss the opportunity 
to turn the Church into a partner for its interventions and social responsibilities . The 
dialogue between the state and the Church is not an element of anti-modernity . Public 
power is divided between a political and a social sphere . The state must arbitrate not the 
freedom of the two, up to mutual immunisation, but their potential to provide citizens 
with security and trust . The pandemic is not a test of faith . But biopolitics can be a test 
of secularisation .
3.12. Designing public policies in biopolitical terms.
The epidemic generates risk areas and groups, isolation and immunisation areas, domes-
tic outbreak, militarisation . These things show that the profile of the politician capable 
of governing such a crisis resists through two political virtues: pragmatism and resilience . 
Unaccompanied by a historical sensibility, these are not virtues, but only skills . Voters 
are less and less used to looking at politicians as authors of a country project . This biopo-
litical crisis recovers the author’s function as a  competent and virtuous legislator . In 
recognising the legitimacy of measures to combat the pandemic but also in recognising 
their reasonableness, people link the authority of the law to the authority of the author . 
Who develops, in other words, public policies? What credibility and competence do 
politicians have in proposing laws that are both just and moral for the preservation of 
the lives and safety of citizens? What is the trust capital and expertise that public policy 
makers must have for the law not to produce immoral effects when it concerns sensitive 
topics such as freedom, privacy and human rights? This time, the elaboration of public 
policies must be done situating as a source, but also as a goal, the life of individuals .
4. Instead of conclusions
One can reject a biopolitical platform for the sake of maintaining governance on either 
side of the political spectrum . Both the leftist and the right-wing oriented political 
measures could build their own biopolitical ideological agenda based on these founda-
tions . However, in times of a post-pandemic world, it would be reasonable and lucid to 
drop political rivalries in order to advance a biopolitical regime that makes use of both 
wings of the political spectre by securing biological life in front of non-biological under-
takings of life, from cultural and economic insights to social ones . The biopolitical left 
and biopolitical liberalism cross at the heart of biopolitics: these twelve topics could 
map a post-Covid political agenda for any reasonable governance that would value and 
cherish the pandemic experience as an opportunity to strength, not to fault contempo-
rary, imperfect democracies . Along this article, a  positive sketch of biopolitics as 
a moderated regime that has nothing to do with its negative governmental tradition has 
been engaged in order to offer a new perspective on the multiple manners in which not 
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only our lives, but equally this domain experienced radical changes that redesign the 
priorities of political interventions across public spheres . In the end, it is not a  post-
Covid world defying the pandemic the one we would like to live in, but one that turns 
such despicable historical crises into an opportunity for progress . Resilience is not 
incompatible with progress: as long as this statement will be supported by empirical 
facts revealed by governmental decisions that chose to defend life not to use it for elec-
toral advantages, biopolitics will earn a positive place in our future .
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Abstract: This paper will evaluate the current situation and role of the Hungarian (administrative) 
lower-middle level and make projections about its future . Centralisation efforts since  2010 have 
had a non-negligible impact on the administrative and non-administrative (common institution 
maintenance, micro-regional development policy) tasks assigned to the lower-middle level . 
However, it may be argued that the transition to the Web  3 .0 era – the era of the most advanced, 
most intelligent and customised web technologies  –  may put such centralisation efforts into 
a  new context . Revitalisation of formations similar to the multi-functional micro-regional 
associations of local self-governments which largely disappeared after  1  January  2013  may be 
justifiable in the forthcoming period in order to promote local synergies . If this is correct, a re-
think of the public administration system at the lower-middle level may become a very important 
task for the public administration as along with regional discourse .
Keywords: districts, local self-government associations, public administration, territorial policy, 
local public services, Hungary
1. Introduction
The subject matter of this paper is what is known as the lower-middle level of adminis-
tration, which – with some simplifications – I have placed in the category of the local 
equivalents of the European Union’s local administrative units (LAU) level  1, as used 
before  1  January  2017, when EUROSTAT disbanded levels LAU  1  and LAU  2, and 
implemented a unified LAU classification . In Hungary, as in the majority of EU mem-
ber states, the new LAU levels implemented in  2017 are equivalent to the former LAU 
 1 levels (3,155 towns, at the town level) (Local Administrative Units [LAU], s .a .) . The 
primary aim of the study is to make recommendations on the ideal size and desirable 
functions of lower-middle level of administrative units in Hungary, especially with 
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regard to the challenges of the upcoming era of the most advanced, most intelligent and 
customised web technologies, i .e ., the Web  3 .0 era (Mitra,  2014) . The second section of 
the paper will briefly outline the prehistory of the lower-middle level in Hungary in 
order to provide a proper context for the situation and role of the current district sys-
tem, which constitutes the most important representative of the lower-middle level after 
 2010 .  In the third section, based on the professional  literature on the ideal size and 
desirable functions of districts, I conclude that it would be a  mistake to identify the 
lower-middle level with one single geographical delimitation, such as the current district 
system, and that research on the ideal size and desirable functions of lower-middle level 
administrative units should focus on the needs of users, in line with one of the funda-
mental postulates of the concept of the neo-Weberian state . Based on this, the fourth 
section seeks to rethink the ideal size of districts in the transition to the Web  3 .0  era 
through empirical research . The results of this research suggest that a reduction in the 
frequency of administrative acts requiring personal presence could lead to a reduction in 
the current number of districts . Furthermore, the concluding part of the paper will dis-
cuss in more detail the fact that there may even be a  resurgence of formations smaller 
than the current districts, which may be best placed to fill the void left by the marginali-
sation of the multi-purpose associations of small municipalities after  2013 .
2. A historical overview
The term ‘district!’ (járás in Hungarian), the most characteristic Hungarian equivalent 
of the lower-middle administrative level, is quite controversial . On the one hand, its use 
dates back a  long time: Historical research has found evidence of districts known as 
iudex nobilium from as early as the fifteenth century (Csite & Oláh,  2011, pp .  21–24; 
Hoffman,  2012, p .  23) . On the other hand, in a geographical sense, these districts did 
not constitute fixed regional units . As Bálint Csatári put it, ‘Their boundaries, their seat, 
and the roles, number and importance of district-level administration or supply insti-
tutes have been often changing’ (Csatári,  1995, p .  11) . To understand current problems 
with districts, it is vital to first shed some light on how their real career started . They 
were introduced in the socialist era, when districts – which were construed until then as 
areas of jurisdiction of ‘on-site’ county bodies – were established as fully-fledged admin-
istration levels on a  par with counties or cities . This change, resulting in a  three-level 
administration, was introduced by Act XX of  1949 (The Constitution of the Hungarian 
People’s Republic) and Act I of  1950 (the first act of the Council) . However, bestowing 
such powers upon districts was based on specific political circumstances: They were 
meant to facilitate taking control over agricultural activities, including the collectivisa-
tion process, which was considered strategically important at the time (Szoboszlai, 
 1973) . Since in smaller villages, no adequate and reliable party officials were available, 
the governing (and only) party intended to rely on this administration level in realising 
its goals . As a result of this intention, the three-level administration could not survive 
completion of the collectivisation process, or the disruption of the strictly centralised 
plan- and instruction-based regime . For this reason, the dissolution of districts or 
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merging them with other districts started as early as the  1950s . Ultimately, Act I of 
 1971  (third act of the Council) sped up the process . Pursuant to the legislation, to 
ensure a gradual loss of power, the district councils were first replaced by so called dis-
trict offices, and as of  1  January  1984, the last districts were dissolved . They were 
replaced by so-called city environs administrations . This change was introduced to 
improve cost-efficiency, specifically the government intended to improve efficiency of 
territorial administration by allocating former district-level tasks to central cities and 
their associated specialised administration bodies . Another point worth considering is 
that in the late Kádár era, these measures which were meant to improve cost-efficiency 
proved insufficient to offset the trend of cutbacks in central grants, and an increasing 
‘competition for development resources’ (Vági,  1982) resulted in sharp conflicts 
between city environs centres and the councils in their catchment areas, in spite of the 
fact that by creating so-called city environs funds, the central city, as a net contributor, 
tried to prevent a  further increase in inequalities by adding its own humble offerings 
(Pfeil,  2003, p .  53) .
Following the regime change, it briefly seemed that the lower-middle administra-
tion levels might be forced to the periphery . Spurred by the unpleasant memory of the 
city environs administrations and the lobby of local influencers, Act LXV of  1990 on 
Local Self-Governments (Local Self-Government Act  1990) implemented a  local self-
government structure that was not only decentralised (one town  –  one local 
self-government), but which also allocated the majority of local-level tasks and authori-
sations to municipalities . However, it did not take long for it to become apparent that 
local self-governments do not have adequate resources to perform these tasks or fulfil 
their mandates . The current era has seen a trend of decreasing central grants, and only 
a few local self-government bodies were lucky enough to have sufficient income to fund 
the adequate performance of the tasks they were charged with . An illustration of this is 
that, whereas legislators in  1990  would have left  100  per cent of personal income tax 
paid by locals with the local government, by  1991, only  50 per cent remained with them, 
and by  2010, this number had decreased to  40  per cent . Moreover, only  8  per cent 
remained with the respective local government, the other  32 per cent was re-distributed 
to various local governments in line with normative indicators (Kovács,  1991, p .  34; 
Lentner,  2019, p .  25) . Accordingly, a  revitalisation of the lower-middle administrative 
level became inevitable in the early  1990s, though the diversity of local-level tasks and 
authorisations, and the conflicts of interests between individual municipalities or 
between the municipality level and the central government made it almost impossible to 
establish a nationwide, unified and overlap-free lower-middle administrative level .
As regards the local level of public administration, the Local Self-Government Act 
 1990  imposed heavy burdens on mayor’s offices operating under individual local self-
governments, and on joint heads of the local self-government offices alike . The Local 
Self-Government Act  1990 only provided recommendations for villages with less than 
 1,000  residents to establish a  joint head of the local self-government offices . As the 
unpleasant memories of joint town councils from the communist era still lived on, joint 
heads of local self-government offices were scarce, even in regions with the most frag-
mented village-structures . Typically, the small number of joint heads of the local 
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self-government offices or the number of participating villages decreased even further 
(1991:  529 and  1,535), and this trend only reversed in  1997/98 (1997/98:  492 to  505; 
and  1,360 to  1,391 – Szigeti,  2009, p .  8) .
Due to the urgent nature of public utility investments in the years after the regime 
change, and due to the fact that individual institutes providing some local public services 
could only be operated jointly, the necessity of local-level collaboration in the organisa-
tion of local public services and territorial development was recognised fairly early on . The 
first local self-government associations were created in the early  1990s, and the institu-
tionalisation of domestic territorial development, by the promulgation of Act XXI of 
 1996 on Territorial Development and Spatial Planning (Territorial Development Act) 
and the appearance of decentralised financial aid promoted the spread of more complex 
territorial development associations . Subsequently, the reinforcement of the lower-
middle administrative level was mostly hindered by the conflicts of interests between 
the municipality level and the government . In particular, the government insisted on the 
idea of a nationwide, unified and overlap-free lower-middle administration level, while 
in reality at local level a  complicated system of local interests and conflicts prevailed . 
The issue of how to force constitutionally autonomous town local self-governments into 
a  unified system was finally resolved by Section  1(2) of Act CVII of  2004  on 
Multipurpose Micro-Regional Associations which replaced duress with indirect incen-
tives (various statutory grants) for municipalities willing to integrate into the centrally 
defined and limited lower-middle administrative level (into the system of multipurpose 
micro-regional associations) . The minimum requirements of integration were a commit-
ment on the joint performance of tasks related to education, social and healthcare, and 
territorial development . Meanwhile, in relation to the local level of public administra-
tion, Section  1(2) of Government Decree no . 244/2003 (XII .18 .) set out that ‘the area 
of jurisdiction of the organ performing public administration authority tasks may only 
differ from the area of the respective micro-region, if the characteristics associated with 
the performance of the tasks and the exercise of the respective authority justify such 
a  difference’ . After a  short detour, the unified lower-middle administration level had 
apparently been restored in Hungary .
As it transpired, when the FIDESZ–KDNP coalition came to power in  2010, they 
initiated a  centralisation process which fundamentally changed the role of the lower-
middle administrative level in the Hungarian administration system . The amendment of 
the Territorial Development Act (Act CXCVIII of  2011) dissolved the micro-regional 
development councils, transferring lower-middle administrative level territorial develop-
ment tasks to the county local self-governments . Although, in relation to the organisation 
of local public services, possibilities continued to exist to perform tasks associated with 
the lower-middle level, with the repeal of Act CVII of  2004 on  1 January  2013 and the 
subsequent cessation of micro-regional statutory grants, multifunctional micro-regional 
associations practically fell apart . However, the most significant change took place at the 
local level of public administration. Act XCIII of  2012 on the Establishment of Districts 
and the Amendment of the Associated Statutes primarily re-allocated some of the local 
level public administration tasks to newly established district offices, that had formerly 
been carried out by local governments, primarily by notaries, who were local 
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self-government employees, and local state administration bodies with general authori-
ties at the same time . To summarise the post-2010 trends in one sentence, the existence 
of a  unified lower-middle administrative level had been questioned, if not outright 
denied . Below, I will attempt to define the present situation and future perspectives of 
the lower-middle administrative level in an era when bespoke answers to specific chal-
lenges will dominate even in the field of administration .
3. Districts versus lower-middle level
Based on the circumstances outlined in the introduction, I will develop an approach to 
the term lower-middle administrative level, which, instead of consisting of an exclusive 
lower-middle administrative level (where lower-middle level = a specific district distri-
bution), is flexible enough to facilitate the solution of today’s special challenges . This 
approach is based on the fact that the characteristics of Hungarian lower-middle admin-
istrative levels was defined by districts, which  –  despite being unstable  –  increasingly 
assumed the form of self-evident units of administrative spatial planning . The following 
section will explore the reasons .
Paul David, in the course of researching the causes of the Remington company’s 
commercial success, argues that, since certain random events in the past can fundamentally 
affect the current course of events, sometimes it is necessary to accept that only history can 
explain a  current situation (David,  1985) . However, it should be added that due to 
a general resistance to change in society, adjustment to such eventualities may prove to be 
a difficult task . To paraphrase the most important conclusion of David’s classic study, this 
may be regarded as a special case of path dependency, as traditional districts encompassing 
areas within about one day’s walk (about  15–20 km) could have been allocated in a more 
favourable way in the present era . Indeed, in the twentieth century, an increasing diver-
gence became apparent between the practice of Hungarian lower-middle administrative 
level spatial planning, and their treatment by academics . It is worth quoting one of the 
classics of Hungarian administration studies, István Bibó, who in a  paper originally 
published in  1975  pointed out that, although the district system was launched with 
 140 districts in  1950 and this number had gradually decreased, at that time, professional 
discourse still considered the  80–90 larger district regions or city environs as the quintes-
sential elements of the lower-middle administrative level .
This number of  80–90 occasionally recurs in our discourse of spatial planning . In one of the 
closing chapters of his book entitled Magyar város, Ferenc Erdei assumes about  80  centres, 
and . . . Károly Eszláry, who introduced three alternatives for administrative spatial planning 
(the large county, middle-sized county and small county systems) in the Városi Szemle in  1947, 
divided the country into almost the same number of basic elements in all versions: Large 
counties encompassed  87 districts, middle-sized counties had  93 districts, while in the small 
county system, the country was divided into  90 small counties . This author published another 
work entitled Magyarország városhálózatának kiépítése in  1949, wherein, based in Ferenc 
Erdei’s theories, he took into account  98 city environs (Bibó,  1990, vol . III, p .  214) .
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The reason why this is remarkable is that, despite the fact that the number of Hungarian 
cities with a  lower-middle level catchment area is well below  140, mainstream middle 
level spatial planning kept insisting on similar numbers even after the regime change . 
The number of statistical micro-regions created by Notice No . 9006/1994 (S .K .3) of the 
President of the Hungarian Central Statistical Office on the Delimitation of Statistical 
Micro-Regions (138) only slightly differs from that of the system introduced in 
 1950 .  Moreover, most probably due to local level political bargains, the number of 
micro-regions thus defined continuously increased . The number of statistical micro-
regions created in  1994  was first increased by Notice No .  9002/1998  (S .K .1) of the 
President of the Hungarian Central Statistical Office, to  150 . A second increase, enacted 
by Government Decree no .  244/2003  (XII .18 .), took it to  168, while a  third change, 
Act CVII of  2007 increased it further to  174 . Finally, Act CXLIX of  2010 brought the 
number of micro-regions to  175 by  2011 .
With the implementation of the new district system on  1  January  2013, even 
though the actual centres and limits of districts differ from that of the statistical micro-
regions here and there, legislators did not set out to intervene in the structure of the 
lower-middle administrative level . One hundred seventy-five districts were established, 
which more or less corresponded to the number of statistical micro-regions just 
dissolved . Apart from the dissolution of the Polgárdi district, this number remains 
unchanged (presently, the lower-middle administrative level in Hungary consists of 
 174 districts plus  23 capital city districts) .
Since, ideally, a  lower-middle level administrative unit is identical to a  real (func-
tional) city and its catchment area (city district), it is inevitable, when clarifying the 
number of districts, to ask the question: How many cities are there in Hungary? 
Polemics on the topic in the academic  literature generally start from the fact that the 
large number of cities that only became cities for political reasons after the regime 
change has resulted in an extremely fragmented ‘barely-city’ structure (Murányi,  2011), 
which presently includes  346 cities .1 In a study in  2006, Pál Beluszky and Róbert Győri 
concluded that out of the  289 cities officially recognised at the time, only  210 actually 
function as a city to an extent, and a further  122 cities with incomplete city functions 
are deducted, the number goes down to  80–90, the number of larger district regions or 
city environs mentioned by Bibó (Beluszky & Győri,  2006, p .  68) . In a parallel paper, 
Géza Salamin et al . estimated that there were only  57 actual cities with real city func-
tions (Salamin et al .,  2008) . However, Imre Körmendy points out that the latter authors 
define a functional city in such a way that it meets another common criterium, namely 
the minimum of  20  thousand residents defined in the UN’s Demographic Yearbook 
(Körmendy,  2018) . The aim here is not to determine a number or to define our lower-
middle level administrative units according to Bibó’s approach or to the UN guidelines 
but to address the more pressing question of how to handle the meaning of contents 
associated with the lower-middle administrative level .
To arrive at a contextualised definition of the lower-middle administrative level, it 
is essential to understand the concept of the neo-Weberian state . It is well known that 
1 https://statinfo.ksh.hu/Statinfo/themeSelector.jsp?&lang=en
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the dominance of the market-friendly approach attributable to the New Public 
Management was largely replaced after the recession in  2008 by the concept of the neo-
Weberian state, involving strong state engagement . Christopher Pollitt, while admitting 
that, in a neo-Weberian state, strengthening the state’s dominance may even be regarded 
as a traditional Weberian element, points out that the replacement of external orienta-
tion by internal orientation with more focus on bureaucratic rules, along with the 
consideration of citizen’s needs and wants, clearly indicates that this is a ‘neo-’ or innova-
tive version of the concept (Pollitt,  2007, p .  21) . These parallels are also present in the 
state concept of the FIDESZ–KDNP coalition since it attained power in  2010 . Focusing 
only on the creation of the districts mostly associated with the lower-middle administra-
tive level: Although establishing districts (or allocating tasks formerly fulfilled by 
municipalities, notaries or formerly deconcentrated state administrative organisations to 
the district offices) may be considered a  clear sign of Weberian centralisation, this 
ignores the fact that this does not only (or primarily) serve to concentrate powers in the 
hands of the state but also to take into consideration citizens’ needs and wants in 
carrying out administrative tasks . As far as the Hungarian  literature is concerned, it is 
enough to recall István Balázs’s comment on the establishment of a  system of govern-
ment offices and districts that establishes a direct link between the state and its citizens 
(Balázs,  2020, pp .  29–30) .
This is even more clearly evidenced by the institutionalisation of government 
customer service points, facilitating a one-stop-shop style of customer service . Although 
the first government customer service points were brought into existence before the 
district reform (they have been present since  2011), they became the determining 
elements of the administration reform at the time when the districts were established . 
More precisely, pursuant to Section  1(1) of the no longer effective Government Decree 
no . 515/2013 (XII .30 .), ‘Capital City and county Government Offices . . . shall operate 
an integrated customer service (hereinafter: Government customer service point) in the 
district (capital city district) offices’ . On the other hand, based on Section  3(1) of 
Government Decree no .  86/2019  (IV .23 .) on Capital City and County Government 
Offices and District (Capital City District) Offices, which is currently in force, govern-
ment customer service points are even more closely linked to the even stronger district 
(capital city district) offices . The legislation describes government customer service 
points and document offices ‘operated by the district office’ . Even though, at first glance, 
defining government customer service points as the bodies of the district office would 
appear to reinforce the dominance of the district within the lower-middle administra-
tive level, it turns out that the neo-Weberian postulate of ‘meeting citizens’ needs and 
wants’ can still override efforts aimed at reinforcing both districts at all costs and 
centralisation at the same time .
This suggests that districts have clearly shifted the focus of local level public admin-
istration tasks to the lower-middle administrative level . However, in terms of territorial 
development and the organisation of local public services, the lower-middle administra-
tive level is better characterised by the void created by the dissolution of multifunctional 
micro-regional associations . Nevertheless, this current void may also imply that these 
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tasks would be better placed at the lower-middle administrative level, and not  –  as is 
presently the case – at the level of county local self-governments or municipalities .
To summarise the above reasoning, a double conclusion can be drawn . On the one 
hand, it is a  mistake to identify the lower-middle administrative level with one single 
geographical delimitation . Moreover, should a demand for such delimitation appear, be 
it about the practice of Hungarian lower-middle administrative level spatial planning, or 
in regard to a relevant academic argument, it may be presumed that the underlying cause 
is a lack of critical analysis of ‘path dependency’ . On the other hand, in line with one of 
the fundamental postulates of the concept of the neo-Weberian state, the viability of 
aiming to meet citizens’ needs is accepted . If the final decision in such matters lies with 
the citizens themselves, we must not obstruct an increasing focus on customers in terms 
of spatial use within the lower-middle administrative level .
The short piece of empirical research below aims to give an insight into an even 
more customer-focused pattern at the lower-middle administrative levels . Its starting 
point is the fact that at the lower-middle administrative level, the objectives of the trans-
formation of the Hungarian administration after  2010 have primarily been manifested 
by the establishment of districts and government customer service points . Therefore, 
based on the publicly accessible data of the Hungarian Central Statistical Office and the 
district-level and town-level data of government customer service points, I will outline 
a few simple correlations that may indicate a possibly fruitful direction for the develop-
ment of the middle-lower administration level in Hungary .
4. Reporting results
My empirical research is aimed both at highlighting a few characteristics of the lower-
middle administrative level since  2010  and suggesting a  possible direction for future 
development . Perhaps the most important feature I would like to point out is that the 
existence of a unified lower-middle administrative level is questionable . In the light of 
the multipurpose micro-regional associations’ reduced influence, this becomes clear . I 
must add that even after the most important results of the reforms of  2010, the district 
system appears to be fragmenting further . Within the territories of the present  174 dis-
tricts and the  23 capital city districts, currently  304 government customer service points 
were in operation on  4 February  2020 . Although the distribution is slightly uneven, this 
yields  1 .54 government customer service points for each district and capital city district, 
loosening the unified district-system further by creating what are termed ‘government 
customer service catchment areas’ . However, the expression ‘catchment area’ is placed 
within quotation marks for a reason . Namely that integrated customer services are pre-
cisely based on the notion of facilitating the running of official errands for everyone, in 
any of the customer service offices . Of course, an individual’s rational choice is the 
 closest or the most easily accessible office . This rules out the official existence of govern-
ment customer service’s areas of jurisdiction, yet based on the customary use of 
territories, a  structure defining the new elements of the lower-middle administrative 
level could be established . These elements would be smaller than districts, and in a sense, 
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they would represent competition for the former . Below, I will argue that such a  frag-
mentation of district levels is not only an indication of the situation at present, but also, 
it may be used to establish the future course of development for the lower-middle 
administrative level .
Let us start out from a  peculiar contradiction . On the one hand, the legislators 
obviously created government customer service points to facilitate an easy procedure for 
private individuals to resolve official matters . On the other hand, apparently, the 
majority of cases formerly requiring a personal presence will be replaced by using various 
communication means or e-government technology . To support the second notion, in 
an extreme case, it could reach the point where, in the imminent era of Web  3 .0, the 
existence of districts becomes simply unnecessary, as people will be able to run their 
official errands (and not only the ones related to administration) online, even from the 
smallest village . For the time being, however, it is not necessary to go this far: It is 
enough to presume that with e-government technologies gaining traction, (which is 
forecasted for the near future), personal presence in the government customer service 
points may become rarer, which may then lead to a cutback in the number of govern-
ment customer service points operated by each district office, or even to a decrease in 
the number of the districts themselves .
Considering this, it can be hypothesised that, within the territory of districts with 
higher levels of Internet coverage, more people are already able to run their official 
errands electronically than by reporting to the government customer service points in 
person . Furthermore, if this finding is valid, in a  rational area distribution and spatial 
planning system, districts with more developed Internet coverage will need fewer 
government customer service points than those with lower levels of Internet coverage . 
As is described below, I attempted to find a correlation between the two indicators, but, 
considering the differences between the characteristics of each region, I conducted the 
analysis separately for the districts of the seven planning and statistical NUTS  2 regions 
before  1  January  2018, specifically: Western Transdanubia (Győr-Moson-Sopron, Vas 
and Zala counties), Middle Transdanubia (Fejér, Komárom and Veszprém counties), 
Southern Transdanubia (Baranya, Tolna and Somogy counties), Middle Hungary 
(Budapest and Pest county), Northern Hungary (Borsod-Abaúj-Zemplén, Heves and 
Nógrád counties), the Northern Great Plain (Hajdú-Bihar, Jász-Nagykun-Szolnok and 
Szabolcs-Szatmár-Bereg counties), and the Southern Great Plain (Bács-Kiskun, Békés 
and Csongrád counties) . For the sake of completeness, please note that, since  1 January 
 2018, Middle Hungary has been divided into two NUTS  2 regions, Budapest and Pest 
County . However, I have not yet taken this split into account in my analysis as Budapest 
and a  large part of Pest County can be considered a  single functional unit of the 
Budapest agglomeration, regardless of the recent changes in the NUTS system .
Based on the above data, the following correlation was found between Internet pene-
tration (the percentage of Internet subscriptions among the permanent residents of the 
subject districts, or  –  due to the lack of data on Internet penetration in the capital city 
districts – the capital, Budapest) and the availability of government customer service points 
(the percentage of residents of the municipalities with a  government customer service 
point within the permanent residents of the subject districts, or Budapest), in  2018:
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Table  1 .
Correlations between Internet penetration and the availability of government customer service 
points in Hungarian NUTS  2 regions before  1 January  2018, broken down by districts or for 
Budapest as a whole (2018)
correlation (r)
Southern Transdanubia 0 .79
Western Transdanubia 0 .77
Middle Transdanubia 0 .72
Northern Great Plain 0 .65
Southern Great Plain 0 .60
Northern Hungary 0 .55
Middle Hungary 0 .31
Source: Compiled by the author based on data from the KSH dissemination database .2
This table shows that in Hungary, contrary to what might be expected, at this time, the 
residents of municipalities of districts with better Internet penetration also have access 
to more government customer service points than residents of districts with lower 
Internet penetration, making reporting in person to use government customer services 
more difficult in the latter districts . More specifically, based on Joy Guilford’s approach 
(1942), in the majority of the NUTS  2 regions in question, a high (Pearson’s) positive 
correlation (distinct association) or a  medium positive correlation (significant 
association) is present between the variables of Internet penetration and the availability 
of government customer service points . The only exception is the Middle Hungarian 
region, encompassing Budapest Capital City and the adjacent agglomeration, where the 
Pearson’s correlation value of  0 .31 suggests a weak, yet stable correlation . In this region, 
the percentage of Internet subscriptions was by far the highest in the country in 
 2018 (38 .1 per cent) . However, in terms of availability of government customer service 
points (58 .9  per cent of residents live in the territory of a  municipality where 
a  government customer service point is available), no  similar dominance is present in 
the Middle Hungarian region . Moreover, this region is clearly inferior to the Southern 
Great Plan region in this sense (67 .7 per cent), while the Northern Great Plain region 
shows a  similar value (58 .9  per cent) . In Budapest, a  city with  56 .4  per cent of the 
population of the Middle Hungarian region, not only were Internet penetration values 
the highest (for Budapest, the percentage of Internet penetration is  45 .1  per cent, 
compared to  40 .7  per cent in the Debrecen district, which has the highest internet 
penetration outside the Budapest area) but also the government customer service points 
were available in every district of the capital, which is even more remarkable . The smaller 
anomaly is mainly attributable to the fact that, although the population significantly 
increased in some municipalities of Budapest’s agglomeration after the regime change, 
2 https://statinfo.ksh.hu/Statinfo/themeSelector.jsp?&lang=en; town-level data of  government customer service 
points; https://kormanyablak.hu/hu/kormanyablakok
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policy makers still concluded that there is no need to provide local outlets to facilitate 
the official errands of private individuals in these ‘dormitory towns’ . The underlying 
assumption was that the majority of residents of these satellite settlements commute to 
Budapest in the first place, and for the rest of the population, traveling to Budapest is 
not very inconvenient, either . The result of this reasoning is perhaps demonstrated best 
by the example of the Dunakeszi district . Although this district has  86,992  residents, 
(its seat of the same name has  43,813 residents, putting it in second place after the town 
of Érd with county rights with  69,014  residents in the agglomeration), it is the only 
district with no government customer service point at all .
By the same token, the unavailability of government customer service points in 
Dunakeszi district or Dunakeszi city is most probably caused by other contingencies 
outside of the scope of this paper, and not by an intentional policy . It is also clear that, 
except for in the Middle Hungarian region, Internet penetration – and the closely asso-
ciated general socio-economic development level – and the availability of government 
customer service points are positively correlated . Theoretically, this discrepancy could 
be decreased by opening new government customer service points . The unlimited possi-
bilities of such efforts are demonstrated by the example of Őriszentpéter, the village in 
Hungary with the smallest number of residents (1,166) which has a  government 
customer service point, operating an integrated customer service despite the fact that it 
is not even a  district seat . However, opening such a  large number of government 
customer service points would not be feasible, as the maintenance of the present system 
already imposes a heavy burden on the state . To illustrate this, and most probably due to 
the permanent lack of personnel and the low pay for civil servants, the government 
customer service office in that village, which was formerly open between  08:00 am and 
 08:00  pm every working day, (Fibinger et al .,  2017, p .  5), now operates full-time on 
Wednesdays only, significantly restricting the opportunities for in person business .
5. Conclusion and further implications
As I mentioned above, the Local Self-Government Act  1990 implemented a quite frag-
mented local self-government structure, although the multipurpose micro-regional 
associations institutionalised by Act CVII of  2004 were able to create good opportuni-
ties for expanding local level synergies . Unfortunately, in the early  2010s, these 
formations were marginalised as a result of centralisation efforts . Furthermore, the sys-
tem of multipurpose micro-regional associations had a  significant and inherent defect 
since, due to the nature of associations, the former collaborations were not always able 
to provide a stable framework for administration, since instead of being organised from 
bottom up, the multipurpose micro-regional associations were defined and limited from 
above, and kept together by indirect instructions from above, as opposed to by a mutual 
recognition and management of interests . As a  result, after their statutory grants were 
cut in  2013, these organisations fell apart perhaps too easily, and, considering the 
increasingly limited possibilities of the local level, without justification . The author of 
this paper is of the opinion that the near future should bring a process of simplification 
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based on the mutual recognition of interests, similarly to that which took place after the 
regime change: Individual local self-governments which are weak by themselves should 
work together again, supported by the pillars of the lower-middle level described above .
The theoretical underpinnings of the study pointed out that it would be a mistake 
to identify the lower-middle level with one single geographical delimitation, such as the 
current district system, and that research on the ideal size and desirable functions of 
lower-middle level administrative units should focus on the needs of users, in line with 
one of the most fundamental postulates of the concept of the neo-Weberian state . The 
subsequent empirical research suggested that problems arising at the local level of public 
administration cannot be adequately solved by the current district system or by govern-
ment customer service points alone . The transition to the Web  3 .0 era will be long and 
ponderous in Hungarian regions at lower levels of socio-economic development, and 
government customer service points are already short of personnel to fulfil their 
intended function (to facilitate the in person handling of official tasks after work) . The 
currently prevailing approach, that is, the network of mobile district assistants (Kelő, 
 2019), or the mobile government customer service points which appear from time to 
time in smaller villages, burden the system further, and do not represent a  permanent 
solution, with the gradual transition to the use of the technologies offered by the Web 
 3 .0 era . A system of information hubs operated or supported by local self-governments 
in the centres of micro-regions, for example, developed on the basis of the current 
Digital Welfare Programme Hubs (Digitális Jólét Program pontok), where people could 
receive help with solving their official issues electronically would potentially solve this 
problem . This would encourage citizens to familiarise themselves with and embrace the 
technologies offered by the Web  3 .0  era, and  –  to a  limited extent, so far  –  it would 
channel people away from district level offices, allowing them to deal with more impor-
tant cases requiring personal presence . In the longer term, this could even result in 
a decrease in the number of districts compared to today, possibly down to the number of 
 80–90 mentioned by Bibó and which recurs in the professional discourse .
Moving on to the further implications beyond the tasks of public administration, 
the role of local self-governments is also crucial in terms of the territorial development 
tasks associated with the lower-middle administrative level . Although the current legisla-
tion requires all municipalities to follow an independent town development policy (for 
example to draft the strategic document of the town development concept indepen-
dently), this does not imply neglecting territorial development tasks which go beyond 
local level . Government Decree no . 314/2012 (XI .8 .) on City Development Concepts, 
Integrated City Development Strategies and Urban Planning Means, and Individual 
Specific Legal Institutions Associated with Urban Planning, for example, clearly stipu-
lates that urban development concepts for cities with city rights shall contain a vision of 
the role the city will play in the region, which makes joint review and planning of terri-
torial development problems affecting the city and its catchment area alike 
unavoidable .
It is also worth saying a few words about the problems of the organisation of local 
public services. In this respect, it is obvious that collaboration at the lower-middle 
administrative level is essential, as Section  11(2) of Act CLXXXIX of  2011  on 
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Hungary’s Local Self-Governments detailing unnecessary yet required tasks clearly sets 
out that ‘the statute shall differentiate when establishing the mandatory tasks and scope 
of authorities’ . Thus, the joint maintenance of the associates’ tasks and different insti-
tutes (for example, in an association under the auspices of a gestor municipality) is still 
a working practice today . The re-establishment of bottom-up associations at the lower-
middle administrative level  –  under the old name of multipurpose micro-regional 
association or with a new, different name – could facilitate the more rational and clear 
operation of these associations . They could also partly relieve the burden on the ‘ideal 
district’, which is mentioned in the Hungarian Public Administration and Public Service 
Development Strategy, as a typical level of the organisation of public services in the long 
term (Közigazgatás- és közszolgáltatásfejlesztési stratégia,  2014–2020, p .  51) .
Finally, allow me to make a few closing remarks . On the one hand, I have discussed 
the possible question of considering the geographical scale of the associations operating 
below district level, primarily by supplementing and relieving them, instead of competing 
with them . Hungary’s cities with city rights, as micro-region centres, could provide an 
adequate starting point in this regard . However, it has to be understood that, to achieve 
the re-institutionalisation of these lower-middle level administrative units, willingness is 
necessary on the part of the state . Due to the decrease in the number of districts fore-
casted for the Web  3 .0 era, the creation of such associations may potentially be in the 
interest of building a neo-Weberian state aiming to meet citizens’ needs and wants (and 
ultimately, downsizing administration to a smaller, more human scale) .
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Abstract: This study outlines the development of Hungary’s monetary policy, and the course and 
changes in its objectives and instruments since the beginning of the market economy transition 
in the late  1980s . The author’s basic thesis is that the period since the two-level banking system 
was reinstated after four decades of a planned economy system, in  1987, can be basically divided 
into three development phases with significantly different characteristics . The first phase was an 
‘attempt to introduce’ an imported monetary mechanism, or perhaps an urge to comply with it, 
while the second phase was an approach of a  monetary regime change launched in  2013  and 
supporting economic growth and financial stability strongly and directly, which lasted until the 
appearance of the traumatic elements of the Covid-19  pandemic crisis . The third phase is 
evolving today, under the circumstances of adapting to the conditions of the real essence of the 
twenty-first century, i .e . a  new type of international competitiveness, which is pursued by the 
Central Bank of Hungary as stipulated by the Fundamental Law and the cardinal Central Bank 
Act of Hungary .
Keywords: regime change, monetary policy, pressure for competitiveness
1. Introduction – the general nature of central banking policies
In Continental Europe, until the crisis of  2007–2008, it was generally believed that 
monetary policy was an activity of fiscal policy, in the course of which the monetary 
government influenced interest terms and thereby also impacted macro-economic 
demand .1 In practice this means and entails that the most important instrument for the 
implementation of the monetary policy for most central banks was the determination of 
the levels of applicable interest rates . Increasing the applicable interest rate and conse-
quently reducing the money supply are known as restrictive monetary policy . 
A restrictive policy temporarily holds back economic growth, but it also helps to curb 
1 The study seeks to follow A. P. Samuelson & D. W. Nordhaus’s classification (2005, pp.  479–489), although deviance 
from that is justified by time and changed practice and circumstances.
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inflation . Implementing measures aimed at expanding the money supply by lowering the 
applicable interest rate is referred to as an expansionary monetary policy . This temporar-
ily stimulates the economy, although it may adversely affect inflation .
After these decades of applying this approach (that is, the monetarist solution), 
usually considered as an axiom during boom phases, was overridden by the crisis which 
arose in Anglo-Saxon subprime markets, and, although the determination of the base 
rate enjoyed primacy in the Federal Reserve’s target system and the set of instruments 
aligned with it (and at the same time, in the entire Anglo-Saxon central banking prac-
tice), its outcome dimension is measured by the extent to which it alleviates 
unemployment and improves the employment rate, while making the inflation index 
‘bearable’ is only its umpteenth objective .
In the boom phases of developed countries central banks play a prominent role in 
controlling the money supply, within the framework of which so-called quantitative 
reference values are applied . These quantitative reference values are determined by mid-
term price stability, the interest rates of long-term loans, government deficit, the level of 
government debt (essentially, the Maastricht nominal convergence criteria) as well as 
changes in the money supply, the velocity of money and the strength of the exchange 
rate (for more detail, see Huszti,  2006) .
This one-dimensional monetary model, based on controlling the money supply and 
with a  correspondingly loose approach to banking regulation ended in worldwide 
failure . Economic growth and financial stability ‘built’ on price stability had faltered by 
 2007–2008 .2 That is, central banks were mostly (in Hungary, to a  lesser degree) 
successful at achieving price stability, but in the meantime, risks undermining financial 
stability had emerged . Perhaps the collapse of Anglo-Saxon subprime markets could 
have been avoided if in practice unreasonable and barely controlled lending for building 
residential properties, real estate investments and other ludicrous trade transactions in 
order to boost the economy increasingly vigorously and high leverage ratios had not 
saturated the market relatively rapidly, which resulted in a significant rise in the ratio of 
non-performing and doubtful loans . Ultimately, the financial actors of the decades 
preceding the crisis had followed (unfortunately) without criticism Alan Greenspan’s 
former basic concept, that ‘the market-stabilizing private regulatory forces should gradu-
ally displace many cumbersome, increasingly ineffective government structures’ .3 
Greenspan’s theoretical guidance was widely put into practice not only in the United 
States but, with the globalisation of financial market operations, all over the world .4
In the late twentieth century, the traditional banking system was globalised also in 
its branches of business, i .e . it became a banking system with a homogeneous practice 
(mostly with a  concentrated, international ownership background) prevailing interna-
tionally, with various financial activities (insurance, leasing, factoring, capital market 
2 Essentially, I am using Olivier Blanchard’s approach (2012), with ‘an added value’, noting that in emerging markets 
placing the burden of  the exclusivity of  price stability on their central banks’ consequences were even more severe.
3 Adopted from The Financial Crisis Inquiry Report,  2011.
4 For the description of  the excessive lending practice of  American monetary markets see Lentner (2012) and Kecskés 
(2015). For the meltdown of  the Hungarian loan market stifled by foreign currency loans see Kovács (2013) and 
Lentner (2015).
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businesses) included in one single ‘plant’, which the supervisory and controlling practice 
was unable to keep pace with . The Washington Consensus, the ‘dismantling’ of the 
Glass Steagal, the Maastricht and Copenhagen Criteria and the market practice which 
formed in line with the European Union’s four freedoms all ultimately created a neolib-
eral market economy model, in which the innovation of banking products was not 
followed by the development of supervisory and control activities .5
According to the approach which prevailed for decades, the bank (the plant), as 
a  market operator, enforcing the laws of supply and demand  –  based on Greenspan’s 
logic – is able to make responsible decisions, particularly when granting loans . In fact, 
neither self-restraint, a  prudent decision-making mechanism nor effective regulation 
and supervision were exercised . The collapse of the system by  2007–2008  forced not 
only the reconsideration of regulation and supervision in a strict sense, but also placed 
the further operation of the neoliberal system of the market economy under stricter 
state regulation .6
2. The fundamental problem of the monetary practice  
of the transitioning Hungarian economy (1987–2013)
From the late  1980s onwards, three reforms: the Companies Act (Act no . VI of  1988) 
promoting the market economy transition, the act guaranteeing investments by foreign-
ers and the decision allowing for the establishment of a two-tier banking system steered 
Hungary towards a  market economy . The transformation of the economic model was 
accelerated by the excessive indebtedness of the country, the almost complete dysfunc-
tionality of public assets, narrowing foreign export markets, a  sharp decline in the 
demand of domestic market outlets, and, in particular, an increasingly marked demand 
for Western products of higher quality . Clearly, reactivating an economy requires high 
volumes of working capital and financial capital imports capable of further financing an 
exceptionally high government debt . There was neither the intellectual capacity nor the 
patience to fix the economy by means of internal resources . All that existed was a vague 
political promise to create a social market economy made in right-wing political circles 
which were organising and preparing themselves for a  regime change from the late 
 1980s . It should also be noted that this was the period when the social market economy 
model existed only in fragments in Western Europe and was being replaced by a neolib-
eral mode of production applying the principle of freedom of multinational companies 
and an economy without any limitations .
The transformation of the Hungarian economic regime, including the introduction 
of a  two-tier banking system, and in particular, the development of the central bank’s 
roles, took place in accordance with the expectations of this lopsided, but increasingly 
neoliberal world . Commercial banks, ‘seceding’ from the Central Bank of Hungary 
5 The American practice basically ‘bypassed’ the attention of  the supervisory authority and lost its transparency as 
securitisation processes became common and vigilance against risks was artificially relaxed. See Kecskés (2017).
6 Its main components include: the Dodd-Frank Act, stricter regulation of  and control over credit rating agencies, 
enhancing micro- and macroprudential supervision by central banks and other authorities.
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(Magyar Nemzeti Bank, MNB), as well as brand new, domestically established banks, 
struggled with capitalisation and management problems from the very start . Their 
operations were overwhelmed by a situation where they simultaneously had to manage 
the increasingly doubtful loans of inefficient state-owned companies and the resource 
requirements of a new entrepreneurial class lacking capital and business knowledge . In 
addition to forced credit exposures, the situation of state subsidies provided by the 
central budget was also characterised by similar duress . Private start-up companies were 
granted loans not according to efficiency criteria but only to a  degree necessary for 
keeping them operable, but due to ‘confusion’ and the lack of coordination of compre-
hensive financial (taxing, aiding, market, central banking) instruments, both credit and 
state aid was used with low efficiency .
In the early  1990s, government deficit much more depended on how roles in financing 
companies were divided between the budget and the credit system rather than how much 
additional demand was created by the state . . . companies, including their subsidies, were 
financed from continuously rolling loans . In other words, the credit system assumed quite 
a significant part of public (fiscal) functions, therefore also a significant part of the demand 
created by the state was realised in the form of companies’ credit expansion, that is, 
bypassing the budget (Antal,  2004, p .  75) .
The (initially) increasing value and efficiency of the banking sector can be accounted for 
by the fact that from  1987 to  1990 sectoral profit increased by  223 .7 per cent (Nyers, 
 1991) . The impact of the unfolding transformational crisis, however, could also be felt 
in the banking sector, as the downturn of the real sector also negatively affected the 
performance of the banks, resulting in a series of bank consolidations .
Supervision over the operations of commercial banks is exercised by the central 
bank, which influences financial institutions through its regulatory activities . From the 
early  1990s, however, the MNB began to continuously remove its refinancing instru-
ments, gradually phasing out refinancing loans with lower interest rates and longer terms 
in the undercapitalised corporate sector, so that by the mid-1990s start-up companies 
and farmers found themselves in a hopeless situation due to the gradually reduced state 
subsidies and simultaneous phasing out of protective duties in what had become an 
increasingly fiercely competitive market . They were ‘dragging down’ the commercial 
banks, which were stumbling from one consolidation to the other . The same kind of 
process of dismantlement took place in the field of the refinancing of government debt 
by the MNB (Kolozsi & Lentner,  2006), i .e . the MNB also let the fiscal sector down, 
and due to the government’s failed taxation and state aid policies, additionally financing 
a  continuously increasing government deficit and debt required the involvement of 
foreign investors, which, due to risk premiums being set higher than the market rate, 
caused a massive outflow of revenues from the country and even entailed vulnerability 
to international markets .
The central banking practice applied in developed market economies was also 
adopted in the central banking policy of Hungary after the regime change, which had 
destructive effects on both the national economy and society and which caused severe 
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problems in financing both Hungarian enterprises and government debt, and even the 
loss of resources and income . The second wave of adopting Western banking practice 
without criticism dates to the period after the turn of the Millennium, when the corpo-
rate clientele – as a result of the above processes –had a decreasing demand for loans and 
were being financed by parent companies and capital market instruments, which 
encouraged the banking sector to shift towards the retail market, especially demographic 
groups with low credit ratings even by Hungarian standards, which over time led to 
a culture of excessive lending . Despite this trend, no substantial measures were taken by 
the MNB to curb retail credit outflows without adequate collateral, and this would be 
one of the main contributors to the crisis which unfolded at the end of the  2000s .
The function of the banking system is to build market conditions and, in the period 
following its consolidation, this is expected to strengthen the market economy, which 
serves the national economy as a whole through financing real market operators, there-
fore reducing government deficit and debt . Instead, as a  result of its excessive lending 
operation in the  2000s, the banking system in Hungary inflicted further budgetary and 
social damage, which had to be repaired by further fiscal and central banking sacrifices 
since  2010, now within an active state-governed framework .
‘The function of the Central Bank is, by influencing the changes in the value of the 
currency, to achieve such a state of employment and the international payment position 
that is considered desirable, and through this, to promote economic growth accepted as 
optimal’ (Hagelmayer,  1969, p .  165) . Of these functions, the MNB’s attempts to 
increase employment and growth were pushed into the background in the first decades 
of the market economy . Ernő Huszti (1987), argued that the MNB’s room for 
manoeuvre depends on the share of the growth of the annual credit volume which is 
accounted for by the amount of loans granted to the budget . The MNB can influence 
the expansion of solvent demand, also manifested in the growth of the aggregate money 
supply, only to this extent . The MNB, however, provided an opportunity for this expan-
sion of commercial loans by playing a smaller and smaller role in financing the budget, 
as less and less resources were allocated to it . Huszti believed that the MNB has primacy 
in shaping commercial banks’ lending and controlling solvent demand . Since the 
capacity to refinance the real sector dropped in the activities of the MNB after the first 
third of the  1990s, and its role in refinancing the budget had also finished by  2000, the 
contingent assets of the MNB could be focussed to a significant degree on the aggregate 
money supply and the regulation of commercial banks’ lending, thereby aiming at 
boosting macroeconomic progress .
In the  1990s, Hungary was not yet a Member State of the European Union, but it 
implemented its central banking regulatory guidelines rapidly and without adequate 
consideration . The main objective of the regulation adopted within the EU on  1 January 
 1994 was to make the public sector subject to the same conditions pertaining to indebt-
edness as applied in the private sector . In order to enhance the market sensitivity of the 
public sector, central banks were prohibited from purchasing government securities 
directly at the time of their issue, but they could purchase securities on the secondary 
market without limitations, as securities purchased there had already been ‘priced’ by 
the market . The aim of this regulation was to give fiscal policy a better perception of the 
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price of deficit, but if the structure of the budget is poor, this perception and its expected 
positive effect are hardly significant, because the generation of deficit is permanent, 
despite its heightened interest rate sensitivity . Furthermore, the expectations of the EU 
and international financial institutions (such as the International Monetary Fund and 
the World Bank) to reduce the level of aid provided to the real economy and indirectly 
to reduce social policy aid, and the swift compliance with these requirements by 
Hungary  –  without an adequate transition  –  also caused internal problems, since 
domestic, less creditworthy start-up enterprises would have had an enormous demand 
for the MNB’s refinancing loans .
As the management of the economy produced temporary potential for growth 
despite the boom following the world economic shock in  1997–1998, the results 
achieved by the Hungarian economy between  1999  and  2002, and then a  loose fiscal 
policy after  2002 put the commercial banking sector onto a dynamic, credit-expanding 
path . Despite the improvements in some of the macroeconomic figures in the real sector, 
the standard of living and real wages in Hungary fell short of the expectations of the 
population . However, excessive lending, which was common internationally, and the 
‘globalisation’ of this trend spreading into Hungary (Lentner,  2015), led to Hungarian 
banks issuing spectacular credit quotas after the turn of the Millennium, while the 
Hungarian retail and local government sectors created an inexhaustible demand for this 
credit supply . The MNB, designed to regulate the loan market, exhibited a  laissez-fair 
attitude (Matolcsy et al .,  2015; Bethlendi et al .,  2015), while the government was unable 
to provide solvent demand at a  satisfactory and expected level (in terms of wages and 
social benefits), which resulted in a  peculiar ‘compensation’ or ‘supplementation’ (of 
loans) being provided by the banks . Lending, however, lagged behind the creditworthi-
ness of borrowers, which later, after the outbreak of the global economic crisis, caused 
problems in society and for the national economy, which later triggered a  series of 
consolidation measures by the central bank . Although both external empirical experi-
ences of a  new type of crisis management (for example, Galema & Lugo,  2017), in 
particular in the field of central banking and internal theoretical approaches (for 
example, Neményi,  2009; Neményi,  2011) were directly available after the outbreak of 
the crisis, substantial crisis management measures were implemented only after the 
change of government in  2010, particularly after the change of the central banking 
regime in  2013 .
When the Economic and Monetary Union was established, it was generally consid-
ered that, with the introduction of the euro, the elimination of the exchange rates of 
national currencies, and the enforcement of strict regulations on the operation of the 
EMU, including the control of the central budget balances of Member States, Member 
States would be free of financial imbalances or crises (Losoncz,  2010) . The Maastricht 
convergence criteria, which are applicable to the candidate countries of the EU and to 
euro zone aspirants, who are required to meet them, presumed a quasi crisis-free situa-
tion . However, due to the weakness of fiscal positions, the banking crisis which arose in 
 2007–2008  soon caused a  fiscal shock and a  government debt crisis across Europe, 
particularly in Hungary and other significantly indebted countries, the banking systems 
of which had been weakened more severely than average .
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The ability of fiscal policy to generate solvent demand sufficient for social and 
corporate needs fell short of expectations, and the banking system sought to fill this gap 
by making loans but ignoring classic lending regulations . After the banking crises, 
however, commercial banks –partly to meet their needs for state consolidation – adopted 
more ‘low-key’ business policies, in which the acceptance of tightening regulations and 
corporate social responsibility prevailed in a more comprehensive and robust way . The 
mandate-objective system of central banks, which has assumed a  key role in crisis 
management since  2008, also underwent certain changes, by which the value system of 
central banks’ social responsibility was also modified, as it became more carefully 
adapted to the macroeconomic dimension and the social context . However, the Central 
Bank of Hungary started to align with this only in  2013 (Lentner,  2013; Zéman et al ., 
 2018) .
3. The central banking regime change after  2013
The framework of monetary policy substantially changed as a  result of the crisis of 
 2007–2008 .  According to Blanchard (2012), the separation between monetary and 
prudential competencies became less rigid within the new monetary policy framework 
and, in addition to price stability, financial stability also became a  priority for central 
banks, while some unconventional elements were added to the central banking toolkit, 
as a  result of which central banks started to play a  greater role in crisis management . 
During crisis management, most developed central banks soon achieved an interest rate 
level of zero and in many cases interest rates sank into the negative range . However, the 
reduction of interest rates did not prove to be a sufficient remedy, so the central banks of 
developed countries increasingly put emphasis on quantitative easing . The central banks 
of the United States, the euro area, Japan, the United Kingdom and Sweden launched 
securities purchase programmes, in particular programmes to purchase government 
bonds (Abidi & Ixart  2018; Macchiarelli et al .,  2017; Arrata & Nguyen,  2017; 
Funashima,  2018; Ramcharan & Yu,  2016) .
Emerging economies took a different path and near-zero interest rate levels were far 
less characteristic of them . In this group of countries, Eastern and Central European 
countries were able to achieve a relatively low interest rate level, while the interest rate 
levels of emerging Asian and South American central banks were farther from zero . 
Higher risk premiums, resulting from the greater external vulnerability of these econo-
mies and their inflation rates, which are higher than those of developed economies, as 
well as their more dynamic growth, largely account for these differences .
The distinct and independent monetary policy of the MNB presents an opportu-
nity to create a  constructive harmony between fiscal and the central banking policy . 
Nevertheless, the operation of the central bank and the programmes it implements are 
determined under the Central Bank Act, Section  3(1) of which includes the following 
provision: The primary objective of the MNB shall be to achieve and maintain price 
stability . Section  3(2) states that, without prejudice to its primary objective, the MNB 
shall support the maintenance of the stability of the system of financial intermediation, 
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the enhancement of its resilience and its sustainable contribution to economic growth; 
furthermore, the MNB shall support the government’s economic policy, using the 
instruments at its disposal .
Between  2012 and  2019, the MNB, taking its statutory powers and assigned tasks 
into account, reduced the base rate from  7 per cent to  0 .9 per cent and kept it at that 
level . This decline in yields significantly reduced the Government’s interest expenditure, 
saving  4 .5  per cent of the GDP (1,600  billion forint) between  2013  and  2018 .  The 
Funding for Growth Scheme, announced in the spring of  2013  as one of the MNB’s 
credit incentives, offered banks a  refinancing loan at a   0  per cent interest rate, which 
would enable them to lend to small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) at an interest 
rate margin capped at  2 .5  per cent (Kolozsi et al .,  2017) . In  2015, the Funding for 
Growth Scheme was replaced by the Growth Supporting Programme, which aimed at 
transitioning corporate lending to market conditions . The MNB introduced the Self-
Financing Programme in the middle of  2014 to reduce external vulnerability (exposure 
to foreign currency risk) . In this programme, the MNB encouraged banks to keep their 
liquid assets in other liquid assets, particularly in forint-denominated government secu-
rities, instead of in deposits at the MNB . The accommodation of banks to the measures 
of the MNB was manifested in the increase of the purchase of government securities by 
banks, which considerably contributed to the improvement of the structure of financing 
government debt (through the increase of the banks’ holdings of government securities 
and the decrease of foreign currency debt) . When household loans denominated in 
foreign currencies were being phased out, the MNB took a pro-active role in the nego-
tiations between the government and the Hungarian Banking Association, and after 
that, it substantially contributed to the conversion of foreign currency-denominated 
household loans into Hungarian forint-denominated ones by providing the required 
foreign currency liquidity (9 billion euro) for the banking sector . By the end of  2015, 
the balance of Hungarian households had practically no foreign currency-denominated 
loans, and this risk was eliminated once and for all from the Hungarian economy (for 
more details, see Matolcsy & Palotai,  2018) .
In Hungary, the corporate credit portfolio shrank by  4–5  per cent annually 
between  2009 and  2013 . The sustainability risks of Hungarian processes are well illus-
trated by the fact that while in other countries hit by a major financial crisis the decline 
in lending usually stopped by the fifth year following the crisis, Hungary’s loan portfolio 
was still decreasing in  2013 . The resolution of the lending anomaly became one of the 
priority objectives of the Hungarian economic policy . Above all, the general reduction 
of interest rates aimed to halt the decline in lending . The sharply falling trend of the 
corporate credit portfolio was broken after  2013 and a credit freeze became avoidable . 
The SME credit portfolio, which had been decreasing for years prior to  2013, has seen 
continuous growth since  2015 .  In  2017, the growth dynamics of the corporate credit 
portfolio reached  10  per cent, and taking private entrepreneurs also in consideration, 
the credit portfolio of the SME sector expanded by  12  per cent . By Q2  of  2018, the 
annual growth dynamics reached  15  per cent . In line with the MNB’s forecasts, the 
increase of SME lending has stabilised in between  5 and  10 per cent, which is within the 
range considered necessary for sustainable economic growth by the MNB .
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Figure  1 .
Annual changes in SME lending
Source: From the charts of the Central Bank of Hungary,  2019 .
The financial crisis which broke in  2008  and soon expanded globally, hit Hungary in 
a  fragile and vulnerable state . One of the main reasons for this was that, in an 
international context, the amount of external and foreign currency-denominated debt 
of the Hungarian national economy was outstanding . A  large proportion of this high 
external and foreign-currency denominated debt was related to public finances, as the 
state relied heavily on foreign investors and international organisation which were 
financing Hungary in  2008, particularly the International Monetary Fund . After the 
change of direction in the monetary policy in  2013, the MNB considered the reduction 
of external vulnerability to be a strategic goal .
The gross external debt of public finances started to moderate in  2014  and to 
decrease markedly during  2015 . From  2014–2016, the gross external debt of the state 
dropped from  50 per cent of the GDP to  40 per cent . The foreign currency ratio of the 
gross debt of the central budget decreased from  42 per cent in March  2015 to less than 
 30 per cent in March,  2016, and to  27 .1 per cent in June, reaching pre-crisis levels, and 
was subsequently further reduced .
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Figure  2 .
Development of foreign currency ratio of the gross debt of the central budget
Source: From the charts of the Central Bank of Hungary,  2019 .
4. Conclusions and consequences – at the beginning of a new 
central banking path
The policy followed by the central bank between  2013 and  2020 can be accounted for 
by the fact that the pursuit of a set of macroeconomic objectives (moderating inflation, 
promoting growth and achieving financial equilibrium) and goals for society (improv-
ing public welfare and the situation of disadvantaged groups of the population, such as 
foreign currency borrowers) and the instruments adopted to achieve them have contrib-
uted to the improvements in the positions of the national economy and society to a very 
large extent . A  different set of objectives and instruments (as in the decades prior to 
 2013), i .e . focussing exclusively on inflation (but handling even that poorly) had a clearly 
destructive effect . Put another way, monetary policy elements or even systems which are 
not in line with the economic characteristics of the country and which are mostly 
imported are neither appropriate nor effective .
International experience shows that excessive intervention to improve the processes 
of the national economy adversely affects the direction of monetary development when 
central banks may almost convince themselves that the reasonable operations of 
commercial banks can reasonably be sacrificed on the altar of firm demand management 
(Huszti,  1996, p .  53) . This theorem may be true for the refinancing activity of central 
banks . After the crisis of  2007–2008, central banks also played a role in the recovery of 
the economies . This is particularly true of the Hungarian central banking practice after 
 2013 .  If a  central bank, however, also adopts an almost passive fiscal policy in 
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reorganising the economy and then steering it towards the path of competitiveness (and 
exerts a substitution effect instead of an auxiliary one), serious problems could occur .
Hungary’s fiscal policy was successful between  2010  and  2013 .  Income tax 
decreased by  20–21 per cent, corporate tax was basically halved, the aspects of sharing 
public burdens also prevailed more strongly; therefore, Hungary was characterised by 
simultaneous financial stability and economic growth until the pandemic crisis of 
 2020 . After  2013, however, the reduction of income type taxes came to a halt, and the 
primary objectives of the Ministry of Finance did not include exerting economic control 
to pursue an intensive growth path and the improvement of the economies of scale of 
the SME sector, but instead the maintenance of the financial equilibrium attained 
earlier, while the MNB pursued a  refinancing policy which also endured during the 
spring and autumn waves of the pandemic . Ultimately, it can be concluded that the 
hyperactivity of the Central Bank has become a kind of counterbalance to a slowdown 
in fiscal practice .
The unimplemented fiscal and SME sector reforms are being seen in a lower added 
value of products manufactured and services provided in Hungary, especially by the 
corporate sector, which has failed to achieve economies of scale in the past three decades 
and, in particular, in the dynamic economic context of the decade preceding the 
pandemic crisis . Seventy per cent of the employees of the market sector are in the SME 
sector, which has a   40–45 per cent share of the GDP, but receives only  30 per cent of 
the investments in the national economy . This on its own suggests a deficit of efficiency, 
in particular in domestically owned enterprises, only a  small number of which are 
capable of producing an exportable commodity base and which cannot even implement 
a  rise in the statutory minimum wage without support from the state . Of some 
 756 thousand employers,  710 thousand have fewer than  10 employees . In Hungary, the 
productivity of micro-enterprises is  20 per cent, that of small enterprises is  35 per cent 
and of medium-sized enterprises is about  40 per cent that of the large (mostly multina-
tional) company sector . This is by far the worst worldwide, even in comparison with 
neighbouring countries . Evidently, corporate structures and sizes have not developed 
which would enable more efficient production . Meanwhile, significant investment 
resources are being received and expected from the Reconstruction Fund; furthermore, 
Hungary is also awaiting considerable investment loans from China and Russia .7 The 
problems are compounded by a  budget deficit planned by the Ministry of Finance at 
a level well above that stipulated by the Maastricht Fiscal Criterion of  3 percent, which 
produces significant further solvent excess demand in the economy, which may entail 
rampant inflation . Preserving the stability of the value of incomes earned by companies 
and the population has become a  primary task in Hungary, and the responsibility for 
moderating inflation specifically belongs to the MNB . Consequently, the MNB has 
been forced to moderate the refinancing role it assumed in the previous decade and in 
7 The annual normative support from the EU amounts to  2.7 per cent of  the GDP (HUF1,500 billion), 
HUF3,390 billion is expected from the Reconstruction Fund, the planned Chinese and Russian loans give a total of  
HUF4,000 billion, and beyond that, the Ministry of  Finance calculates a deficit of   5.9 per cent for  2021 after the 
downturn and the deficit of   5.1 per cent in  2020. To illustrate the overheating economy and the multiplier effect of  
investments, cf. Hungary’s annual GDP is approximately HUF50,000 billion.
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the first year of the pandemic crisis since the refinancing resources of the MNB, resulting 
in newer investments, would further increase inflation in the economy, and – it should 
be added – most of these investments would be directed at a still uncompetitive SME 
sector which has become reliant on subsidies .
A new situation has also arisen in the world at large; therefore, a central banking 
policy returning to an emphasis on the control of inflation again is not unique . More 
sophisticated cooperation between fiscal and monetary policies has become more 
important, which orients central banks that had earlier excelled at refinancing towards 
holding back macroeconomic and social stimuli .8 Meanwhile, after earlier fiscal and 
monetary turnarounds, the MNB is turning even more towards the development of 
a knowledge- and capital-intensive economy,9 since Hungary, despite the fact that it has 
achieved the most successful ten years of the past one hundred years in the past decade, 
has had relatively poor results in the catching-up competition among the new states of 
the European Union (see Table  1) .
Table  1 .
Per capita GDP measured at purchasing power parity as a percentage of the EU28
Name of country 2010 2019 Extent of improvement (catching-up)
Estonia  65 .3 83 .3 18%
Latvia  52 .9  68 .6 15 .7%
Lithuania  60 .3 83 .0 22 .7%
Hungary  65 .1 72 .7 7 .6%
Poland  62 .4 72 .4 10%
Romania 50 .9 69 .2 18 .3%
Slovakia  69 .7 75 5 .3%
Source: Eurostat . MNB –  2020 (euro data as a percentage of the GDP) .
The circumstances which have evolved by the end of  2021 justify an adjustment to the 
path of the MNB in its fiscal policy, with less emphasis on an intensive growth path, the 
first signs of which have been manifested in the increase of the base rate, and, as a result, 
the improvement of the exchange rate, the moderation of the inflationary spiral, and 
a  stronger orientation towards environmental aspects, in that the MNB has received 
a sustainability mandate as its fourth mandate from the National Assembly of Hungary .
8 On the new, prominent responsibility of  central banking policies see Borio and Disyatat,  2021.
9 For details of  the opportunities of  the Hungarian economy embedded in an international context see Matolcsy, 
 2020.
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